From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S967084AbdADA4z (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Jan 2017 19:56:55 -0500 Received: from quartz.orcorp.ca ([184.70.90.242]:59497 "EHLO quartz.orcorp.ca" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965333AbdADA4Q (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Jan 2017 19:56:16 -0500 Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 17:56:13 -0700 From: Jason Gunthorpe To: James Bottomley Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, open list Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH RFC 0/4] RFC: in-kernel resource manager Message-ID: <20170104005613.GA783@obsidianresearch.com> References: <20170102132213.22880-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <1483374980.2458.13.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170102193320.trawto65nkjccbao@intel.com> <1483393248.2458.32.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170103135121.4kh3jld5gaq3ptj4@intel.com> <1483461370.2464.19.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170103214702.GC29656@obsidianresearch.com> <1483483198.2464.44.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170104001732.GB32185@obsidianresearch.com> <1483489799.2464.79.camel@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1483489799.2464.79.camel@HansenPartnership.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Broken-Reverse-DNS: no host name found for IP address 10.0.0.156 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jan 03, 2017 at 04:29:59PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2017-01-03 at 17:17 -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 03, 2017 at 02:39:58PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > > > > > > I think we should also consider TPM 1.2 support in all of this, > > > > it is still a very popular peice of hardware and it is equally > > > > able to support a RM. > > > > > > I've been running with the openssl and gnome-keyring patches in 1.2 > > > for months now. The thing about 1.2 is that the volatile store is > > > much larger, so there's a lot less of a need for a RM. It's only a > > > requirement in 2.0 because most shipping TPMs only seem to have > > > room for about 3 objects. > > > > It would be great if the 1.2 RM could support just enough to allow > > RSA key operations from userspace, without key virtualization. That > > would allow the plugins that already exist to move to the RM > > interface and we can get rid of the hard dependency on trousers. > [getting long, let's divide into separate issues] > > They actually already do: Trousers, for all its annoying complexity, > doesn't actually implement a resource manager, so we should be able to > do all the RSA operations we want today with the current 1.2 interface > and no RM. The current interface cannot be used by unprivileged users. I want to see the kernel provide an unprivileged safe interface for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 > The difficulty is no API ... unless you want to speak at > the TPM command level and do all the HMAC calculations yourself. I think the openssl RSA method could certainly do the TPM command level with not really a big problem. That would avoid all these crazy dependencies and debate :| I have a very good idea what that would look like for tpm 1.2 and I would estimate < 500 lines.... Jason From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jason Gunthorpe Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/4] RFC: in-kernel resource manager Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 17:56:13 -0700 Message-ID: <20170104005613.GA783@obsidianresearch.com> References: <20170102132213.22880-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <1483374980.2458.13.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170102193320.trawto65nkjccbao@intel.com> <1483393248.2458.32.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170103135121.4kh3jld5gaq3ptj4@intel.com> <1483461370.2464.19.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170103214702.GC29656@obsidianresearch.com> <1483483198.2464.44.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170104001732.GB32185@obsidianresearch.com> <1483489799.2464.79.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1483489799.2464.79.camel-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: tpmdd-devel-bounces-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org To: James Bottomley Cc: linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org, open list List-Id: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net On Tue, Jan 03, 2017 at 04:29:59PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2017-01-03 at 17:17 -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 03, 2017 at 02:39:58PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > > > > > > I think we should also consider TPM 1.2 support in all of this, > > > > it is still a very popular peice of hardware and it is equally > > > > able to support a RM. > > > > > > I've been running with the openssl and gnome-keyring patches in 1.2 > > > for months now. The thing about 1.2 is that the volatile store is > > > much larger, so there's a lot less of a need for a RM. It's only a > > > requirement in 2.0 because most shipping TPMs only seem to have > > > room for about 3 objects. > > > > It would be great if the 1.2 RM could support just enough to allow > > RSA key operations from userspace, without key virtualization. That > > would allow the plugins that already exist to move to the RM > > interface and we can get rid of the hard dependency on trousers. > [getting long, let's divide into separate issues] > > They actually already do: Trousers, for all its annoying complexity, > doesn't actually implement a resource manager, so we should be able to > do all the RSA operations we want today with the current 1.2 interface > and no RM. The current interface cannot be used by unprivileged users. I want to see the kernel provide an unprivileged safe interface for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 > The difficulty is no API ... unless you want to speak at > the TPM command level and do all the HMAC calculations yourself. I think the openssl RSA method could certainly do the TPM command level with not really a big problem. That would avoid all these crazy dependencies and debate :| I have a very good idea what that would look like for tpm 1.2 and I would estimate < 500 lines.... Jason ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot