From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754410AbdGYTb3 (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jul 2017 15:31:29 -0400 Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:36958 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754204AbdGYTZd (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jul 2017 15:25:33 -0400 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" , "J. Bruce Fields" , Jeff Layton , Trond Myklebust , Anna Schumaker , linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, Anna Schumaker Subject: [PATCH 4.12 149/196] sunrpc: use constant time memory comparison for mac Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:22:28 -0700 Message-Id: <20170725192053.327878085@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.3 In-Reply-To: <20170725192046.422343510@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20170725192046.422343510@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jason A. Donenfeld commit 15a8b93fd5690de017ce665382ea45e5d61811a4 upstream. Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" Cc: Jeff Layton Cc: Trond Myklebust Cc: Anna Schumaker Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -927,7 +928,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kc if (ret) goto out_err; - if (memcmp(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) { + if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) { ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; goto out_err; }