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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2016 17:55:23 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160804155523.GO6879@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1470325468.22643.95.camel@gmail.com>

On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 11:44:28AM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:

> This feature doesn't come from Android. The perf events subsystem in the
> mainline kernel is packed full of vulnerabilities too. 

Uhh, not so much. I spend a _lot_ of time a while back to get the core
and x86 solid. I could run the fuzzers for hours on end at some point.

> The problem is so bad that pointing one of the public fuzzers at it
> for a short period of time is all that's required to start finding
> them.

If you know of any that reproduce on x86 I'll go fix. For anything else
you need to complain elsewhere as I don't have hardware nor bandwidth.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-04 15:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-27 14:45 [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open Jeff Vander Stoep
2016-07-27 14:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jeff Vander Stoep
2016-07-27 20:43 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-27 20:43   ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02  9:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02  9:52   ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02 13:04   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-08-02 13:04     ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-08-02 13:10     ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 13:16   ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 19:04   ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 19:04     ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 20:30     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02 20:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02 20:51       ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 20:51         ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 21:06         ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-08-03  8:28         ` Ingo Molnar
2016-08-03  8:28           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-08-03 12:28           ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-03 12:53             ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-03 13:36             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 14:41         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 14:41           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 15:42           ` Schaufler, Casey
2016-08-03 15:42             ` Schaufler, Casey
2016-08-03 17:25         ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-03 17:25           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-03 18:53           ` Kees Cook
2016-08-03 18:53             ` Kees Cook
2016-08-03 21:44             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 21:44               ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04  2:50               ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04  2:50                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04  9:11                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04  9:11                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 15:13                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04 15:13                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04 15:37                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 15:37                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 19:36           ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 10:28             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 13:45               ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 14:11                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 15:44                   ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 15:55                     ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2016-08-04 16:10                     ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 16:32                       ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 17:09                         ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 17:36                           ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 21:16       ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-08-02 21:16         ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-10-17 13:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-17 14:54   ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-19  9:41     ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-19 15:16       ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-18 20:48   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-18 20:48     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-18 21:15     ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-19  9:56       ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-19 10:01       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-19 10:26         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-10-19 10:40           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-19 15:39           ` Daniel Micay

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