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Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 01:57:42 -0700
From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
       Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
       Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
       Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/3a] ptrace: add _ptrace_may_access()
Message-ID: <20090507085742.GB3036@sequoia.sous-sol.org>
References: <20090505224729.GA965@redhat.com> <20090506080050.GF17457@elte.hu> <20090506235349.GC3756@redhat.com> <20090507002133.02D05FC39E@magilla.sf.frob.com> <20090507063606.GA15220@redhat.com> <20090507082027.GD12285@elte.hu> <20090507083102.GA20125@redhat.com> <20090507083851.GA19133@elte.hu>
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* Ingo Molnar (mingo@elte.hu) wrote:
> * Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Agreed, but what about security_operations->ptrace_may_access ?
> > It has the same (bad) name, but returns the error code or 0 on 
> > success.
> 
> Bad code should generally be fixed, or in exceptional circumstances 
> it can tolerated if it's pre-existing bad code, but it should never 
> be propagated. It has not spread _that_ widely yet, and is isolated 
> to the security subsystem:

And the security hooks tend to all follow the 0 success -ve ERR on error.