From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757986Ab1FPNeN (ORCPT ); Thu, 16 Jun 2011 09:34:13 -0400 Received: from mail-fx0-f46.google.com ([209.85.161.46]:57062 "EHLO mail-fx0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752045Ab1FPNeF (ORCPT ); Thu, 16 Jun 2011 09:34:05 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=sender:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; b=r96GEErs7X4LUYzPap/XqectARcaKMHdSBj+N5A5LHvOAEGZ6VTDPxXNvceuKGf3/U 7xo1I121lIvueLfvjejlGg0rauk2bLq4fqgTG1b6al7jBFe6yZyVUR7jC9peuGcc+Pxe x7MoZxEmU8giqC/6BN8A7W8i1EAvAq0ysmxhQ= Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2011 17:33:59 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov To: Arnd Bergmann Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Andrew Morton , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "David S. Miller" Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options Message-ID: <20110616133359.GA12564@albatros> References: <1308163895-5963-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com> <201106161050.27716.arnd@arndb.de> <20110616085842.GB3215@albatros> <201106161340.16117.arnd@arndb.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <201106161340.16117.arnd@arndb.de> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Arnd, On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 13:40 +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > E.g. if all the sensitive information > you are hiding in procfs is still available through netlink, your patch > is pointless. Ah, I've complitely missed this piece of a puzzle! :( With procfs, proc connector and taskstats (probably, something else) should be restricted too. Thank you very much for this notice! -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Sender: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2011 17:33:59 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov Message-ID: <20110616133359.GA12564@albatros> References: <1308163895-5963-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com> <201106161050.27716.arnd@arndb.de> <20110616085842.GB3215@albatros> <201106161340.16117.arnd@arndb.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <201106161340.16117.arnd@arndb.de> Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options To: Arnd Bergmann Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Andrew Morton , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "David S. Miller" List-ID: Arnd, On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 13:40 +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > E.g. if all the sensitive information > you are hiding in procfs is still available through netlink, your patch > is pointless. Ah, I've complitely missed this piece of a puzzle! :( With procfs, proc connector and taskstats (probably, something else) should be restricted too. Thank you very much for this notice! -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments