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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [Part2 PATCH v4 02/29] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 15:46:00 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170919204627.3875-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170919204627.3875-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.  SEV is identified by
CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG and set bit 0 of MSR_K7_HWCR).  Only show the SEV feature
as available if reported by CPUID and enabled by BIOS.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    |  1 +
 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 2519c6c801c9..759d29c37686 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE	( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME		( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV		( 7*32+11) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN	( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT	( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 17f5c12e1afd..e399d68029a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@
 #define MSR_K7_PERFCTR3			0xc0010007
 #define MSR_K7_CLK_CTL			0xc001001b
 #define MSR_K7_HWCR			0xc0010015
+#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT		0
+#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK		BIT_ULL(MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT)
 #define MSR_K7_FID_VID_CTL		0xc0010041
 #define MSR_K7_FID_VID_STATUS		0xc0010042
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 9862e2cd6d93..48820d8c006b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -556,6 +556,51 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 }
 
+static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	/*
+	 * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
+	 *   For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
+	 *	      the SME physical address space reduction value.
+	 *	      If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
+	 *	      SME feature (set in scattered.c).
+	 *   For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
+	 *            SEV feature (set in scattered.c).
+	 *
+	 *   In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
+	 *   don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
+		/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
+		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
+		if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+			goto clear_all;
+
+		/*
+		 * Always adjust physical address bits. Even though this
+		 * will be a value above 32-bits this is still done for
+		 * CONFIG_X86_32 so that accurate values are reported.
+		 */
+		c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+			goto clear_all;
+
+		rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, msr);
+		if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
+			goto clear_sev;
+
+		return;
+
+clear_all:
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
+clear_sev:
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+	}
+}
+
 static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u32 dummy;
@@ -627,26 +672,7 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
 
-	/*
-	 * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has enabled SME then
-	 * adjust x86_phys_bits by the SME physical address space reduction
-	 * value. If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
-	 * feature (set in scattered.c). Also, since the SME support requires
-	 * long mode, don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
-	 */
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
-		u64 msr;
-
-		/* Check if SME is enabled */
-		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
-		if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
-			c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
-			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
-				clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
-		} else {
-			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
-		}
-	}
+	early_detect_mem_encrypt(c);
 }
 
 static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 05459ad3db46..63a78d5fe505 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CPB,		CPUID_EDX,  9, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK,    CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_SME,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SEV,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
 	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
 
-- 
2.9.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-09-19 20:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-19 20:45 [Part2 PATCH v4 00/29] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:45 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 01/29] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29  6:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 11:52     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-02 13:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-04 10:11   ` [PATCH v5] " Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 20:46 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-09-29 12:19   ` [Part2 PATCH v4 02/29] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 22:44     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30  8:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 03/29] kvm: svm: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 04/29] kvm: svm: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 05/29] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29 15:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 16:23     ` [Part2 PATCH v4.1 05/30] " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30  8:30       ` [PATCH] crypto: ccp: Build the AMD secure processor driver only with AMD CPU support Borislav Petkov
2017-09-30 14:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30 15:53           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-30 15:55     ` [Part2 PATCH v4 05/29] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30 16:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-01 20:05         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-03 16:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-03 16:19             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-02 16:43   ` [Part2 Patch v4.2] " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-04  6:36     ` P J P
2017-10-04  9:15       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 06/29] ccp: crypto: Define SEV key management command id Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 07/29] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-22 21:35   ` [PATCH] crypto: ccp: fix eno.cocci warnings kbuild test robot
2017-09-22 21:35   ` [Part2 PATCH v4 07/29] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support kbuild test robot
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 08/29] KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 09/29] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 10/29] KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 11/29] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 12/29] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REGISTER_REGION ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 13/29] KVM: Define SEV key management command id Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 14/29] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 15/29] KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use assosiated ASID when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 16/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-22 22:13   ` [PATCH] KVM: SVM: fix eno.cocci warnings kbuild test robot
2017-09-22 22:13   ` [Part2 PATCH v4 16/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command kbuild test robot
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 17/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 18/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 19/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 20/29] KVM: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 21/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 22/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 23/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 24/29] KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 25/29] KVM: X86: Add memory encryption enabled ops Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 26/29] KVM: SVM: Clear C-bit from the page fault address Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 27/29] KVM: SVM: Do not install #UD intercept when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 28/29] KVM: X86: Restart the guest when insn_len is zero and " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 20:46 ` [Part2 PATCH v4 29/29] KVM: X86: Add CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-22 20:37   ` kbuild test robot
2017-09-22 22:18   ` kbuild test robot

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