From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754164Ab0IFM7k (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Sep 2010 08:59:40 -0400 Received: from mx2.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.151.9]:54177 "EHLO mx2.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751396Ab0IFM7j (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Sep 2010 08:59:39 -0400 Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2010 14:59:05 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Avi Kivity , Pekka Enberg Cc: Tom Zanussi , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Fr=E9d=E9ric?= Weisbecker , Steven Rostedt , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Peter Zijlstra , linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel Subject: Re: disabling group leader perf_event Message-ID: <20100906125905.GA25414@elte.hu> References: <4C84B088.5050003@redhat.com> <1283772256.1930.303.camel@laptop> <4C84D1CE.3070205@redhat.com> <1283774045.1930.341.camel@laptop> <4C84D77B.6040600@redhat.com> <20100906124330.GA22314@elte.hu> <4C84E265.1020402@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4C84E265.1020402@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-08-17) X-ELTE-SpamScore: -1.1 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-1.1 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_05 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.2.5 -1.1 BAYES_05 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 1 to 5% [score: 0.0280] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org * Avi Kivity wrote: > On 09/06/2010 03:43 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > > Yes. The filter engine is a safe, in-kernel interpreted language in > > the making. The C syntax was chosen because it's close to the heart > > of every kernel developer. > > > > It might make sense to bring this concept a few steps further. Looks > > rather complex but also rather cool ... > > Is this a roundabout way of saying "jit"? Partly. I'm not sure we want to actually upload programs in bytecode form. ASCII is just fine - just like a .gz Javascript is fine for web apps. (and in most cases compresses down better than the bytecode equivalent) So a clear language (the simpler initially the better) plus an in-kernel compiler. This could be used for far more than just instrumentation: IMO security policies could be expressed in such a way. (Simplified, they are quite similar to filters installed on syscall entry/exit, with the ability of the filter to influence whether the syscall is performed.) > If so, I'm all for it. I could use one myself. Good ;-) Thanks, Ingo