From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>, Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, x86@kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>, Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 10:32:01 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170621173201.GA114489@beast> (raw) The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded below the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs above the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- v2: - bump x86_64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB, riel. - moar comments --- arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +++++----- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h index e8ab9a46bc68..1c18d83d3f09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h @@ -245,12 +245,13 @@ extern int force_personality32; #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096 -/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed. Typical - use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of - the loader. We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program - that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. */ - -#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2) +/* + * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On + * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address + * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. + */ +#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \ + 0x100000000UL) /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space, diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 5075fd5c62c8..7465c3ea5dd5 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -927,17 +927,60 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) elf_flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE; vaddr = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr; + /* + * If we are loading ET_EXEC or we have already performed + * the ET_DYN load_addr calculations, proceed normally. + */ if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set) { elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED; } else if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_DYN) { - /* Try and get dynamic programs out of the way of the - * default mmap base, as well as whatever program they - * might try to exec. This is because the brk will - * follow the loader, and is not movable. */ - load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr; - if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) - load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd(); - load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias); + /* + * This logic is run once for the first LOAD Program + * Header for ET_DYN binaries to calculate the + * randomization (load_bias) for all the LOAD + * Program Headers, and to calculate the entire + * size of the ELF mapping (total_size). (Note that + * load_addr_set is set to true later once the + * initial mapping is performed.) + * + * There are effectively two types of ET_DYN + * binaries: programs (i.e. PIE: ET_DYN with INTERP) + * and loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP, since they + * _are_ the ELF interpreter). The loaders must + * be loaded away from programs since the program + * may otherwise collide with the loader (especially + * for ET_EXEC which does not have a randomized + * position). For example to handle invocations of + * "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of + * the loader, the subsequent program that the + * loader loads must avoid the loader itself, so + * they cannot share the same load range. Sufficient + * room for the brk must be allocated with the + * loader as well, since brk must be available with + * the loader. + * + * Therefore, programs are loaded offset from + * ELF_ET_DYN_BASE and loaders are loaded into the + * independently randomized mmap region (0 load_bias + * without MAP_FIXED). + */ + if (elf_interpreter) { + load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE; + if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) + load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd(); + elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED; + } else + load_bias = 0; + + /* + * Since load_bias is used for all subsequent loading + * calculations, we must lower it by the first vaddr + * so that the remaining calculations based on the + * ELF vaddrs will be correctly offset. The result + * is then page aligned. + */ + load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias - vaddr); + total_size = total_mapping_size(elf_phdata, loc->elf_ex.e_phnum); if (!total_size) { -- 2.7.4 -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>, Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, x86@kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>, Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 10:32:01 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170621173201.GA114489@beast> (raw) The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded below the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs above the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- v2: - bump x86_64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB, riel. - moar comments --- arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +++++----- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h index e8ab9a46bc68..1c18d83d3f09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h @@ -245,12 +245,13 @@ extern int force_personality32; #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096 -/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed. Typical - use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of - the loader. We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program - that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. */ - -#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2) +/* + * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On + * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address + * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. + */ +#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \ + 0x100000000UL) /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space, diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 5075fd5c62c8..7465c3ea5dd5 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -927,17 +927,60 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) elf_flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE; vaddr = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr; + /* + * If we are loading ET_EXEC or we have already performed + * the ET_DYN load_addr calculations, proceed normally. + */ if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set) { elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED; } else if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_DYN) { - /* Try and get dynamic programs out of the way of the - * default mmap base, as well as whatever program they - * might try to exec. This is because the brk will - * follow the loader, and is not movable. */ - load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr; - if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) - load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd(); - load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias); + /* + * This logic is run once for the first LOAD Program + * Header for ET_DYN binaries to calculate the + * randomization (load_bias) for all the LOAD + * Program Headers, and to calculate the entire + * size of the ELF mapping (total_size). (Note that + * load_addr_set is set to true later once the + * initial mapping is performed.) + * + * There are effectively two types of ET_DYN + * binaries: programs (i.e. PIE: ET_DYN with INTERP) + * and loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP, since they + * _are_ the ELF interpreter). The loaders must + * be loaded away from programs since the program + * may otherwise collide with the loader (especially + * for ET_EXEC which does not have a randomized + * position). For example to handle invocations of + * "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of + * the loader, the subsequent program that the + * loader loads must avoid the loader itself, so + * they cannot share the same load range. Sufficient + * room for the brk must be allocated with the + * loader as well, since brk must be available with + * the loader. + * + * Therefore, programs are loaded offset from + * ELF_ET_DYN_BASE and loaders are loaded into the + * independently randomized mmap region (0 load_bias + * without MAP_FIXED). + */ + if (elf_interpreter) { + load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE; + if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) + load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd(); + elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED; + } else + load_bias = 0; + + /* + * Since load_bias is used for all subsequent loading + * calculations, we must lower it by the first vaddr + * so that the remaining calculations based on the + * ELF vaddrs will be correctly offset. The result + * is then page aligned. + */ + load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias - vaddr); + total_size = total_mapping_size(elf_phdata, loc->elf_ex.e_phnum); if (!total_size) { -- 2.7.4 -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
next reply other threads:[~2017-06-21 17:32 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-06-21 17:32 Kees Cook [this message] 2017-06-21 17:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE Kees Cook 2017-06-21 18:24 ` Rik van Riel 2017-06-21 18:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel 2017-06-27 14:49 ` Michal Hocko 2017-06-27 14:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2017-06-27 14:54 ` Daniel Micay 2017-06-27 14:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay 2017-06-27 20:08 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-27 20:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-27 20:08 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-04 13:12 ` Michal Hocko 2017-07-04 13:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2017-07-04 13:12 ` Michal Hocko
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