* [PATCH 4.9 01/96] dm bufio: fix shrinker scans when (nr_to_scan < retain_target)
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/96] mac80211: Add RX flag to indicate ICV stripped Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Suren Baghdasaryan, Mike Snitzer
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
commit fbc7c07ec23c040179384a1f16b62b6030eb6bdd upstream.
When system is under memory pressure it is observed that dm bufio
shrinker often reclaims only one buffer per scan. This change fixes
the following two issues in dm bufio shrinker that cause this behavior:
1. ((nr_to_scan - freed) <= retain_target) condition is used to
terminate slab scan process. This assumes that nr_to_scan is equal
to the LRU size, which might not be correct because do_shrink_slab()
in vmscan.c calculates nr_to_scan using multiple inputs.
As a result when nr_to_scan is less than retain_target (64) the scan
will terminate after the first iteration, effectively reclaiming one
buffer per scan and making scans very inefficient. This hurts vmscan
performance especially because mutex is acquired/released every time
dm_bufio_shrink_scan() is called.
New implementation uses ((LRU size - freed) <= retain_target)
condition for scan termination. LRU size can be safely determined
inside __scan() because this function is called after dm_bufio_lock().
2. do_shrink_slab() uses value returned by dm_bufio_shrink_count() to
determine number of freeable objects in the slab. However dm_bufio
always retains retain_target buffers in its LRU and will terminate
a scan when this mark is reached. Therefore returning the entire LRU size
from dm_bufio_shrink_count() is misleading because that does not
represent the number of freeable objects that slab will reclaim during
a scan. Returning (LRU size - retain_target) better represents the
number of freeable objects in the slab. This way do_shrink_slab()
returns 0 when (LRU size < retain_target) and vmscan will not try to
scan this shrinker avoiding scans that will not reclaim any memory.
Test: tested using Android device running
<AOSP>/system/extras/alloc-stress that generates memory pressure
and causes intensive shrinker scans
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/md/dm-bufio.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
@@ -1554,7 +1554,8 @@ static unsigned long __scan(struct dm_bu
int l;
struct dm_buffer *b, *tmp;
unsigned long freed = 0;
- unsigned long count = nr_to_scan;
+ unsigned long count = c->n_buffers[LIST_CLEAN] +
+ c->n_buffers[LIST_DIRTY];
unsigned long retain_target = get_retain_buffers(c);
for (l = 0; l < LIST_SIZE; l++) {
@@ -1591,6 +1592,7 @@ dm_bufio_shrink_count(struct shrinker *s
{
struct dm_bufio_client *c;
unsigned long count;
+ unsigned long retain_target;
c = container_of(shrink, struct dm_bufio_client, shrinker);
if (sc->gfp_mask & __GFP_FS)
@@ -1599,8 +1601,9 @@ dm_bufio_shrink_count(struct shrinker *s
return 0;
count = c->n_buffers[LIST_CLEAN] + c->n_buffers[LIST_DIRTY];
+ retain_target = get_retain_buffers(c);
dm_bufio_unlock(c);
- return count;
+ return (count < retain_target) ? 0 : (count - retain_target);
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 02/96] mac80211: Add RX flag to indicate ICV stripped
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/96] dm bufio: fix shrinker scans when (nr_to_scan < retain_target) Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/96] ath10k: rebuild crypto header in rx data frames Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Spinadel, Johannes Berg, Kalle Valo
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Spinadel <david.spinadel@intel.com>
commit cef0acd4d7d4811d2d19cd0195031bf0dfe41249 upstream.
Add a flag that indicates that the WEP ICV was stripped from an
RX packet, allowing the device to not transfer that if it's
already checked.
Signed-off-by: David Spinadel <david.spinadel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/net/mac80211.h | 5 ++++-
net/mac80211/wep.c | 3 ++-
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/mac80211.h
+++ b/include/net/mac80211.h
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_info_clear_status(struct ie
* @RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED: This frame was decrypted in hardware.
* @RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED: the Michael MIC is stripped off this frame,
* verification has been done by the hardware.
- * @RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED: The IV/ICV are stripped from this frame.
+ * @RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED: The IV and ICV are stripped from this frame.
* If this flag is set, the stack cannot do any replay detection
* hence the driver or hardware will have to do that.
* @RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED: Currently only valid for CCMP/GCMP frames, this
@@ -1078,6 +1078,8 @@ ieee80211_tx_info_clear_status(struct ie
* @RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN: Allow the same PN as same packet before.
