From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754687AbdFWKAh (ORCPT ); Fri, 23 Jun 2017 06:00:37 -0400 Received: from mail.skyhub.de ([5.9.137.197]:40472 "EHLO mail.skyhub.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754475AbdFWKAe (ORCPT ); Fri, 23 Jun 2017 06:00:34 -0400 Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 12:00:13 +0200 From: Borislav Petkov To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Brijesh Singh , Toshimitsu Kani , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Matt Fleming , Alexander Potapenko , "H. Peter Anvin" , Larry Woodman , Jonathan Corbet , Joerg Roedel , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Ingo Molnar , Andrey Ryabinin , Dave Young , Rik van Riel , Arnd Bergmann , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Andy Lutomirski , Boris Ostrovsky , Dmitry Vyukov , Juergen Gross , Thomas Gleixner , Paolo Bonzini Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Message-ID: <20170623100013.upd4or6esjvulmvg@pd.tnic> References: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:56:19PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating > new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping > and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through > a temporary buffer. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 + > arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 150 +++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 472 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > index af835cf..7da6de3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ > > extern unsigned long sme_me_mask; > > +void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long kernel_len, > + unsigned long encryption_wa, > + unsigned long encryption_pgd); > + > void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > unsigned long size); > void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > index 9e13841..0633142 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > @@ -38,3 +38,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o > obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o > + > +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > index 842c8a6..6e87662 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > /* > * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must > @@ -209,8 +211,320 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size) > set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT); > } > > +static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start, > + unsigned long end) > +{ > + unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size; > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + > + pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK; > + pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK; > + > + pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1); > + pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t); > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start); > + > + memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size); > +} > + > +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL > +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } > +#endif Huh, why isn't this in arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h in the #else branch of #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4 ? Also ERROR: Macros with complex values should be enclosed in parentheses #105: FILE: arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c:232: +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } so why isn't it a function? > + > +#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) > + > +static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, > + unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val) > +{ > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + p4d_t *p4d_p; > + pud_t *pud_p; > + pmd_t *pmd_p; > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr); > + if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) { > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) Err, I don't understand: so this is a Kconfig symbol and when it is enabled at build time, you do a 5level pagetable. But you can't stick a 5level pagetable to a hardware which doesn't know about it. Or do you mean that p4d layer folding at runtime to happen? (I admit, I haven't looked at that in detail.) But then I'd hope that the generic macros/functions would give you the ability to not care whether we have a p4d or not and not add a whole bunch of ifdeffery to this code. Hmmm. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 12:00:13 +0200 Message-ID: <20170623100013.upd4or6esjvulmvg@pd.tnic> References: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Brijesh Singh , Toshimitsu Kani , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Matt Fleming , Alexander Potapenko , "H. Peter Anvin" , Larry Woodman , Jonathan Corbet , Joerg Roedel , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Ingo Molnar , Andrey Ryabinin , Dave Young , Rik van Riel , Arnd Bergmann , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:56:19PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating > new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping > and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through > a temporary buffer. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 + > arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 150 +++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 472 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > index af835cf..7da6de3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ > > extern unsigned long sme_me_mask; > > +void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long kernel_len, > + unsigned long encryption_wa, > + unsigned long encryption_pgd); > + > void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > unsigned long size); > void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > index 9e13841..0633142 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > @@ -38,3 +38,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o > obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o > + > +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > index 842c8a6..6e87662 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > /* > * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must > @@ -209,8 +211,320 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size) > set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT); > } > > +static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start, > + unsigned long end) > +{ > + unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size; > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + > + pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK; > + pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK; > + > + pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1); > + pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t); > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start); > + > + memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size); > +} > + > +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL > +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } > +#endif Huh, why isn't this in arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h in the #else branch of #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4 ? Also ERROR: Macros with complex values should be enclosed in parentheses #105: FILE: arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c:232: +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } so why isn't it a function? > + > +#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) > + > +static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, > + unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val) > +{ > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + p4d_t *p4d_p; > + pud_t *pud_p; > + pmd_t *pmd_p; > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr); > + if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) { > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) Err, I don't understand: so this is a Kconfig symbol and when it is enabled at build time, you do a 5level pagetable. But you can't stick a 5level pagetable to a hardware which doesn't know about it. Or do you mean that p4d layer folding at runtime to happen? (I admit, I haven't looked at that in detail.) But then I'd hope that the generic macros/functions would give you the ability to not care whether we have a p4d or not and not add a whole bunch of ifdeffery to this code. Hmmm. