From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: nicolas@belouin.fr Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 21:04:48 +0200 Message-ID: <201710211904.v9LJ4o1X046943__18051.9666093916$1508612906$gmane$org@smtp5.infomaniak.ch> References: <20171021134558.21195-1-nicolas@belouin.fr> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: reiserfs-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" To: Casey Schaufler , Jan Kara , Theodore Ts'o , Andreas Dilger , Jaegeuk Kim , Chao Yu , David Woodhouse , Dave Kleikamp , Mark Fasheh , Joel Becker , Miklos Szeredi , Phillip Lougher , Richard Weinberger , Artem Bityutskiy , Adrian Hunter , Alexander Viro , Serge Hallyn , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris , James.Morris@smtp5.inf ,linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net,ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com,linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org,linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,linux-api@vger.kernel.org,kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com From: Nicolas Belouin Message-ID: On October 21, 2017 7:25:21 PM GMT+02:00, Casey Schaufler wrote: >On 10/21/2017 6:45 AM, Nicolas Belouin wrote: >> with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to >> flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted >> xattr is near zero. >> CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as >> entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It >> would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs. > >Please explain how this is different from CAP_MAC_ADMIN in >any existing use case. If it is significantly different, how >would the two interact? >From my point of view, CAP_MAC_ADMIN allows one to read/write security xattrs, those are meant to describe security policies. As far as I know of, trusted xattrs are intended for a privileged process to read or write arbitrary data. I don't have any real world example in mind that use trusted xattrs, but I'll try to find one. > >> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin >> --- >> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++- >> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++-- >> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h >b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h >> index ce230aa6d928..27e457b93c84 100644 >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h >> @@ -369,7 +369,11 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { >> >> #define CAP_SYS_MOUNT 38 >> >> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_MOUNT >> +/* Allow read/write trusted xattr */ >> + >> +#define CAP_TRUSTED 39 >> + >> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_TRUSTED >> >> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) >> >> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h >b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h >> index a873dce97fd5..f5dc8e109f5a 100644 >> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h >> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h >> @@ -24,9 +24,10 @@ >> "audit_control", "setfcap" >> >> #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ >> - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount" >> + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount", \ >> + "trusted" >> >> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_MOUNT >> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_TRUSTED >> #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. >> #endif >> Nicolas