* This is used for AMSDU subframes which can have the same PN as
* the first subframe.
+ * @RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED: The ICV is stripped from this frame. CRC checking must
+ * be done in the hardware.
*/
enum mac80211_rx_flags {
RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR = BIT(0),
@@ -1113,6 +1115,7 @@ enum mac80211_rx_flags {
RX_FLAG_RADIOTAP_VENDOR_DATA = BIT(31),
RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED = BIT_ULL(32),
RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN = BIT_ULL(33),
+ RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED = BIT_ULL(34),
};
#define RX_FLAG_STBC_SHIFT 26
--- a/net/mac80211/wep.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wep.c
@@ -293,7 +293,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
ieee80211_wep_remove_iv(rx->local, rx->skb, rx->key);
/* remove ICV */
- if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN))
+ if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED) &&
+ pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -295,7 +295,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
/* Trim ICV */
- skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+ if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED))
+ skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
/* Remove IV */
memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 03/96] ath10k: rebuild crypto header in rx data frames
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/96] dm bufio: fix shrinker scans when (nr_to_scan < retain_target) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/96] mac80211: Add RX flag to indicate ICV stripped Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/96] KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Manikanta Pubbisetty,
Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan, Kalle Valo
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan <vthiagar@qti.qualcomm.com>
commit 7eccb738fce57cbe53ed903ccf43f9ab257b15b3 upstream.
Rx data frames notified through HTT_T2H_MSG_TYPE_RX_IND and
HTT_T2H_MSG_TYPE_RX_FRAG_IND expect PN/TSC check to be done
on host (mac80211) rather than firmware. Rebuild cipher header
in every received data frames (that are notified through those
HTT interfaces) from the rx_hdr_status tlv available in the
rx descriptor of the first msdu. Skip setting RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED
flag for the packets which requires mac80211 PN/TSC check support
and set appropriate RX_FLAG for stripped crypto tail. Hw QCA988X,
QCA9887, QCA99X0, QCA9984, QCA9888 and QCA4019 currently need the
rebuilding of cipher header to perform PN/TSC check for replay
attack.
Please note that removing crypto tail for CCMP-256, GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers
in raw mode needs to be fixed. Since Rx with these ciphers in raw
mode does not work in the current form even without this patch and
removing crypto tail for these chipers needs clean up, raw mode related
issues in CCMP-256, GCMP and GCMP-256 can be addressed in follow up
patches.
Tested-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan <vthiagar@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h | 3
2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
@@ -548,6 +548,11 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_le
return IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN;
case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2:
return IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+ case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM256_WPA2:
+ return IEEE80211_CCMP_256_HDR_LEN;
+ case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_GCMP_WPA2:
+ case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_GCMP256_WPA2:
+ return IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_WEP128:
case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_WAPI:
break;
@@ -573,6 +578,11 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_tail_len
return IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2:
return IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+ case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM256_WPA2:
+ return IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN;
+ case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_GCMP_WPA2:
+ case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_GCMP256_WPA2:
+ return IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_WEP128:
case HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_WAPI:
break;
@@ -1024,9 +1034,21 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_raw(
hdr = (void *)msdu->data;
/* Tail */
- if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)
+ if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) {
skb_trim(msdu, msdu->len -
ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_tail_len(ar, enctype));
+ } else {
+ /* MIC */
+ if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) &&
+ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2)
+ skb_trim(msdu, msdu->len - 8);
+
+ /* ICV */
+ if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED &&
