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From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>,
	"Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>,
	Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert.xu@redhat.com>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: add blocking facility to urandom
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2011 07:48:27 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201109080748.27750.sgrubb@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110908084420.GC4032@infradead.org>

On Thursday, September 08, 2011 04:44:20 AM Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07, 2011 at 11:27:12PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > And exactly that is the concern from organizations like BSI. Their
> > cryptographer's concern is that due to the volume of data that you can
> > extract from /dev/urandom, you may find cycles or patterns that increase
> > the probability to guess the next random value compared to brute force
> > attack. Note, it is all about probabilities.
> 
> So don't use /dev/urandom if you don't like the behaviour.  Breaking all
> existing application because of a certification is simply not an option.

This patch does not _break_ all existing applications. If a system were under attack, 
they might pause momentarily, but they do not break. Please, try the patch and use a 
nice large number like 2000000 and see for yourself. Right now, everyone arguing about 
this breaking things have not tried it to see if in fact things do break and how they 
break if they do.

-Steve

  reply	other threads:[~2011-09-08 11:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-09-02 14:37 [PATCH] random: add blocking facility to urandom Jarod Wilson
2011-09-05  2:36 ` Sandy Harris
2011-09-06 14:09   ` Stephan Mueller
2011-09-07 17:38 ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-07 18:12   ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 18:26     ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-07 19:05       ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 19:30         ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-07 20:00           ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 19:35         ` Neil Horman
2011-09-07 19:27       ` Ted Ts'o
2011-09-07 19:36         ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-07 19:36           ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-08  2:43           ` Sandy Harris
2011-09-07 19:49         ` David Miller
2011-09-07 20:02         ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-07 20:23           ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 20:30             ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-07 20:37               ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 20:56                 ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-07 21:10                   ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 21:28                     ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-07 21:38                       ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 21:35                     ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-07 21:43                       ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-07 22:46                         ` Sven-Haegar Koch
2011-09-08  7:21                         ` Sasha Levin
2011-09-07 23:57                   ` Neil Horman
2011-09-08  6:41                     ` Tomas Mraz
2011-09-08 12:52                       ` Neil Horman
2011-09-08 13:11                         ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-08 13:49                           ` Neil Horman
2011-09-09  2:21                           ` Sandy Harris
2011-09-09 13:04                             ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-09 16:25                               ` Ted Ts'o
2011-09-09 21:27                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2011-09-12 13:56                                 ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-13 10:58                                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-09-13 12:18                                     ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-11  2:05                             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-12 13:55                               ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-12 16:58                                 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-12 18:26                                   ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-07 20:33           ` Neil Horman
2011-09-07 20:48             ` Steve Grubb
2011-09-07 21:18           ` Ted Ts'o
2011-09-07 21:27             ` Stephan Mueller
2011-09-07 21:27               ` Stephan Mueller
2011-09-07 21:38               ` Ted Ts'o
2011-09-08  8:44               ` Christoph Hellwig
2011-09-08 11:48                 ` Steve Grubb [this message]
2011-09-08 16:13                   ` David Miller
2011-09-09 19:08                     ` Eric Paris
2011-09-09 19:12                       ` Neil Horman
2011-09-08  8:42             ` Christoph Hellwig
2011-09-08  8:42               ` Christoph Hellwig
2011-09-07 21:20           ` Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
2011-09-08  8:41           ` Christoph Hellwig
2011-09-12 14:02         ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-12 14:02           ` Jarod Wilson
2011-09-12 14:58           ` Neil Horman
2011-09-12 17:06           ` Mark Brown

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