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Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2016 23:17:44 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
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        Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions
Message-ID: <20160429201744.GD27821@intel.com>
References: <1461605698-12385-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
 <20160426190009.GC8162@amd>
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On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 09:00:10PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Mon 2016-04-25 20:34:07, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by
> > applications to set aside private regions of code and data.  The code
> > outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory inside the
> > enclave by the CPU access control.
> > 
> > The firmware uses PRMRR registers to reserve an area of physical memory
> > called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). There is a hardware unit in the
> > processor called Memory Encryption Engine. The MEE encrypts and decrypts
> > the EPC pages as they enter and leave the processor package.
> 
> What are non-evil use cases for this?

I'm not sure what you mean by non-evil.

> 
> 									Pavel
> 
> -- 
> (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
> (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

/Jarkko