From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Wei Liu Subject: Re: Upstream QEMU based stubdom and rump kernel Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 14:57:56 +0000 Message-ID: <20150317145756.GE27314@zion.uk.xensource.com> References: <20150317142907.GD27314@zion.uk.xensource.com> <1426604049.18247.260.camel@citrix.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1426604049.18247.260.camel@citrix.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Ian Campbell Cc: Wei Liu , Stefano Stabellini , Ian Jackson , xen-devel@lists.xen.org, rumpkernel-users@freelists.org, Anthony PERARD List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 02:54:09PM +0000, Ian Campbell wrote: > On Tue, 2015-03-17 at 14:29 +0000, Wei Liu wrote: > > 2. The ability to access files in Dom0. That will be used to write to / > > read from QEMU state file. > > This requirement is not as broad as you make it sound. > Yes. You're right. > All which is really required is the ability to slurp in or write out a > blob of bytes to a service running in a control domain, not actual This is more accurate. > ability to read/write files in dom0 (which would need careful security > consideration!). > > For the old qemu-traditional stubdom for example this is implemented as > a pair of console devices (one r/o for restore + one w/o for save) which > are setup by the toolstack at start of day and pre-plumbed into two > temporary files. > Unfortunately I don't think that hack in mini-os is upstreamable in rump kernel. Wei. > Ian.