From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753521AbdKXJXg (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Nov 2017 04:23:36 -0500 Received: from mail-wm0-f66.google.com ([74.125.82.66]:39268 "EHLO mail-wm0-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753164AbdKXJPh (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Nov 2017 04:15:37 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGs4zMZtfWM9zdld15u5r54j89Z2lsn5ElljEKws3wLNJp7VEmQCZCeRlfqWLJ0++d0dnZbWimNtng== From: Ingo Molnar To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Thomas Gleixner , "H . Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra , Borislav Petkov , Linus Torvalds Subject: [PATCH 19/43] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2017 10:14:24 +0100 Message-Id: <20171124091448.7649-20-mingo@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <20171124091448.7649-1-mingo@kernel.org> References: <20171124091448.7649-1-mingo@kernel.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Andy Lutomirski Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary to detect overflow after the fact. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/be3179c0a38c392fa44ebeb7dd89391ff5c010c3.1511497875.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 7 ------- 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 3a09e5571a92..7743aedb82ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -337,7 +337,6 @@ struct tss_struct { * Space for the temporary SYSENTER stack, used for SYSENTER * and the entry trampoline as well. */ - unsigned long SYSENTER_stack_canary; unsigned long SYSENTER_stack[64]; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index bb61919c9335..9ce5fcf7d14d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ bool in_sysenter_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info) int cpu = smp_processor_id(); struct tss_struct *tss = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss; - /* Treat the canary as part of the stack for unwinding purposes. */ - void *begin = &tss->SYSENTER_stack_canary; + void *begin = &tss->SYSENTER_stack; void *end = (void *)&tss->SYSENTER_stack + sizeof(tss->SYSENTER_stack); if ((void *)stack < begin || (void *)stack >= end) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 86e83762e3b3..6a04287f222b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ __visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss) = { */ .io_bitmap = { [0 ... IO_BITMAP_LONGS] = ~0 }, #endif - .SYSENTER_stack_canary = STACK_END_MAGIC, }; EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_tss); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index cbc4272bb9dd..19475dbff068 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -801,13 +801,6 @@ dotraplinkage void do_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) debug_stack_usage_dec(); exit: - /* - * This is the most likely code path that involves non-trivial use - * of the SYSENTER stack. Check that we haven't overrun it. - */ - WARN(this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.SYSENTER_stack_canary) != STACK_END_MAGIC, - "Overran or corrupted SYSENTER stack\n"); - ist_exit(regs); } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_debug); -- 2.14.1