From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 19:02:24 +0000 From: Jason Cooper Message-ID: <20151109190224.GD20491@io.lakedaemon.net> References: <20151106235545.97d0e86a5f1f80c98e0e9de6@gmail.com> <563F4A78.21151.23C6852D@pageexec.freemail.hu> <5640E0DD.6040107@labbott.name> <20151109182832.GB20491@io.lakedaemon.net> <13041.1447095477@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <13041.1447095477@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Proposal for kernel self protection features To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Emese Revfy , Kees Cook , PaX Team , Brad Spengler , Greg KH , Theodore Tso , Josh Triplett List-ID: Hey Valdis, On Mon, Nov 09, 2015 at 01:57:57PM -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote: > On Mon, 09 Nov 2015 18:28:32 +0000, Jason Cooper said: > > I had a proposal a while back (can't find atm, sorry) to have the > > bootloader load the random-seed into RAM ... > > It's *easy* to come up with an API to hand the kernel 64 or 128 bits of > random to kick things off. > > The *hard* part is finding 64 or so bits of trustable random to hand to > the kernel.... /var/lib/misc/random-seed has served that role for years, I'm only advocating loading it earlier in the boot process. It's *much* harder to guess the state of random-seed than the dtb or mac address(es)... thx, Jason.