+ enctype != HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2)
+ skb_trim(msdu, msdu->len -
+ ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_tail_len(ar, enctype));
+ }
/* MMIC */
if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED) &&
@@ -1048,7 +1070,8 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_raw(
static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_nwifi(struct ath10k *ar,
struct sk_buff *msdu,
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status,
- const u8 first_hdr[64])
+ const u8 first_hdr[64],
+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct htt_rx_desc *rxd;
@@ -1056,6 +1079,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_nwif
u8 da[ETH_ALEN];
u8 sa[ETH_ALEN];
int l3_pad_bytes;
+ int bytes_aligned = ar->hw_params.decap_align_bytes;
/* Delivered decapped frame:
* [nwifi 802.11 header] <-- replaced with 802.11 hdr
@@ -1084,6 +1108,14 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_nwif
/* push original 802.11 header */
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)first_hdr;
hdr_len = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+ if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
+ memcpy(skb_push(msdu,
+ ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype)),
+ (void *)hdr + round_up(hdr_len, bytes_aligned),
+ ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype));
+ }
+
memcpy(skb_push(msdu, hdr_len), hdr, hdr_len);
/* original 802.11 header has a different DA and in
@@ -1144,6 +1176,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_eth(
u8 sa[ETH_ALEN];
int l3_pad_bytes;
struct htt_rx_desc *rxd;
+ int bytes_aligned = ar->hw_params.decap_align_bytes;
/* Delivered decapped frame:
* [eth header] <-- replaced with 802.11 hdr & rfc1042/llc
@@ -1172,6 +1205,14 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_eth(
/* push original 802.11 header */
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)first_hdr;
hdr_len = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+ if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
+ memcpy(skb_push(msdu,
+ ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype)),
+ (void *)hdr + round_up(hdr_len, bytes_aligned),
+ ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype));
+ }
+
memcpy(skb_push(msdu, hdr_len), hdr, hdr_len);
/* original 802.11 header has a different DA and in
@@ -1185,12 +1226,14 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_eth(
static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_snap(struct ath10k *ar,
struct sk_buff *msdu,
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status,
- const u8 first_hdr[64])
+ const u8 first_hdr[64],
+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
size_t hdr_len;
int l3_pad_bytes;
struct htt_rx_desc *rxd;
+ int bytes_aligned = ar->hw_params.decap_align_bytes;
/* Delivered decapped frame:
* [amsdu header] <-- replaced with 802.11 hdr
@@ -1206,6 +1249,14 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_snap
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)first_hdr;
hdr_len = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+ if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
+ memcpy(skb_push(msdu,
+ ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype)),
+ (void *)hdr + round_up(hdr_len, bytes_aligned),
+ ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype));
+ }
+
memcpy(skb_push(msdu, hdr_len), hdr, hdr_len);
}
@@ -1240,13 +1291,15 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(stru
is_decrypted);
break;
case RX_MSDU_DECAP_NATIVE_WIFI:
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_nwifi(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_nwifi(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr,
+ enctype);
break;
case RX_MSDU_DECAP_ETHERNET2_DIX:
ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_eth(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype);
break;
case RX_MSDU_DECAP_8023_SNAP_LLC:
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_snap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap_snap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr,
+ enctype);
break;
}
}
@@ -1289,7 +1342,8 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload
static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar,
struct sk_buff_head *amsdu,
- struct ieee80211_rx_status *status)
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status,
+ bool fill_crypt_header)
{
struct sk_buff *first;
struct sk_buff *last;
@@ -1299,7 +1353,6 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype;
u8 first_hdr[64];
u8 *qos;
- size_t hdr_len;
bool has_fcs_err;
bool has_crypto_err;
bool has_tkip_err;
@@ -1324,15 +1377,17 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
* decapped header. It'll be used for undecapping of each MSDU.
*/
hdr = (void *)rxd->rx_hdr_status;
- hdr_len = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
- memcpy(first_hdr, hdr, hdr_len);
+ memcpy(first_hdr, hdr, RX_HTT_HDR_STATUS_LEN);
/* Each A-MSDU subframe will use the original header as the base and be
* reported as a separate MSDU so strip the A-MSDU bit from QoS Ctl.