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wr0-f199.google.com (mail-wr0-f199.google.com [209.85.128.199]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 586B16B03CE for ; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 06:00:34 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-wr0-f199.google.com with SMTP id z1so11315452wrz.10 for ; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 03:00:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.skyhub.de (mail.skyhub.de. [2a01:4f8:190:11c2::b:1457]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id r132si3082079wme.119.2017.06.23.03.00.32 for ; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 03:00:32 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 12:00:13 +0200 From: Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Message-ID: <20170623100013.upd4or6esjvulmvg@pd.tnic> References: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Brijesh Singh , Toshimitsu Kani , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Matt Fleming , Alexander Potapenko , "H. Peter Anvin" , Larry Woodman , Jonathan Corbet , Joerg Roedel , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Ingo Molnar , Andrey Ryabinin , Dave Young , Rik van Riel , Arnd Bergmann , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Andy Lutomirski , Boris Ostrovsky , Dmitry Vyukov , Juergen Gross , Thomas Gleixner , Paolo Bonzini On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:56:19PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating > new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping > and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through > a temporary buffer. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 + > arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 150 +++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 472 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > index af835cf..7da6de3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ > > extern unsigned long sme_me_mask; > > +void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long kernel_len, > + unsigned long encryption_wa, > + unsigned long encryption_pgd); > + > void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > unsigned long size); > void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > index 9e13841..0633142 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > @@ -38,3 +38,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o > obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o > + > +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > index 842c8a6..6e87662 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > /* > * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must > @@ -209,8 +211,320 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size) > set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT); > } > > +static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start, > + unsigned long end) > +{ > + unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size; > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + > + pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK; > + pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK; > + > + pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1); > + pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t); > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start); > + > + memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size); > +} > + > +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL > +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } > +#endif Huh, why isn't this in arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h in the #else branch of #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4 ? Also ERROR: Macros with complex values should be enclosed in parentheses #105: FILE: arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c:232: +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } so why isn't it a function? > + > +#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) > + > +static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, > + unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val) > +{ > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + p4d_t *p4d_p; > + pud_t *pud_p; > + pmd_t *pmd_p; > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr); > + if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) { > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) Err, I don't understand: so this is a Kconfig symbol and when it is enabled at build time, you do a 5level pagetable. But you can't stick a 5level pagetable to a hardware which doesn't know about it. Or do you mean that p4d layer folding at runtime to happen? (I admit, I haven't looked at that in detail.) But then I'd hope that the generic macros/functions would give you the ability to not care whether we have a p4d or not and not add a whole bunch of ifdeffery to this code. Hmmm. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mail.skyhub.de ([2a01:4f8:190:11c2::b:1457]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.87 #1 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1dOLOd-0005Ka-QI for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 10:01:01 +0000 Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 12:00:13 +0200 From: Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Message-ID: <20170623100013.upd4or6esjvulmvg@pd.tnic> References: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170616185619.18967.38945.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Brijesh Singh , Toshimitsu Kani , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Matt Fleming , x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Alexander Potapenko , "H. Peter Anvin" , Larry Woodman , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet , Joerg Roedel , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, Ingo Molnar , Andrey Ryabinin , Dave Young , Rik van Riel , Arnd Bergmann , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Andy Lutomirski , Boris Ostrovsky , Dmitry Vyukov , Juergen Gross , kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Thomas Gleixner , Paolo Bonzini On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:56:19PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating > new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping > and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through > a temporary buffer. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 + > arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 150 +++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 472 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > index af835cf..7da6de3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h > @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ > > extern unsigned long sme_me_mask; > > +void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr, > + unsigned long kernel_len, > + unsigned long encryption_wa, > + unsigned long encryption_pgd); > + > void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > unsigned long size); > void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > index 9e13841..0633142 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > @@ -38,3 +38,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o > obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o > + > +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > index 842c8a6..6e87662 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > /* > * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must > @@ -209,8 +211,320 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size) > set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT); > } > > +static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start, > + unsigned long end) > +{ > + unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size; > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + > + pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK; > + pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK; > + > + pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1); > + pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t); > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start); > + > + memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size); > +} > + > +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL > +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } > +#endif Huh, why isn't this in arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h in the #else branch of #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4 ? Also ERROR: Macros with complex values should be enclosed in parentheses #105: FILE: arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c:232: +#define native_make_p4d(_x) (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd(_x) } so why isn't it a function? > + > +#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC > +#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) > + > +static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, > + unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val) > +{ > + pgd_t *pgd_p; > + p4d_t *p4d_p; > + pud_t *pud_p; > + pmd_t *pmd_p; > + > + pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr); > + if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) { > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) Err, I don't understand: so this is a Kconfig symbol and when it is enabled at build time, you do a 5level pagetable. But you can't stick a 5level pagetable to a hardware which doesn't know about it. Or do you mean that p4d layer folding at runtime to happen? (I admit, I haven't looked at that in detail.) But then I'd hope that the generic macros/functions would give you the ability to not care whether we have a p4d or not and not add a whole bunch of ifdeffery to this code. Hmmm. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply. _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec