From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751671AbdIEOBR (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Sep 2017 10:01:17 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.31]:37726 "EHLO mga06.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751316AbdIEOBQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Sep 2017 10:01:16 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.41,480,1498546800"; d="scan'208";a="897250100" From: Alexander Shishkin To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, acme@redhat.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, Borislav Petkov , rric@kernel.org, Alexander Shishkin Subject: [RFC PATCH 15/17] perf: Allow controlled non-root access to detached events Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 16:30:24 +0300 Message-Id: <20170905133026.13689-16-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.1 In-Reply-To: <20170905133026.13689-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> References: <20170905133026.13689-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The user who created the event should also be able to open its corresponding file in tracefs and/or remove it. Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin --- kernel/events/core.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index fbee221d19..802c0862a9 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -5579,7 +5579,7 @@ static int perf_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) static int perf_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { struct perf_event *event = inode->i_private; - int ret; + int ret = 0; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!event)) return -EINVAL; @@ -5587,7 +5587,13 @@ static int perf_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)) return -ENOENT; - ret = simple_open(inode, file); + /* event's user is stable while we're holding the reference */ + if (event->rb->mmap_user != current_user() && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + ret = -EACCES; + + if (!ret) + ret = simple_open(inode, file); if (ret) put_event(event); @@ -9593,7 +9599,7 @@ perf_event_detach(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event *parent_event, if (!filename) return -ENOMEM; - event->dent = tracefs_create_file(filename, 0600, + event->dent = tracefs_create_file(filename, 0666, perf_tracefs_dir, event, &perf_fops); kfree(filename); @@ -11521,6 +11527,7 @@ static int perf_instance_unlink(const char *name) { struct perf_event *event; struct dentry *dent; + int ret = 0; dent = lookup_one_len_unlocked(name, perf_tracefs_dir, strlen(name)); if (!dent) @@ -11530,6 +11537,18 @@ static int perf_instance_unlink(const char *name) if (!event) return -EINVAL; + if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)) + return 0; + + /* event's user is stable while we're holding the reference */ + if (event->rb->mmap_user != current_user() && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + ret = -EACCES; + put_event(event); + + if (ret) + return ret; + if (!(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT)) return -EBUSY; -- 2.14.1