*/
hdr = (void *)first_hdr;
- qos = ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr);
- qos[0] &= ~IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_A_MSDU_PRESENT;
+
+ if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) {
+ qos = ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr);
+ qos[0] &= ~IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_A_MSDU_PRESENT;
+ }
/* Some attention flags are valid only in the last MSDU. */
last = skb_peek_tail(amsdu);
@@ -1379,9 +1434,14 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED;
if (likely(!is_mgmt))
- status->flag |= RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED |
- RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED;
-}
+ status->flag |= RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED;
+
+ if (fill_crypt_header)
+ status->flag |= RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED |
+ RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED;
+ else
+ status->flag |= RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED;
+ }
skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) {
ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu);
@@ -1397,6 +1457,9 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
if (is_mgmt)
continue;
+ if (fill_crypt_header)
+ continue;
+
hdr = (void *)msdu->data;
hdr->frame_control &= ~__cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
}
@@ -1407,6 +1470,9 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_deliver(stru
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status)
{
struct sk_buff *msdu;
+ struct sk_buff *first_subframe;
+
+ first_subframe = skb_peek(amsdu);
while ((msdu = __skb_dequeue(amsdu))) {
/* Setup per-MSDU flags */
@@ -1415,6 +1481,13 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_deliver(stru
else
status->flag |= RX_FLAG_AMSDU_MORE;
+ if (msdu == first_subframe) {
+ first_subframe = NULL;
+ status->flag &= ~RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN;
+ } else {
+ status->flag |= RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN;
+ }
+
ath10k_process_rx(ar, status, msdu);
}
}
@@ -1557,7 +1630,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(st
ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, 0xffff);
ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, ret > 0);
ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status);
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true);
ath10k_htt_rx_h_deliver(ar, &amsdu, rx_status);
return num_msdus;
@@ -1892,7 +1965,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(stru
num_msdus += skb_queue_len(&amsdu);
ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id);
ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status);
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status);
+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false);
ath10k_htt_rx_h_deliver(ar, &amsdu, status);
break;
case -EAGAIN:
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h
@@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type {
HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_WAPI = 5,
HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2 = 6,
HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_NONE = 7,
+ HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM256_WPA2 = 8,
+ HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_GCMP_WPA2 = 9,
+ HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_GCMP256_WPA2 = 10,
};
#define RX_MPDU_START_INFO0_PEER_IDX_MASK 0x000007ff
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 04/96] KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/96] ath10k: rebuild crypto header in rx data frames Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/96] can: gs_usb: fix return value of the "set_bittiming" callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Vyukov, Darren Kenny,
Marc Zyngier, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Christoffer Dall, Wanpeng Li, Mathieu Desnoyers
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
commit e39d200fa5bf5b94a0948db0dae44c1b73b84a56 upstream.
Reported by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8803259df7f8 by task syz-executor/32298
CPU: 6 PID: 32298 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G OE 4.15.0-rc2+ #18
Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkCentre M8500t-N000/SHARKBAY, BIOS FBKTC1AUS 02/16/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xab/0xe1
print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
kasan_report+0x28a/0x370
write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm]
emulator_read_write_onepage+0x311/0x600 [kvm]
emulator_read_write+0xef/0x240 [kvm]
emulator_fix_hypercall+0x105/0x150 [kvm]
em_hypercall+0x2b/0x80 [kvm]
x86_emulate_insn+0x2b1/0x1640 [kvm]
x86_emulate_instruction+0x39a/0xb90 [kvm]
handle_exception+0x1b4/0x4d0 [kvm_intel]
vcpu_enter_guest+0x15a0/0x2640 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x549/0x7d0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x479/0x880 [kvm]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x142/0x9a0
SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0x9a
The path of patched vmmcall will patch 3 bytes opcode 0F 01 C1(vmcall)
to the guest memory, however, write_mmio tracepoint always prints 8 bytes
through *(u64 *)val since kvm splits the mmio access into 8 bytes. This
leaks 5 bytes from the kernel stack (CVE-2017-17741). This patch fixes
it by just accessing the bytes which we operate on.
Before patch:
syz-executor-5567 [007] .... 51370.561696: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0x1ffff10077c1010f
After patch:
syz-executor-13416 [002] .... 51302.299573: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0xc1010f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm/kvm/mmio.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 ++++----
include/trace/events/kvm.h | 7 +++++--
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/kvm/mmio.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kvm/mmio.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vc
}
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, len, run->mmio.phys_addr,
- data);
+ &data);
data = vcpu_data_host_to_guest(vcpu, data, len);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmio_decode.rt, data);
}
@@ -182,14 +182,14 @@ int io_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
data = vcpu_data_guest_to_host(vcpu, vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, rt),
len);
- trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, len, fault_ipa, data);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, len, fault_ipa, &data);
kvm_mmio_write_buf(data_buf, len, data);
ret = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
data_buf);
} else {
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, len,
- fault_ipa, 0);
+ fault_ipa, NULL);
ret = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
data_buf);
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4264,7 +4264,7 @@ static int vcpu_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcp
addr, n, v))
&& kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, n, v))
break;
- trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, n, addr, *(u64 *)v);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, n, addr, v);
handled += n;
addr += n;
len -= n;
@@ -4517,7 +4517,7 @@ static int read_prepare(struct kvm_vcpu
{
if (vcpu->mmio_read_completed) {
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, bytes,
- vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa, *(u64 *)val);
+ vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa, val);
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -4539,14 +4539,14 @@ static int write_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu
static int write_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int bytes, void *val)
{
- trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, bytes, gpa, *(u64 *)val);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, bytes, gpa, val);
return vcpu_mmio_write(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val);
}
static int read_exit_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
void *val, int bytes)
{
- trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, bytes, gpa, 0);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, bytes, gpa, NULL);
return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
}
--- a/include/trace/events/kvm.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/kvm.h
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_ack_irq,
{ KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, "write" }
TRACE_EVENT(kvm_mmio,
- TP_PROTO(int type, int len, u64 gpa, u64 val),
+ TP_PROTO(int type, int len, u64 gpa, void *val),
TP_ARGS(type, len, gpa, val),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
@@ -222,7 +222,10 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_mmio,
__entry->type = type;
__entry->len = len;
__entry->gpa = gpa;
- __entry->val = val;
+ __entry->val = 0;
+ if (val)
+ memcpy(&__entry->val, val,
+ min_t(u32, sizeof(__entry->val), len));
),
TP_printk("mmio %s len %u gpa 0x%llx val 0x%llx",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 05/96] can: gs_usb: fix return value of the "set_bittiming" callback
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/96] KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/96] IB/srpt: Disable RDMA access by the initiator Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wolfgang Grandegger, Marc Kleine-Budde
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
commit d5b42e6607661b198d8b26a0c30969605b1bf5c7 upstream.
The "set_bittiming" callback treats a positive return value as error!
For that reason "can_changelink()" will quit silently after setting
the bittiming values without processing ctrlmode, restart-ms, etc.
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static int gs_usb_set_bittiming(struct n
dev_err(netdev->dev.parent, "Couldn't set bittimings (err=%d)",
rc);
- return rc;
+ return (rc > 0) ? 0 : rc;
}
static void gs_usb_xmit_callback(struct urb *urb)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 06/96] IB/srpt: Disable RDMA access by the initiator
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/96] can: gs_usb: fix return value of the "set_bittiming" callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/96] MIPS: Validate PR_SET_FP_MODE prctl(2) requests against the ABI of the task Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Bart Van Assche, Jason Gunthorpe
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
commit bec40c26041de61162f7be9d2ce548c756ce0f65 upstream.
With the SRP protocol all RDMA operations are initiated by the target.
Since no RDMA operations are initiated by the initiator, do not grant
the initiator permission to submit RDMA reads or writes to the target.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
@@ -992,8 +992,7 @@ static int srpt_init_ch_qp(struct srpt_r
return -ENOMEM;
attr->qp_state = IB_QPS_INIT;
- attr->qp_access_flags = IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE | IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_READ |
- IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE;
+ attr->qp_access_flags = IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE;
attr->port_num = ch->sport->port;
attr->pkey_index = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 07/96] MIPS: Validate PR_SET_FP_MODE prctl(2) requests against the ABI of the task
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/96] IB/srpt: Disable RDMA access by the initiator Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/96] MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maciej W. Rozycki, Paul Burton,
James Hogan, linux-mips, Ralf Baechle
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
commit b67336eee3fcb8ecedc6c13e2bf88aacfa3151e2 upstream.
Fix an API loophole introduced with commit 9791554b45a2 ("MIPS,prctl:
add PR_[GS]ET_FP_MODE prctl options for MIPS"), where the caller of
prctl(2) is incorrectly allowed to make a change to CP0.Status.FR or
CP0.Config5.FRE register bits even if CONFIG_MIPS_O32_FP64_SUPPORT has
not been enabled, despite that an executable requesting the mode
requested via ELF file annotation would not be allowed to run in the
first place, or for n64 and n64 ABI tasks which do not have non-default
modes defined at all. Add suitable checks to `mips_set_process_fp_mode'
and bail out if an invalid mode change has been requested for the ABI in
effect, even if the FPU hardware or emulation would otherwise allow it.
Always succeed however without taking any further action if the mode
requested is the same as one already in effect, regardless of whether
any mode change, should it be requested, would actually be allowed for
the task concerned.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 9791554b45a2 ("MIPS,prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_FP_MODE prctl options for MIPS")
Reviewed-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17800/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/process.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/process.c
@@ -683,6 +683,18 @@ int mips_set_process_fp_mode(struct task
struct task_struct *t;
int max_users;
+ /* If nothing to change, return right away, successfully. */
+ if (value == mips_get_process_fp_mode(task))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Only accept a mode change if 64-bit FP enabled for o32. */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MIPS_O32_FP64_SUPPORT))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /* And only for o32 tasks. */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && !test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT_REGS))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
/* Check the value is valid */
if (value & ~known_bits)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 08/96] MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/96] MIPS: Validate PR_SET_FP_MODE prctl(2) requests against the ABI of the task Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/96] MIPS: Guard against any partial write attempt with PTRACE_SETREGSET Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maciej W. Rozycki, James Hogan,
Paul Burton, Alex Smith, Dave Martin, linux-mips, Ralf Baechle
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
commit a03fe72572c12e98f4173f8a535f32468e48b6ec upstream.
