From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 21:13:41 +0000 From: Matthew Garrett Message-ID: <20151109211341.GA29829@srcf.ucam.org> References: <20151106235545.97d0e86a5f1f80c98e0e9de6@gmail.com> <563F4A78.21151.23C6852D@pageexec.freemail.hu> <5640E0DD.6040107@labbott.name> <20151109182832.GB20491@io.lakedaemon.net> <13041.1447095477@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <20151109190224.GD20491@io.lakedaemon.net> <20151109210922.GF20491@io.lakedaemon.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20151109210922.GF20491@io.lakedaemon.net> Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Proposal for kernel self protection features To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Theodore Tso , Emese Revfy , Kees Cook , PaX Team , Brad Spengler , Greg KH , Josh Triplett List-ID: On Mon, Nov 09, 2015 at 09:09:22PM +0000, Jason Cooper wrote: > Well, That's why I referred to reading from /boot or from a flash > partition. Existing bootloaders in the field already have that > capability. That's how they load the kernel. This doesn't really handle cases like network booting. Most SoCs have some kind of RNG, recent x86 has hardware RNG, older x86 frequently has an RNG in a TPM. Pulling an entropy seed from the filesystem is a reasonable fallback, but we should definitely be thinking of it as a fallback - someone with physical access to your system while it's turned off may be able to infer the ASLR state for your next boot, for instance. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org