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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 RESEND 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2017 10:09:29 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170627150929.17428.31589.stgit__3293.61235858432$1498576245$gmane$org@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170627150718.17428.81813.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a
dirty line with this memtype.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |    4 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h        |   13 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |    8 ++++++
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c                |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h  |    2 ++
 mm/early_ioremap.c                   |   10 ++++++++
 6 files changed, 81 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 3a59e9c..a04081ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1434,6 +1434,10 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
 	  If set to N, then the encryption of system memory can be
 	  activated with the mem_encrypt=on command line option.
 
+config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+	def_bool y
+	depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
 # Common NUMA Features
 config NUMA
 	bool "Numa Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
index d9ff226..dcd9fb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
@@ -164,6 +164,19 @@ static inline void __set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx,
  */
 #define FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE
 
+/*
+ * Early memremap routines used for in-place encryption. The mappings created
+ * by these routines are intended to be used as temporary mappings.
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+				      unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+					 unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+				      unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+					 unsigned long size);
+
 #include <asm-generic/fixmap.h>
 
 #define __late_set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags) __set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index de32ca3..32095af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 
 #define _PAGE_CACHE_MASK	(_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)
 #define _PAGE_NOCACHE		(cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC))
+#define _PAGE_CACHE_WP		(cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP))
 
 #define PAGE_NONE	__pgprot(_PAGE_PROTNONE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
 #define PAGE_SHARED	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | \
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR		(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_USER)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE		(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PSE)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC	(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_PSE)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP		(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_CACHE_WP)
 
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO		(__PAGE_KERNEL)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE	(__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE)
@@ -202,6 +204,12 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 #define _KERNPG_TABLE	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED |	\
 			 _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ENC)
 
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC	(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP	(__PAGE_KERNEL_WP | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC	(__PAGE_KERNEL)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC_WP	(__PAGE_KERNEL_WP)
+
 #define PAGE_KERNEL		__pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
 #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO		__pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC)
 #define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC	__pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_ENC)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index bfc3e2d..26db273 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -414,6 +414,50 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
 	iounmap((void __iomem *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+/* Remap memory with encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+				      unsigned long size)
+{
+	return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remap memory with encryption and write-protected - cannot be called
+ * before pat_init() is called
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+					 unsigned long size)
+{
+	/* Be sure the write-protect PAT entry is set for write-protect */
+	if (__pte2cachemode_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] != _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP);
+}
+
+/* Remap memory without encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+				      unsigned long size)
+{
+	return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remap memory without encryption and write-protected - cannot be called
+ * before pat_init() is called
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+					 unsigned long size)
+{
+	/* Be sure the write-protect PAT entry is set for write-protect */
+	if (__pte2cachemode_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] != _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC_WP);
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT */
+
 static pte_t bm_pte[PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(pte_t)] __page_aligned_bss;
 
 static inline pmd_t * __init early_ioremap_pmd(unsigned long addr)
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h b/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
index 734ad4d..2edef8d 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ extern void *early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 			    unsigned long size);
 extern void *early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 			       unsigned long size);
+extern void *early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+				 unsigned long size, unsigned long prot_val);
 extern void early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size);
 extern void early_memunmap(void *addr, unsigned long size);
 
diff --git a/mm/early_ioremap.c b/mm/early_ioremap.c
index 6d5717b..d7d30da 100644
--- a/mm/early_ioremap.c
+++ b/mm/early_ioremap.c
@@ -226,6 +226,16 @@ void __init early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+void __init *
+early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+		    unsigned long prot_val)
+{
+	return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
+					       __pgprot(prot_val));
+}
+#endif
+
 #define MAX_MAP_CHUNK	(NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT)
 
 void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-27 15:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 178+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-27 15:07 [PATCH v8 RESEND 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:07   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-27 15:09 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-28  9:36   ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-28  9:36   ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-28  9:36     ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-28  9:36     ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-28 14:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-28 14:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-28 14:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-28 14:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-28 14:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:12   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` [PATCH v8 RESEND 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-27 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky

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