On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 02:13:40PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-07-13 at 18:55 +0200, Dominick Grift wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:59:55AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2017-07-13 at 11:48 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 2017-07-13 at 09:25 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 8:44 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa
> > > > > .gov
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > On Wed, 2017-07-12 at 20:27 -0400, Chris PeBenito wrote:
> > > > > > > On 07/12/2017 05:38 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 9:26 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tyc
> > > > > > > > ho.n
> > > > > > > > sa
> > > > > > > > .gov
> > > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On Tue, 2017-07-11 at 17:00 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 4:25 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds
> > > > > > > > > > @tyc
> > > > > > > > > > ho
> > > > > > > > > > .nsa
> > > > > > > > > > .gov>
> > > > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > While I think splitting the NNP/nosuid transition
> > > > > > > > restrictions
> > > > > > > > might
> > > > > > > > be a good idea under the new policy capability, I'm not
> > > > > > > > sure
> > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > worth the cost of a "process2" object class.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > With that in mind, let's do two things with this patch:
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > * Mention the nosuid restrictions in the patch
> > > > > > > > description.  It
> > > > > > > > doesn't need much text, but something would be good so we
> > > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > > documentation in the git log.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > * Let's pick a new permission name that is not specific
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > NNP
> > > > > > > > or
> > > > > > > > nosuid.  IMHO, nnpnosuid_transition is ... less than
> > > > > > > > good.
> > > > > > > > Unfortunately, I'm not sure I'm much better at picking
> > > > > > > > names;
> > > > > > > > how
> > > > > > > > about "protected_transition"?  "restricted_transition"?
> > > > > > > > "enable_transition"?  "override_transition"?
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > I vote for nnp_transition anyway.  "No New Privileges"
> > > > > > > encompasses
> > > > > > > nosuid in my mind.  If the two perms had been separated I
> > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > been inclined to allow both every time one of them was
> > > > > > > needed,
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > make
> > > > > > > sure no one was surprised by the behavior difference.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I agree; I'll keep it as nnp_transition and just document it
> > > > > > in
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > patch description.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Sorry to be a stubborn about this, but nnp_transition makes
> > > > > little
> > > > > sense for the nosuid restriction.  Like it or not, NNP has a
> > > > > concrete
> > > > > meaning which is distinct from nosuid mounts.  We don't have to
> > > > > pick
> > > > > any of the permission names I tossed out, none of those were
> > > > > very
> > > > > good, but I would like to see something that takes both NNP and
> > > > > nosuid
> > > > > into account, or preferably something that doesn't use either
> > > > > name
> > > > > explicitly but still conveys the meaning.
> > > > 
> > > > NNP is essentially a superset of nosuid; it applies to all
> > > > execve()
> > > > calls by the process and its descendants rather than only to
> > > > execve()
> > > > calls on specially marked filesystems.  So I viewed it as the
> > > > more
> > > > general term.
> > > > 
> > > > If that's not viable, I can't think of anything clearer or better
> > > > than
> > > > nnp_nosuid_transition.  That clearly links it to what it means
> > > > (allow
> > > > a
> > > > SELinux domain transition under NNP or nosuid).  It is somewhat
> > > > ugly
> > > > and verbose but it is clear in what it means, which I think is
> > > > more
> > > > important. All of your suggestions IMHO were less clear since
> > > > they
> > > > had
> > > > no clear linkage to either NNP or nosuid, and I couldn't tell
> > > > from
> > > > reading the permission name what it meant.  The SELinux domain
> > > > transition isn't protected, it isn't restricted, it isn't clear
> > > > what
> > > > enable_transition means versus the regular transition or
> > > > dyntransition
> > > > permissions, and we aren't overriding a transition but rather
> > > > allowing
> > > > one under NNP/nosuid.
> > > > 
> > > > The only other alternative I see is to introduce a process2 class
> > > > and
> > > > use separate nnp_transition and nosuid_transition permissions
> > > > (but in
> > > > practice I expect them to be both allowed or denied
> > > > together).  Note
> > > > that this will require two avtab and AVC entries for every domain
> > > > pair
> > > > (if we allow whichever one ends up going in the process2 class),
> > > > so
> > > > that has an impact on policy and AVC size.  Don't really see that
> > > > as
> > > > worthwhile.
> > > > 
> > > > Other approach would be to make the nosuid transition checks
> > > > file-
> > > > based 
> > > > instead so that it would go in the file class (while the nnp one
> > > > would
> > > > remain in the process class), but I don't think that's really
> > > > what we
> > > > want either.  Difference between "Can domain D1 transition under
> > > > nosuid
> > > >  to D2?" and "Can domain D1 transition under nosuid when
> > > > executing
> > > > file
> > > > with type T1?".
> > > 
> > > Just to be clear, we would also be separately checking regular
> > > transition permission between the old and new contexts on these
> > > transitions, so you would need both:
> > > allow D1 D2:process transition;
> > > allow D1 T1:file nosuid_transition;
> > > if we took the latter approach.
> > > 
> > > So we wouldn't lose entirely on a domain-to-domain check, but it
> > > would
> > > no longer be domain-to-domain for the nosuid part.
> > > 
> > > Whereas with original approach, we end up requiring:
> > > allow D1 D2:process transition;
> > > allow D1 D2:process nnp_nosuid_transition; # or whatever permission
> > > name is used
> > 
> > I don't know if i understand all the ins-and-outs of the matter but i
> > think i do like the idea of differentiating between nosuid_transition
> > and nnp_transition
> > It provides more flexibility because i might not want to allow one or
> > the other automatically.
> > 
> > I do not think it its a good idea to allow a process to transiton on
> > nosuid mounted filesystems just because i am forced to allow it nnp.
> 
> Can you provide a real use case where you would need to distinguish
> them?

