From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-it0-f50.google.com ([209.85.214.50]:38475 "EHLO mail-it0-f50.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755549AbcLPNGi (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Dec 2016 08:06:38 -0500 Received: by mail-it0-f50.google.com with SMTP id j191so18958200ita.1 for ; Fri, 16 Dec 2016 05:06:11 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 07:06:09 -0600 From: Seth Forshee To: Trond Myklebust Cc: "bfields@fieldses.org" , "anna.schumaker@netapp.com" , "ebiederm@xmission.com" , "linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH] sunrpc: Use current_real_cred() when looking up rpc credentials Message-ID: <20161216130609.GA124240@ubuntu-hedt> References: <1481821992-77583-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <1481842899.11785.1.camel@primarydata.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 In-Reply-To: <1481842899.11785.1.camel@primarydata.com> Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 11:01:41PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote: > On Thu, 2016-12-15 at 11:13 -0600, Seth Forshee wrote: > > Since 4.8 follow_automount() overrides the credentials with > > &init_cred before calling d_automount(). When > > rpcauth_lookupcred() is called in this context it is now using > > fs[ug]id from the override creds instead of from the user's > > creds, which can cause authentication to fail. To fix this, take > > the ids from current_real_cred() instead. > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+ > > CC: Eric W. Biederman > > Fixes: aeaa4a79ff6a ("fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems > > creds") > > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee > > --- > >  net/sunrpc/auth.c | 2 +- > >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth.c b/net/sunrpc/auth.c > > index 2bff63a73cf8..e6197b2bda86 100644 > > --- a/net/sunrpc/auth.c > > +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth.c > > @@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ rpcauth_lookupcred(struct rpc_auth *auth, int > > flags) > >  { > >   struct auth_cred acred; > >   struct rpc_cred *ret; > > - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > > + const struct cred *cred = current_real_cred(); > >   > >   dprintk("RPC:       looking up %s cred\n", > >   auth->au_ops->au_name); > > Among other things, this will break the access() syscall. Okay, I see that now. > It's completely the wrong level in which to override credentials. The reason for it is that sget() now has a capability check which will fail on automount if current doesn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN. So what are the alternatives? A few ideas: - Instead of using a completely differnet set of creds, we could copy the current creds and raise CAP_SYS_ADMIN. This won't work if curreent is in a different user ns however. - Filesystems could get around the capability check by using sget_userns() during automount. - We could add a mount flag, say MS_AUTOMOUNT, and skip the capability check if that is set. Any opinions or other ideas? Thanks, Seth