From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753932AbaCMKNr (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Mar 2014 06:13:47 -0400 Received: from lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk ([81.2.110.251]:34747 "EHLO lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753863AbaCMKNE (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Mar 2014 06:13:04 -0400 Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 10:12:35 +0000 From: One Thousand Gnomes To: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook , Andrew Morton , "jwboyer@fedoraproject.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "hpa@zytor.com" , Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Message-ID: <20140313101235.753c3ec0@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk> In-Reply-To: References: <1393445473-15068-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> <1394686919.25122.2.camel@x230> Organization: Intel Corporation X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.8.1 (GTK+ 2.24.20; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 13 Mar 2014 20:33:06 +1100 (EST) James Morris wrote: > On Wed, 12 Mar 2014, Kees Cook wrote: > > > On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 10:01 PM, Matthew Garrett > > wrote: > > > On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 14:03 +1100, James Morris wrote: > > > > > >> Ok, which tree should take this? I'm happy to, although most of it is > > >> outside security/ . > > > > > > Should I be looking for someone else to take them instead? :) > > > > Andrew, is this series[1] something you'd be okay taking? It touches > > many different areas, so you might be best for it. > > I'll take it, but there's unanswered review feedback (your response to the > first question), and Alan raised some doubts about the patches which I'm > not sure have been resolved. I have a series of doubts about their completeness which didn't get any answer at all, and one on the misleading use of the term "secure" as opposed to "measured" 8) I don't think it's reasonable to have a policy of refusing them until they cover all cases. It's not like it can be dropped into staging and refined. So other than the usual moan about people naming things "security" being like putting "i-" and "e-" on the front of stuff to make it sound cool when it isn't what it says I'm fine 8) I would prefer it did the revocation of CAP_SYS_RAWIO or at least documented the absolute requirement. Alan From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: One Thousand Gnomes Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 10:12:35 +0000 Message-ID: <20140313101235.753c3ec0@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk> References: <1393445473-15068-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> <1394686919.25122.2.camel@x230> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook , Andrew Morton , "jwboyer@fedoraproject.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "hpa@zytor.com" , Matthew Garrett List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 13 Mar 2014 20:33:06 +1100 (EST) James Morris wrote: > On Wed, 12 Mar 2014, Kees Cook wrote: > > > On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 10:01 PM, Matthew Garrett > > wrote: > > > On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 14:03 +1100, James Morris wrote: > > > > > >> Ok, which tree should take this? I'm happy to, although most of it is > > >> outside security/ . > > > > > > Should I be looking for someone else to take them instead? :) > > > > Andrew, is this series[1] something you'd be okay taking? It touches > > many different areas, so you might be best for it. > > I'll take it, but there's unanswered review feedback (your response to the > first question), and Alan raised some doubts about the patches which I'm > not sure have been resolved. I have a series of doubts about their completeness which didn't get any answer at all, and one on the misleading use of the term "secure" as opposed to "measured" 8) I don't think it's reasonable to have a policy of refusing them until they cover all cases. It's not like it can be dropped into staging and refined. So other than the usual moan about people naming things "security" being like putting "i-" and "e-" on the front of stuff to make it sound cool when it isn't what it says I'm fine 8) I would prefer it did the revocation of CAP_SYS_RAWIO or at least documented the absolute requirement. Alan