From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Subject: Re: [PATCH] misc/xenmicrocode: Upload /lib/firmware/ to the hypervisor Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 15:12:46 -0500 Message-ID: <20150129201245.GD22967@konrad-lan.dumpdata.com> References: <1422389461-19333-1-git-send-email-mcgrof@do-not-panic.com> <54C81078.3070404@citrix.com> <20150127231731.GC3163@pd.tnic> <54C82903.60405@citrix.com> <20150128083924.GA6360@pd.tnic> <1422531409.591726.220430733.6DE9E92B@webmail.messagingengine.com> <20150129121707.GC25399@pd.tnic> <1422550882.704707.220505145.0B3B9942@webmail.messagingengine.com> <20150129173041.GD25399@pd.tnic> <54CA7D2F.4020309@citrix.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Received: from mail6.bemta3.messagelabs.com ([195.245.230.39]) by lists.xen.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1YGvSl-0007PI-03 for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Thu, 29 Jan 2015 20:13:15 +0000 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <54CA7D2F.4020309@citrix.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Andrew Cooper Cc: Juergen Gross , Michal Marek , Jason Douglas , stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com, Takashi Iwai , mcgrof@suse.com, "Luis R. Rodriguez" , Henrique de Moraes Holschuh , david.vrabel@citrix.com, Jan Beulich , xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, Borislav Petkov , Olaf Hering List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 06:34:23PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > Getting this conversation back on topic. > > The current state of play in Xen is this: > > * Boot time microcode loading exists (by scanning uncompressed cpio > multiboot modules) and should be safe to use. Please note that it does require passing in 'ucode=scan' on the Xen command line and does not do it automatically. It would be nice if that was automatic.. > > * The facility for runtime microcode loading exists (via privileged > hypercall), but is unsafe to use at present, especially if virtual > machines are running. There are several steps which can be taken to > make it safer to use. > > > There is a plausible usecase for runtime microcode loading for people > who wish to take that risk, and as such, xenmicrocode is useful utility > to have, but it should probably not be available by default until we > believe the hypervisor side of the interface avoids the known potholes. Aren't these issues the same if we had an runtime microcode implementation (I am referring to the xen-microcode driver that Jeremy wrote once and some distros have in their kernel). The loading of microcode is done the same was as baremetal via 'rescan' interface. > > ~Andrew > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@lists.xen.org > http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel