From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752441AbdLDQvd (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Dec 2017 11:51:33 -0500 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de ([146.0.238.70]:59856 "EHLO Galois.linutronix.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752489AbdLDQvE (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Dec 2017 11:51:04 -0500 Message-Id: <20171204150606.130778051@linutronix.de> User-Agent: quilt/0.63-1 Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2017 15:07:22 +0100 From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , Andy Lutomirsky , Peter Zijlstra , Dave Hansen , Borislav Petkov , Greg KH , keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com, Brian Gerst , Josh Poimboeuf , Denys Vlasenko , Rik van Riel , Boris Ostrovsky , Juergen Gross , David Laight , Eduardo Valentin , aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon , daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at, Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen Subject: [patch 16/60] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack References: <20171204140706.296109558@linutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-15 Content-Disposition: inline; filename=x86-espfix-64--Stop_assuming_that_pt_regs_is_on_the_entry_stack.patch Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Andy Lutomirski When we start using an entry trampoline, a #GP from userspace will be delivered on the entry stack, not on the task stack. Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup to set up #GP according to TSS.SP0, rather than assuming that pt_regs + 1 == SP0. This won't change anything without an entry stack, but it will make the code continue to work when an entry stack is added. While we're at it, improve the comments to explain what's actually going on. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b1ef4136616c6bd2a75d1fd2736d1d54437d65a8.1511497875.git.luto@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -349,9 +349,15 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc /* * If IRET takes a non-IST fault on the espfix64 stack, then we - * end up promoting it to a doublefault. In that case, modify - * the stack to make it look like we just entered the #GP - * handler from user space, similar to bad_iret. + * end up promoting it to a doublefault. In that case, take + * advantage of the fact that we're not using the normal (TSS.sp0) + * stack right now. We can write a fake #GP(0) frame at TSS.sp0 + * and then modify our own IRET frame so that, when we return, + * we land directly at the #GP(0) vector with the stack already + * set up according to its expectations. + * + * The net result is that our #GP handler will think that we + * entered from usermode with the bad user context. * * No need for ist_enter here because we don't use RCU. */ @@ -359,13 +365,26 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc regs->cs == __KERNEL_CS && regs->ip == (unsigned long)native_irq_return_iret) { - struct pt_regs *normal_regs = task_pt_regs(current); + struct pt_regs *gpregs = (struct pt_regs *)this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0) - 1; - /* Fake a #GP(0) from userspace. */ - memmove(&normal_regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp, 5*8); - normal_regs->orig_ax = 0; /* Missing (lost) #GP error code */ + /* + * regs->sp points to the failing IRET frame on the + * ESPFIX64 stack. Copy it to the entry stack. This fills + * in gpregs->ss through gpregs->ip. + * + */ + memmove(&gpregs->ip, (void *)regs->sp, 5*8); + gpregs->orig_ax = 0; /* Missing (lost) #GP error code */ + + /* + * Adjust our frame so that we return straight to the #GP + * vector with the expected RSP value. This is safe because + * we won't enable interupts or schedule before we invoke + * general_protection, so nothing will clobber the stack + * frame we just set up. + */ regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection; - regs->sp = (unsigned long)&normal_regs->orig_ax; + regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax; return; } @@ -390,7 +409,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc * * Processors update CR2 whenever a page fault is detected. If a * second page fault occurs while an earlier page fault is being - * deliv- ered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will + * delivered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will * overwrite the contents of CR2 (replacing the previous * address). These updates to CR2 occur even if the page fault * results in a double fault or occurs during the delivery of a