From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 20:52:21 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20160623185221.GA17983@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwHUw+6xEc-M+mZvwOxCsBD6zZDwyAQ-a_xupaH8py7cA@mail.gmail.com> On 06/23, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 10:03 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote: > > > > Let me quote my previous email ;) > > > > And we can't free/nullify it when the parent/debuger reaps a zombie, > > say, mark_oom_victim() expects that get_task_struct() protects > > thread_info as well. > > > > probably we can fix all such users though... > > TIF_MEMDIE is indeed a potential problem, but I don't think > mark_oom_victim() is actually problematic. > > mark_oom_victim() is called with either "current", This is no longer true in -mm tree. But I agree, this is fixable (and in fact I still hope TIF_MEMDIE will die, at least in its current form). But I am afraid we can have more users which assume that thread_info can't go away if you have a reference to task_struct. And yes, we have a users which rely on RCU, say show_state_filter() which walks the task under rcu_read_lock() and calls sched_show_task() which prints task_thread_info(p)->flags. Yes this is fixable too, but > so these days, thread_info has almost nothing really critical in it > any more. There's the thread-local flags, yes, but they could stay or > easily be moved to the task_struct or get similar per-cpu fixup as > preempt_count did a couple of years ago. The only annoyance is the few > remaining entry code assembly sequences, but I suspect they would > actually become simpler with a per-cpu thing, and with Andy's cleanups > they are pretty insignificant these days. There seems to be exactly > two uses of ASM_THREAD_INFO(TI_flags,.. left. So perhaps on x86_64 we should move thread_info from thread_union to task_struct->thread as Andy suggests. And just in case, even if we move thread_info, of course we will need to change dump_trace/etc which reads ->stack. Again, show_state_filter() relies on RCU, proc_pid_stack() on get_task_struct(). They need to pin task->stack somehow, but this is clear. Oleg.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 20:52:21 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20160623185221.GA17983@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwHUw+6xEc-M+mZvwOxCsBD6zZDwyAQ-a_xupaH8py7cA@mail.gmail.com> On 06/23, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 10:03 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote: > > > > Let me quote my previous email ;) > > > > And we can't free/nullify it when the parent/debuger reaps a zombie, > > say, mark_oom_victim() expects that get_task_struct() protects > > thread_info as well. > > > > probably we can fix all such users though... > > TIF_MEMDIE is indeed a potential problem, but I don't think > mark_oom_victim() is actually problematic. > > mark_oom_victim() is called with either "current", This is no longer true in -mm tree. But I agree, this is fixable (and in fact I still hope TIF_MEMDIE will die, at least in its current form). But I am afraid we can have more users which assume that thread_info can't go away if you have a reference to task_struct. And yes, we have a users which rely on RCU, say show_state_filter() which walks the task under rcu_read_lock() and calls sched_show_task() which prints task_thread_info(p)->flags. Yes this is fixable too, but > so these days, thread_info has almost nothing really critical in it > any more. There's the thread-local flags, yes, but they could stay or > easily be moved to the task_struct or get similar per-cpu fixup as > preempt_count did a couple of years ago. The only annoyance is the few > remaining entry code assembly sequences, but I suspect they would > actually become simpler with a per-cpu thing, and with Andy's cleanups > they are pretty insignificant these days. There seems to be exactly > two uses of ASM_THREAD_INFO(TI_flags,.. left. So perhaps on x86_64 we should move thread_info from thread_union to task_struct->thread as Andy suggests. And just in case, even if we move thread_info, of course we will need to change dump_trace/etc which reads ->stack. Again, show_state_filter() relies on RCU, proc_pid_stack() on get_task_struct(). They need to pin task->stack somehow, but this is clear. Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-23 18:52 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 269+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-06-20 23:43 [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables() Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 9:53 ` Matt Fleming 2016-06-21 9:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Fleming 2016-06-21 9:53 ` Matt Fleming 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-21 9:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-22 7:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-21 9:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov 2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-22 7:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 7:30 ` Jann Horn 2016-06-21 7:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn 2016-06-21 7:30 ` Jann Horn 2016-06-21 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 16:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:13 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-21 17:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-06-21 17:13 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-21 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 18:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel 2016-06-21 18:32 ` Rik van Riel 2016-06-21 19:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 19:44 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 19:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 19:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 19:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-11 17:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrey Ryabinin 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 4:01 ` [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Linus Torvalds 2016-06-21 4:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-21 4:01 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-21 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 16:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:16 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-21 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-21 17:16 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-21 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 18:12 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-21 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-06-21 18:12 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-21 18:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel 2016-06-21 18:19 ` Rik van Riel 2016-06-23 1:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 1:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 1:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 6:02 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 6:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 6:02 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 14:31 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 14:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 14:31 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 16:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 16:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 16:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 17:10 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 17:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 17:10 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-09-06 16:19 ` Jann Horn 2016-09-06 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn 2016-09-06 16:19 ` Jann Horn 2016-09-06 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-06 16:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-06 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 17:03 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 17:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 17:03 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 17:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 17:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 17:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 17:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 18:00 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-23 18:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-06-23 18:00 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-23 18:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:12 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 18:12 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 18:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 18:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 19:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 18:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 18:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 19:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-23 19:13 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:13 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:17 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 19:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 19:17 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 6:17 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 6:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 6:17 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 12:25 ` Brian Gerst 2016-06-24 12:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Brian Gerst 2016-06-24 12:25 ` Brian Gerst 2016-06-24 17:21 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:21 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 18:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 17:51 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 17:51 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 18:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 20:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-24 20:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-24 20:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-24 20:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-24 20:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-24 20:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-24 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 20:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 21:06 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 21:06 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 21:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 21:32 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 21:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 21:32 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-24 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 21:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-24 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-25 2:41 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-25 2:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-25 2:41 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-25 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-25 23:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-25 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-25 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-25 23:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-25 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-26 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-26 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-26 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 18:52 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message] 2016-06-23 18:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-23 18:52 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-24 14:05 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-24 14:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-24 14:05 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-24 15:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-24 20:22 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-24 20:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-24 20:22 ` Oleg Nesterov 2016-06-27 10:36 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-27 10:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-27 10:36 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-23 19:11 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:11 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 19:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-06-23 19:46 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-23 19:46 ` Peter Zijlstra 2016-06-21 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 9:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 17:16 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-21 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-06-21 17:16 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-21 18:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel 2016-06-21 18:02 ` Rik van Riel 2016-06-21 18:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 19:47 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 19:47 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-06-21 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 20:18 ` Kees Cook 2016-06-21 20:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-06-21 20:18 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20160623185221.GA17983@redhat.com \ --to=oleg@redhat.com \ --cc=bp@alien8.de \ --cc=brgerst@gmail.com \ --cc=heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com \ --cc=jann@thejh.net \ --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \ --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=luto@amacapital.net \ --cc=luto@kernel.org \ --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \ --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.