From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753399AbdKIR0I (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Nov 2017 12:26:08 -0500 Received: from h2.hallyn.com ([78.46.35.8]:49466 "EHLO h2.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752549AbdKIRZq (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Nov 2017 12:25:46 -0500 Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 11:25:44 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Mahesh Bandewar Cc: LKML , Netdev , Kernel-hardening , Linux API , Kees Cook , Serge Hallyn , "Eric W . Biederman" , Eric Dumazet , David Miller , Mahesh Bandewar Subject: Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces Message-ID: <20171109172544.GB26229@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20171103004436.40026-1-mahesh@bandewar.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20171103004436.40026-1-mahesh@bandewar.net> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (mahesh@bandewar.net): > From: Mahesh Bandewar > > With this new notion of "controlled" user-namespaces, the controlled > user-namespaces are marked at the time of their creation while the > capabilities of processes that belong to them are controlled using the > global mask. > > Init-user-ns is always uncontrolled and a process that has SYS_ADMIN > that belongs to uncontrolled user-ns can create another (child) user- > namespace that is uncontrolled. Any other process (that either does > not have SYS_ADMIN or belongs to a controlled user-ns) can only > create a user-ns that is controlled. > > global-capability-whitelist (controlled_userns_caps_whitelist) is used > at the capability check-time and keeps the semantics for the processes > that belong to uncontrolled user-ns as it is. Processes that belong to > controlled user-ns however are subjected to different checks- > > (a) if the capability in question is controlled and process belongs > to controlled user-ns, then it's always denied. > (b) if the capability in question is NOT controlled then fall back > to the traditional check. > > Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar > --- > include/linux/capability.h | 1 + > include/linux/user_namespace.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ > kernel/capability.c | 5 +++++ > kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +++ > security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++++++ > 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h > index 6c0b9677c03f..b8c6cac18658 100644 > --- a/include/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h > @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); > extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); > int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); > +bool is_capability_controlled(int cap); > > extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size); > > diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h > index c18e01252346..e890fe81b47e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h > +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */ > }; > > #define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL > +#define USERNS_CONTROLLED 2UL > > #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED > > @@ -102,6 +103,16 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) > __put_user_ns(ns); > } > > +static inline bool is_user_ns_controlled(const struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > + return ns->flags & USERNS_CONTROLLED; > +} > + > +static inline void mark_user_ns_controlled(struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > + ns->flags |= USERNS_CONTROLLED; > +} > + > struct seq_operations; > extern const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations; > extern const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations; > @@ -160,6 +171,15 @@ static inline struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns) > { > return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); > } > + > +static inline bool is_user_ns_controlled(const struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > + return false; > +} > + > +static inline void mark_user_ns_controlled(struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > +} > #endif > > #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */ > diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > index 62dbe3350c1b..40a38cc4ff43 100644 > --- a/kernel/capability.c > +++ b/kernel/capability.c > @@ -510,6 +510,11 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) > } > > /* Controlled-userns capabilities routines */ > +bool is_capability_controlled(int cap) > +{ > + return !cap_raised(controlled_userns_caps_whitelist, cap); > +} > + > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c > index c490f1e4313b..f393ea5108f0 100644 > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c > @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) > cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; > cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; > cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; > + if (!ns_capable(user_ns->parent, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || > + is_user_ns_controlled(user_ns->parent)) > + mark_user_ns_controlled(user_ns); Hm, why do this here, rather than at create_user_ns()? It shouldn't be recalculated when someone does setns() should it? From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 11:25:44 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" Message-ID: <20171109172544.GB26229@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20171103004436.40026-1-mahesh@bandewar.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20171103004436.40026-1-mahesh@bandewar.net> Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces To: Mahesh Bandewar Cc: LKML , Netdev , Kernel-hardening , Linux API , Kees Cook , Serge Hallyn , "Eric W . Biederman" , Eric Dumazet , David Miller , Mahesh Bandewar List-ID: Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (mahesh@bandewar.net): > From: Mahesh Bandewar > > With this new notion of "controlled" user-namespaces, the controlled > user-namespaces are marked at the time of their creation while the > capabilities of processes that belong to them are controlled using the > global mask. > > Init-user-ns is always uncontrolled and a process that has SYS_ADMIN > that belongs to uncontrolled user-ns can create another (child) user- > namespace that is uncontrolled. Any other process (that either does > not have SYS_ADMIN or belongs to a controlled user-ns) can only > create a user-ns that is controlled. > > global-capability-whitelist (controlled_userns_caps_whitelist) is used > at the capability check-time and keeps the semantics for the processes > that belong to uncontrolled user-ns as it is. Processes that belong to > controlled user-ns however are subjected to different checks- > > (a) if the capability in question is controlled and process belongs > to controlled user-ns, then it's always denied. > (b) if the capability in question is NOT controlled then fall back > to the traditional check. > > Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar > --- > include/linux/capability.h | 1 + > include/linux/user_namespace.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ > kernel/capability.c | 5 +++++ > kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +++ > security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++++++ > 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h > index 6c0b9677c03f..b8c6cac18658 100644 > --- a/include/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h > @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); > extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); > int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); > +bool is_capability_controlled(int cap); > > extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size); > > diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h > index c18e01252346..e890fe81b47e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h > +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */ > }; > > #define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL > +#define USERNS_CONTROLLED 2UL > > #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED > > @@ -102,6 +103,16 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) > __put_user_ns(ns); > } > > +static inline bool is_user_ns_controlled(const struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > + return ns->flags & USERNS_CONTROLLED; > +} > + > +static inline void mark_user_ns_controlled(struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > + ns->flags |= USERNS_CONTROLLED; > +} > + > struct seq_operations; > extern const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations; > extern const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations; > @@ -160,6 +171,15 @@ static inline struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns) > { > return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); > } > + > +static inline bool is_user_ns_controlled(const struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > + return false; > +} > + > +static inline void mark_user_ns_controlled(struct user_namespace *ns) > +{ > +} > #endif > > #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */ > diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > index 62dbe3350c1b..40a38cc4ff43 100644 > --- a/kernel/capability.c > +++ b/kernel/capability.c > @@ -510,6 +510,11 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) > } > > /* Controlled-userns capabilities routines */ > +bool is_capability_controlled(int cap) > +{ > + return !cap_raised(controlled_userns_caps_whitelist, cap); > +} > + > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c > index c490f1e4313b..f393ea5108f0 100644 > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c > @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) > cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; > cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; > cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; > + if (!ns_capable(user_ns->parent, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || > + is_user_ns_controlled(user_ns->parent)) > + mark_user_ns_controlled(user_ns); Hm, why do this here, rather than at create_user_ns()? It shouldn't be recalculated when someone does setns() should it?