Nope I cannot, but its easy to merge the two permissions in policy, and thereby preserving flexibility. It will be hard to deal with a case that might arise that was not foreseen if we cover both scenarios with a single permission.

> 
> Currently we handle them the same way (i.e. we don't allow transitions
> unless bounded for both).  The current patch preserves that
> consistency, and just provides a way to allow transitions without
> bounds for both.  Of course, you still have to be allowed the usual
> permissions in order to perform the transition at all (Can the caller
> execute the file? Can the callee be entered (entrypoint) by the file?
> Can the caller transition to the callee?) in addition to the new
> permission check (Can the caller transition under NNP/nosuid to the
> callee?).
> 
> We can't distinguish them on a domain-to-domain basis without
> introducing a new process2 class, and so far no one has been excited
> about that.

Why is that? Eventually that is going to happen anyway. Besides we also have a capability2 and its not like that's a big deal is it?

But again, its not that big of a deal for me.

> 
> > So since the stuff is ugly one way or another might as well make it
> > consistent with SELinux flexibility goals
> > 
> > Just my preference but I dont have a really strong opinion on the
> > matter
> > 
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > On a separate note, I plan to cc luto on the next version of the
> > > > patch
> > > > as I suspect he will have concerns about relaxing this constraint
> > > > on
> > > > NNP and this likely requires updating
> > > > Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs*
> > > > and the man pages that describe NNP behavior.
> > > > 
> > > > The other model would be to figure out a way to make the
> > > > typebounds
> > > > logic work cleanly in a manner that preserves the desired
> > > > NNP/nosuid
> > > > invariant _and_ doesn't require leaking unnecessary accesses into
> > > > the
> > > > ancestor domains that make them less secure, plus CIL support for
> > > > automatically propagating permissions in the desired way.  But I
> > > > haven't yet come up with a way to do that.  We can do it in some
> > > > cases
> > > > by creating typebounds between the object types, e.g.:
> > > > typebounds parent_t child_t;
> > > > allow child_t self:process execmem;
> > > > allow child_t child_exec_t:file entrypoint;
> > > > allow child_t child_tmp_t:file create;
> > > > can be allowed via:
> > > > allow parent_t child_t:process execmem; # an otherwise
> > > > nonsensical
> > > > rule
> > > > typebounds parent_exec_t child_exec_t;
> > > > typebounds parent_tmp_t child_tmp_t;
> > > > but this breaks down when there isn't an equivalent type and
> > > > permission
> > > > set already allowed to the parent for every type allowed to the
> > > > child.
> > 
> > 

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Dominick Grift