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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dwalsh@redhat.com,
	dhowells@redhat.com, pmoore@redhat.com, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label()
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 17:09:21 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160705210921.GF17987@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7669deeb-12db-deeb-abd2-1743acf3721b@schaufler-ca.com>

On Tue, Jul 05, 2016 at 01:25:22PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/5/2016 8:50 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
> > current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
> > from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide
> > where to fetch security pointer from.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> >  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index c68223c..86a07ed 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -1785,13 +1785,13 @@ out:
> >  /*
> >   * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
> >   */
> > -static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
> > -					 const struct qstr *name,
> > -					 u16 tclass,
> > +static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const void *security,
> 
> You know the type. Why not use it?
> 
> 	static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,

Will change it. All callers use current_security() to fetch this pointer
and it returns void * and I guess I assumed that compiler will complain
but it does not seem to complain. 

Vivek

  reply	other threads:[~2016-07-05 21:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-05 15:50 [PATCH 0/5][RFC] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 1/5] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 16:53   ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 16:53     ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 17:43     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 17:20   ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 17:20     ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 19:36   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 20:42     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 20:33     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 21:44       ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-08  7:21         ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 12:45           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 13:42             ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 15:34               ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:35   ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:52     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 22:03       ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:22   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:15     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 21:34       ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-06 17:09         ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 17:50           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:01           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:22             ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:45   ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:53     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:09     ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 4/5] overlayfs: Correctly label newly created file over whiteout Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 5/5] overlayfs: Use vfs_getxattr_noperm() for real inode Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:29   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:16     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06  4:36       ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-06 10:54         ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 14:58           ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-07 18:35             ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08  7:06               ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 15:28                 ` Casey Schaufler

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