From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: RFC: "Hardened" trusted keys Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2016 22:05:47 +0300 Message-ID: <20160829190547.GA18827@intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: tpmdd-devel-bounces-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org To: keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org List-Id: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net After LSS2016 I got this idea of having hardened trusted keys for TPM2 where the key material is never exposed to kernel. Child keys of a hardened trusted key would be unsealed using TPM2_EncryptDecrypt operation. To retain backwards compatibility with the exiting trusted keys format, this would probably require a new option to keyctl. This is not my priority at the moment but just wanted to mirror does this sound like a grazy idea? /Jarkko ------------------------------------------------------------------------------