From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Theodore Tso Subject: Re: [PATCH] Allow aliases to expand to shell commands Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2007 22:56:24 -0500 Message-ID: <20070212035613.GA18010@thunk.org> References: <20070209014852.GA13207@thunk.org> <1171123504783-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu> <11711235041527-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu> <11711235042388-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu> <20070210181357.GE25607@thunk.org> <20070211001346.GA19656@thunk.org> <20070211162136.GA26461@thunk.org> <7vy7n4cqti.fsf@assigned-by-dhcp.cox.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Johannes Schindelin , git@vger.kernel.org To: Junio C Hamano X-From: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Mon Feb 12 07:39:23 2007 Return-path: Envelope-to: gcvg-git@gmane.org Received: from vger.kernel.org ([209.132.176.167]) by lo.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.50) id 1HGUqQ-0003Wh-9f for gcvg-git@gmane.org; Mon, 12 Feb 2007 07:39:22 +0100 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933032AbXBLGjL (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Feb 2007 01:39:11 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S933037AbXBLGjL (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Feb 2007 01:39:11 -0500 Received: from thunk.org ([69.25.196.29]:35541 "EHLO thunker.thunk.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933032AbXBLGjK (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Feb 2007 01:39:10 -0500 Received: from root (helo=candygram.thunk.org) by thunker.thunk.org with local-esmtps (tls_cipher TLS-1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA:32) (Exim 4.50 #1 (Debian)) id 1HGUvK-0000hf-6S; Mon, 12 Feb 2007 01:44:26 -0500 Received: from tytso by candygram.thunk.org with local (Exim 4.62) (envelope-from ) id 1HGSIi-00023J-2N; Sun, 11 Feb 2007 22:56:25 -0500 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <7vy7n4cqti.fsf@assigned-by-dhcp.cox.net> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.12-2006-07-14 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: tytso@thunk.org X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on thunker.thunk.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org Archived-At: On Sun, Feb 11, 2007 at 01:44:25PM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote: > Theodore Tso writes: > > > ..., I think we're > > still safe, since aliases can't override commands. > > I feel a bit uneasy to hear safety argument based on that > current restriction, since we might want to loosen it later. Loosen which restriction? 1) The ability for aliases to shadow existing git commands? 2) The ability for untrusted users to make arbitrary changes to the config file? 3) The ability for untrusted users to execute arbitrary git commands via git-shell? You hjave to loosen at least 2 of the 3 current restrictions before the ability to execute shell commands out of aliases becomes a problem --- and I would argue that either (2) or (3) are things that we would be insane to loosen at least to the point of allowing untrusted users to make arbitrary changes to the config or execute arbitrary git commands, since even today, they could do a huge amount of damage already. - Ted