From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932236AbeDWRij (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Apr 2018 13:38:39 -0400 Received: from gateway22.websitewelcome.com ([192.185.47.144]:46838 "EHLO gateway22.websitewelcome.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932189AbeDWRiV (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Apr 2018 13:38:21 -0400 X-Authority-Reason: nr=8 Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 12:38:19 -0500 From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" To: Mauro Carvalho Chehab , linux-media@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , Dan Carpenter Cc: Kyungmin Park , Sylwester Nawrocki , Kukjin Kim , Krzysztof Kozlowski , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 02/11] exynos4-is: mipi-csis: fix potential Spectre variant 1 Message-ID: <1d1128bd1e8fd3309ff8e615a06346724281e5b4.1524499368.git.gustavo@embeddedor.com> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - gator4166.hostgator.com X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - vger.kernel.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - embeddedor.com X-BWhitelist: no X-Source-IP: 189.145.48.65 X-Source-L: No X-Exim-ID: 1fAfPw-004Lq4-AE X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: X-Source-Sender: (embeddedor) [189.145.48.65]:49544 X-Source-Auth: gustavo@embeddedor.com X-Email-Count: 23 X-Source-Cap: Z3V6aWRpbmU7Z3V6aWRpbmU7Z2F0b3I0MTY2Lmhvc3RnYXRvci5jb20= X-Local-Domain: yes Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org code->index can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. Smatch warning: drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c:549 s5pcsis_enum_mbus_code() warn: potential spectre issue 's5pcsis_formats' Fix this by sanitizing code->index before using it to index s5pcsis_formats. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva --- drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c index cba46a6..60104c1 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ #include "mipi-csis.h" +#include + static int debug; module_param(debug, int, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Debug level (0-2)"); @@ -545,7 +547,8 @@ static int s5pcsis_enum_mbus_code(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, { if (code->index >= ARRAY_SIZE(s5pcsis_formats)) return -EINVAL; - + code->index = array_index_nospec(code->index, + ARRAY_SIZE(s5pcsis_formats)); code->code = s5pcsis_formats[code->index].code; return 0; } -- 2.7.4 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: gustavo@embeddedor.com (Gustavo A. R. Silva) Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 12:38:19 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 02/11] exynos4-is: mipi-csis: fix potential Spectre variant 1 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1d1128bd1e8fd3309ff8e615a06346724281e5b4.1524499368.git.gustavo@embeddedor.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org code->index can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. Smatch warning: drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c:549 s5pcsis_enum_mbus_code() warn: potential spectre issue 's5pcsis_formats' Fix this by sanitizing code->index before using it to index s5pcsis_formats. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva --- drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c index cba46a6..60104c1 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ #include "mipi-csis.h" +#include + static int debug; module_param(debug, int, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Debug level (0-2)"); @@ -545,7 +547,8 @@ static int s5pcsis_enum_mbus_code(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, { if (code->index >= ARRAY_SIZE(s5pcsis_formats)) return -EINVAL; - + code->index = array_index_nospec(code->index, + ARRAY_SIZE(s5pcsis_formats)); code->code = s5pcsis_formats[code->index].code; return 0; } -- 2.7.4