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From: Thomas Garnier via Virtualization <virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
	Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 19/27] x86: Support global stack cookie
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 13:30:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171011203027.11248-20-thgarnie__12227.5395355702$1509080298$gmane$org@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171011203027.11248-1-thgarnie@google.com>

Add an off-by-default configuration option to use a global stack cookie
instead of the default TLS. This configuration option will only be used
with PIE binaries.

For kernel stack cookie, the compiler uses the mcmodel=kernel to switch
between the fs segment to gs segment. A PIE binary does not use
mcmodel=kernel because it can be relocated anywhere, therefore the
compiler will default to the fs segment register. This is going to be
fixed with a compiler change allowing to pick the segment register as
done on PowerPC. In the meantime, this configuration can be used to
support older compilers.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                      | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/Makefile                     |  9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S             |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S             |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h      |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c         |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c      |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c      |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c          |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S             |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c             |  5 +++++
 12 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 063f1e0d51aa..772ff3e0f623 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2133,6 +2133,17 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
 
 	   If unsure, leave at the default value.
 
+config X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool "Stack cookie using a global variable"
+	select CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+	---help---
+	   This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature using a global
+	   variable instead of a segment register. It is useful when the
+	   compiler does not support custom segment registers when building a
+	   position independent (PIE) binary.
+
+	   If unsure, say N
+
 config HOTPLUG_CPU
 	bool "Support for hot-pluggable CPUs"
 	depends on SMP
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 6276572259c8..de228200ef2a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -141,6 +141,15 @@ else
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-funit-at-a-time)
 endif
 
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR
+        ifeq ($(call cc-option, -mstack-protector-guard=global),)
+                $(error Cannot use CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR: \
+                        -mstack-protector-guard=global not supported \
+                        by compiler)
+        endif
+        KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard=global
+endif
+
 ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32
 	x32_ld_ok := $(call try-run,\
 			/bin/echo -e '1: .quad 1b' | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 8a13d468635a..ab3e5056722f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movl	%esp, TASK_threadsp(%eax)
 	movl	TASK_threadsp(%edx), %esp
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	!defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	movl	TASK_stack_canary(%edx), %ebx
 	movl	%ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index d3a52d2342af..01be62c1b436 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movq	%rsp, TASK_threadsp(%rdi)
 	movq	TASK_threadsp(%rsi), %rsp
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	!defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	movq	TASK_stack_canary(%rsi), %rbx
 	movq	%rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_union + stack_canary_offset)
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index b09bd50b06c7..e3a7ef8d5fb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(char *, irq_stack_ptr);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, irq_count);
 extern asmlinkage void ignore_sysret(void);
 #else	/* X86_64 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 /*
  * Make sure stack canary segment base is cached-aligned:
  *   "For Intel Atom processors, avoid non zero segment base address
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
index 8abedf1d650e..66462d778dc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@
 #define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT						\
 	[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18),
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR
+extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
  *
@@ -62,7 +66,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 	u64 canary;
 	u64 tsc;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) != 40);
 #endif
 	/*
@@ -76,17 +80,22 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 	canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
 	canary &= CANARY_MASK;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR
+	if (__stack_chk_guard == 0)
+		__stack_chk_guard = canary ?: 1;
+#else /* !CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR */
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	this_cpu_write(irq_stack_union.stack_canary, canary);
-#else
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 	this_cpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary);
 #endif
+#endif
 }
 
 static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu);
 	struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu);
 	struct desc_struct desc;
@@ -99,7 +108,7 @@ static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
 
 static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory");
 #endif
 }
@@ -115,7 +124,7 @@ static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
 
