From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755210Ab3FDXGb (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:06:31 -0400 Received: from 1wt.eu ([62.212.114.60]:35590 "EHLO 1wt.eu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753120Ab3FDWmw (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Jun 2013 18:42:52 -0400 Message-Id: <20130604172137.140310447@1wt.eu> User-Agent: quilt/0.48-1 Date: Tue, 04 Jun 2013 19:24:15 +0200 From: Willy Tarreau To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Daniel Borkmann , Vlad Yasevich , "David S. Miller" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Willy Tarreau Subject: [ 165/184] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key In-Reply-To: <58df134a4b98edf5b0073e2e1e988fe6@local> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ data From: Daniel Borkmann [ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ] On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index 905fda5..ca48660 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk); -- 1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty