From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Vivek Goyal Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] overlayfs: Use vfs_getxattr_noperm() for real inode Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2016 06:54:08 -0400 Message-ID: <20160706105408.GB6550@redhat.com> References: <1467733854-6314-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> <1467733854-6314-6-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20160705211638.GH17987@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Casey Schaufler , Stephen Smalley , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org" , LSM , Daniel J Walsh , David Howells , pmoore@redhat.com, Al Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 06:36:49AM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > On Tue, Jul 5, 2016 at 11:16 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 05, 2016 at 01:29:39PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > >> On 7/5/2016 8:50 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote: > >> > ovl_getxattr() currently uses vfs_getxattr() on realinode. This fails > >> > if mounter does not have DAC/MAC permission to access getxattr. > >> > > >> > Specifically this becomes a problem when selinux is trying to initialize > >> > overlay inode and does ->getxattr(overlay_inode). A task might trigger > >> > initialization of overlay inode and we will access real inode xattr in the > >> > context of mounter and if mounter does not have permissions, then inode > >> > selinux context initialization fails and inode is labeled as unlabeled_t. > >> > > >> > One way to deal with it is to let SELinux do getxattr checks both on > >> > overlay inode and underlying inode and overlay can call vfs_getxattr_noperm() > >> > to make sure when selinux is trying to initialize label on inode, it does > >> > not go through checks on lower levels and initialization is successful. > >> > And after inode initialization, SELinux will make sure task has getatttr > >> > permission. > >> > > >> > One issue with this approach is that it does not work for directories as > >> > d_real() returns the overlay dentry for directories and not the underlying > >> > directory dentry. > >> > > >> > Another way to deal with it to introduce another function pointer in > >> > inode_operations, say getxattr_noperm(), which is responsible to get > >> > xattr without any checks. SELinux initialization code will call this > >> > first if it is available on inode. So user space code path will call > >> > ->getxattr() and that will go through checks and SELinux internal > >> > initialization will call ->getxattr_noperm() and that will not > >> > go through checks. > >> > > >> > For now, I am just converting ovl_getxattr() to get xattr without > >> > any checks on underlying inode. That means it is possible for > >> > a task to get xattr of a file/dir on lower/upper through overlay mount > >> > while it is not possible outside overlay mount. > >> > > >> > If this is a major concern, I can look into implementing getxattr_noperm(). > >> > >> This is a major concern. > > > > Hmm.., In that case I will write patch to provide another inode operation > > getxattr_noperm() and a wrapper which falls back to getxattr() if noperm > > variant is not defined. That should take care of this issue. > > That's not going to fly. A slighly better, but still quite ugly > solution would be to add a "flags" arg to the current ->getxattr() > callback indicating whether the caller wants permission checking > inside the call or not. > Ok, will try that. > But we already have the current->creds. Can't that be used to control > the permission checking done by the callback? Sorry, did not get how to use current->creds to control permission checking. Vivek