 static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));
 #endif
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index de827d6ac8c2..b30a12cd021e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@
 void common(void) {
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(TASK_threadsp, task_struct, thread.sp);
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	!defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	OFFSET(TASK_stack_canary, task_struct, stack_canary);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c
index 710edab9e644..33584e7e486b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ void foo(void)
 	/* Size of SYSENTER_stack */
 	DEFINE(SIZEOF_SYSENTER_stack, sizeof(((struct tss_struct *)0)->SYSENTER_stack));
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	!defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(stack_canary_offset, stack_canary, canary);
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c
index cf42206926af..06feb31a09f5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c
@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ int main(void)
 	OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0);
 	BLANK();
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	!defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	DEFINE(stack_canary_offset, offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary));
 	BLANK();
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index fac71a3ee0b5..99c8af974874 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1431,7 +1431,8 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) =
 	(unsigned long)&init_thread_union + THREAD_SIZE;
 EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_current_top_of_stack);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	!defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct stack_canary, stack_canary);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
index 9ed3074d0d27..a55a67b33934 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -377,7 +377,8 @@ ENDPROC(startup_32_smp)
  */
 __INIT
 setup_once:
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && \
+	!defined(CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR)
 	/*
 	 * Configure the stack canary. The linker can't handle this by
 	 * relocation.  Manually set base address in stack canary
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index bd6b85fac666..66ea1a35413e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_tss);
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, __tss_limit_invalid);
 EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(__tss_limit_invalid);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_GLOBAL_STACKPROTECTOR
+unsigned long __stack_chk_guard __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * this gets called so that we can store lazy state into memory and copy the
  * current task into the new thread.
-- 
2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-11 20:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 176+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-11 20:30 [PATCH v1 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 01/27] x86/crypto: Adapt assembly for PIE support Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20  8:24   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20  8:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20  8:24     ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20  8:28     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-10-20  8:28       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2017-10-20 14:48       ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-20 14:48       ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20 14:48         ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20 14:48         ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20 14:48       ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20  8:28     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-10-20  8:24   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20  8:24   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 02/27] x86: Use symbol name on bug table " Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 03/27] x86: Use symbol name in jump " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 04/27] x86: Add macro to get symbol address " Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 05/27] x86: relocate_kernel - Adapt assembly " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 06/27] x86/entry/64: " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20  8:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20  8:26     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20 14:47     ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-20 14:47     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20 14:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20 14:47       ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20 15:20       ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20 15:20       ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20 15:20         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-10-20 16:27         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 16:27         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 16:27         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 16:27           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 16:27           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 17:52         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 17:52         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 17:52           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 17:52           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 17:52         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-10-20 14:47     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-20  8:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 07/27] x86: pm-trace - " Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 08/27] x86/CPU: " Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 09/27] x86/acpi: " Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 10/27] x86/boot/64: " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 11/27] x86/power/64: " Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 12/27] x86/paravirt: " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 13/27] x86/boot/64: Use _text in a global " Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 14/27] x86/percpu: Adapt percpu " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 15/27] compiler: Option to default to hidden symbols Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-12 20:02   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-10-12 20:02     ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-10-18 23:15     ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-18 23:15     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-18 23:15     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-18 23:15       ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-18 23:15       ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-19 19:38       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-10-19 19:38         ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-10-19 19:38       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-10-12 20:02   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 16/27] x86/relocs: Handle PIE relocations Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 17/27] xen: Adapt assembly for PIE support Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 18/27] kvm: " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization [this message]
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 19/27] x86: Support global stack cookie Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 20/27] x86/ftrace: Adapt function tracing for PIE support Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 21/27] x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Fix address markers index on x86_64 Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 22/27] x86/modules: Add option to start module section after kernel Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 23/27] x86/modules: Adapt module loading for PIE support Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 24/27] x86/mm: Make the x86 GOT read-only Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 25/27] x86/pie: Add option to build the kernel as PIE Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 26/27] x86/relocs: Add option to generate 64-bit relocations Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` [PATCH v1 27/27] x86/kaslr: Add option to extend KASLR range from 1GB to 3GB Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-11 20:30 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 20:30   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-11 21:34 ` [PATCH v1 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization Tom Lendacky
2017-10-11 21:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-11 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Tom Lendacky
2017-10-11 21:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-12 15:34   ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-12 15:34   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-12 15:34   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-12 15:34     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-12 15:34     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-12 15:51     ` Markus Trippelsdorf
2017-10-12 15:51     ` Markus Trippelsdorf
2017-10-12 15:51       ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Trippelsdorf
2017-10-12 16:28     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-12 16:28     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-12 16:28       ` [kernel-hardening] " Tom Lendacky
2017-10-18 23:17       ` Thomas Garnier via Virtualization
2017-10-18 23:17       ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-18 23:17       ` Thomas Garnier
2017-10-18 23:17         ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-10-18 23:17         ` Thomas Garnier

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