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From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
	Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>,
	Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>,
	Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>,
	Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>,
	Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
	Christian Poetzsch <christian.potzsch@imgtec.com>,
	Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Another pass at Android style loosening of cgroup attach permissions
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2016 16:33:01 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161004203301.GK4205@htj.duckdns.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161004201840.GA27018@mail.hallyn.com>

Hello, Serge.

On Tue, Oct 04, 2016 at 03:18:40PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> how about changing the GLOBAL_ROOT_UID check with a targeted
> capability check, like
> 
> 	if (!ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE) &&
>             !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
>             !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid))
> 		ret = -EACCES;
> 
> where the actual capability to use may require some thought.

Yeah, that's the direction I'm thinking too.  We can't use
CAP_SYS_NICE in general tho.  Let's see if a dedicated CAP sticks.

Thanks.

-- 
tejun

  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-04 20:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-04  4:41 [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Another pass at Android style loosening of cgroup attach permissions John Stultz
2016-10-04  4:41 ` John Stultz
2016-10-04  4:41 ` [PATCH 1/2] cgroup: Add generic cgroup subsystem permission checks John Stultz
2016-10-05 19:09   ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-05 19:09     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-05 19:16     ` John Stultz
2016-10-05 19:16       ` John Stultz
2016-10-05 19:23       ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-04  4:41 ` [PATCH 2/2] cgroup: Add a allow_attach policy for Android John Stultz
2016-10-05 19:10   ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-05 19:10     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-05 19:18     ` John Stultz
2016-10-05 19:18       ` John Stultz
2016-10-06 22:43       ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-06 22:43         ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-06 22:52         ` Dmitry Torokhov
2016-10-04 16:16 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Another pass at Android style loosening of cgroup attach permissions Tejun Heo
2016-10-04 16:16   ` Tejun Heo
2016-10-04 18:01   ` John Stultz
2016-10-04 18:01     ` John Stultz
2016-10-04 19:38     ` Tejun Heo
2016-10-04 19:38       ` Tejun Heo
2016-10-04 19:46       ` John Stultz
2016-10-04 19:46         ` John Stultz
2016-10-04 19:49         ` Tejun Heo
2016-10-04 20:18       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-10-04 20:18         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-10-04 20:33         ` Tejun Heo [this message]
2016-10-04 21:26           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-10-04 21:26             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-10-04 21:29             ` Tejun Heo
2016-10-04 18:03   ` John Stultz

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