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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, aravind.gopalakrishnan@amd.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, bp@suse.de, hpa@linux.intel.com,
	linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [tip:x86/urgent] x86, cpu, amd: Add workaround for family 16h, erratum 793
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 07:28:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140115062817.GA11869@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <52D5DC51.9010606@zytor.com>


* H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:

> On 01/14/2014 04:45 PM, tip-bot for Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > +		rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val);
> > +		if (!(val & BIT(15)))
> > +			wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val | BIT(15));
> 
> Incidentally, I'm wondering if we shouldn't have a
> set_in_msr()/clear_in_msr() set of functions which would incorporate the
> above construct:
> 
> void set_in_msr(u32 msr, u64 mask)
> {
> 	u64 old, new;
> 
> 	old = rdmsrl(msr);
> 	new = old | mask;
> 	if (old != new)
> 		wrmsrl(msr, new);
> }
> 
> ... and the obvious equivalent for clear_in_msr().
> 
> The perhaps only question is if it should be "set/clear_bit_in_msr()"
> rather than having to haul a full 64-bit mask in the common case.

I'd suggest the introduction of a standard set of methods operating on 
MSRs:

	msr_read()
	msr_write()
	msr_set_bit()
	msr_clear_bit()
	msr_set_mask()
	msr_clear_mask()

etc.

msr_read() would essentially map to rdmsr_safe(). Each method has a 
return value that can be checked for failure.

Note that the naming of 'msr_set_bit()' and 'msr_clear_bit()' mirrors 
that of bitops, and set_mask/clear_mask is named along a similar 
pattern, so that it's more immediately obvious what's going on.

With such methods in place we could use them in most new code, and 
would use 'raw, unsafe' rdmsr()/wrmsr() only in very specific, 
justified cases.

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2014-01-15  6:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-01-14 11:41 AMD errata 793 (CVE-2013-6885) needs a workaround in Linux? Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2014-01-14 11:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-14 15:14   ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-14 15:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-14 16:27       ` [PATCH] x86, CPU, AMD: Add workaround for family 16h, erratum 793 Borislav Petkov
2014-01-14 16:30         ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-14 16:42           ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-14 17:46             ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-14 23:07               ` [PATCH -v1.1] " Borislav Petkov
2014-01-15  0:38                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-15 11:10                   ` [PATCH -v1.2] " Borislav Petkov
2014-01-15  0:45                 ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86, cpu, amd: " tip-bot for Borislav Petkov
2014-01-15  0:54                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-15  6:28                     ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2014-01-15 13:36                       ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-15 13:52                         ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-15 18:38                           ` Ingo Molnar
2014-01-16  4:11                             ` H. Peter Anvin
     [not found]         ` <52D59ACC.3090100@amd.com>
2014-01-14 20:38           ` [PATCH] x86, CPU, AMD: " Borislav Petkov
2014-01-16 17:58             ` Aravind Gopalakrishnan
2014-01-16 18:10               ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-17  0:21               ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2014-01-17  0:25                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-17 10:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-17 16:23                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-17 17:02                     ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-17 17:36                       ` Aravind Gopalakrishnan
2014-01-17 17:42                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-17 18:05                         ` Aravind Gopalakrishnan
2014-01-17 18:25                           ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-17 22:28         ` Pavel Machek
2014-01-17 22:50           ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-17 22:51             ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-17 22:57               ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-18  0:29               ` Pavel Machek
2014-01-18  1:21                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-01-18  2:01                   ` Pavel Machek
2014-01-18 10:42                     ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-18 11:08                       ` Pavel Machek
2014-01-18 11:26                         ` Borislav Petkov
2014-01-18 11:31                           ` Pavel Machek

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