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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	xen-devel <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails without !panic_on_oops
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 21:18:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160314201826.GQ6344__24387.7097768292$1457986841$gmane$org@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrV16vh5U0TRzdroSTBR_QHDX1C78t0DDW9qtKjOmV+2sQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 11:10:16AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> A couple of the wrmsr users actually care about performance.  These
> are the ones involved in context switching and, to a lesser extent, in
> switching in and out of guest mode.

Right, this very much includes a number of perf MSRs. Some of those get
called from the context switch path, others from the NMI handler.

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-03-14 20:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-12 18:08 [PATCH v4 0/5] [PATCH v3 0/5] Improve non-"safe" MSR access failure handling Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] x86/paravirt: Add _safe to the read_msr and write_msr PV hooks Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-03-14 17:07     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 17:07     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-03-12 18:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails without !panic_on_oops Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 12:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-03-14 12:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-03-14 17:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 17:11       ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 17:17         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 18:04           ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 18:10             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 18:15               ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 18:15               ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 18:24                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 18:24                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 18:40                   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 18:48                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-15 10:22                       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-15 10:26                         ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-15 10:26                         ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-15 10:22                       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-14 18:48                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 18:40                   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 20:18               ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2016-03-14 20:18               ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-03-14 18:10             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 18:10             ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 18:10             ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-15 10:21             ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-15 10:21             ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-14 18:04           ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-14 17:17         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 17:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/paravirt: Add paravirt_{read,write}_msr Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/paravirt: Add paravirt_{read, write}_msr Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/paravirt: Make "unsafe" MSR accesses unsafe even if PARAVIRT=y Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/msr: Set the return value to zero when native_rdmsr_safe fails Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-12 18:08   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-14 14:32 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 0/5] [PATCH v3 0/5] Improve non-"safe" MSR access failure handling Boris Ostrovsky
2016-03-14 14:32 ` Boris Ostrovsky

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