In preparation to fix a commit 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit
FP registers for FP regset") FCSR access regression factor out
NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers for the non-MSA and the MSA variants
respectively, to avoid having to deal with excessive indentation in the
actual fix.
No functional change, however use `target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]' rather
than `target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]' for FGR holding type size determination
as there's no `i' variable to refer to anymore, and for the factored out
`i' variable declaration use `unsigned int' rather than `unsigned' as
its type, following the common style.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17925/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -439,25 +439,36 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
-static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
- const struct user_regset *regset,
- unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
- void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. FP context's general register slots
+ * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
{
- unsigned i;
- int err;
- u64 fpr_val;
-
- /* XXX fcr31 */
+ return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu,
+ 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
- if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
- return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
- &target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
+ * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ u64 fpr_val;
+ int err;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS; i++) {
fpr_val = get_fpr64(&target->thread.fpu.fpr[i], 0);
- err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ err = user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@@ -467,27 +478,54 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *t
return 0;
}
-static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+/* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer. */
+static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
- const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+ void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
- unsigned i;
int err;
- u64 fpr_val;
/* XXX fcr31 */
- init_fp_ctx(target);
+ if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+ err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ else
+ err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+ return err;
+}
- if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
- return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
- &target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
+ * context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu,
+ 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
+ * bits only of FP context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+ unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+ const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ u64 fpr_val;
+ int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
- err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+ err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
if (err)
@@ -498,6 +536,26 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
return 0;
}
+/* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context. */
+static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+ const struct user_regset *regset,
+ unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+ const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* XXX fcr31 */
+
+ init_fp_ctx(target);
+
+ if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+ err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ else
+ err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
enum mips_regset {
REGSET_GPR,
REGSET_FPR,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 09/96] MIPS: Guard against any partial write attempt with PTRACE_SETREGSET
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/96] MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/96] MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maciej W. Rozycki, James Hogan,
Paul Burton, Alex Smith, Dave Martin, linux-mips, Ralf Baechle
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
commit dc24d0edf33c3e15099688b6bbdf7bdc24bf6e91 upstream.
Complement commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous
registers for short regset write") and ensure that no partial register
write attempt is made with PTRACE_SETREGSET, as we do not preinitialize
any temporaries used to hold incoming register data and consequently
random data could be written.
It is the responsibility of the caller, such as `ptrace_regset', to
arrange for writes to span whole registers only, so here we only assert
that it has indeed happened.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17926/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -536,7 +536,15 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
return 0;
}
-/* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context. */
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.
+ *
+ * We optimize for the case where `count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t) == 0',
+ * which is supposed to have been guaranteed by the kernel before
+ * calling us, e.g. in `ptrace_regset'. We enforce that requirement,
+ * so that we can safely avoid preinitializing temporaries for
+ * partial register writes.
+ */
static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
@@ -544,6 +552,8 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
{
int err;
+ BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
+
/* XXX fcr31 */
init_fp_ctx(target);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 10/96] MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter with PTRACE_SETREGSET
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/96] MIPS: Guard against any partial write attempt with PTRACE_SETREGSET Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/96] MIPS: Fix an FCSR access API regression with NT_PRFPREG and MSA Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maciej W. Rozycki, James Hogan,
Paul Burton, Alex Smith, Dave Martin, linux-mips, Ralf Baechle
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
commit 80b3ffce0196ea50068885d085ff981e4b8396f4 upstream.
Update commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers
for short regset write") bug and consistently consume all data supplied
to `fpr_set_msa' with the ptrace(2) PTRACE_SETREGSET request, such that
a zero data buffer counter is returned where insufficient data has been
given to fill a whole number of FP general registers.
In reality this is not going to happen, as the caller is supposed to
only supply data covering a whole number of registers and it is verified
in `ptrace_regset' and again asserted in `fpr_set', however structuring
code such that the presence of trailing partial FP general register data
causes `fpr_set_msa' to return with a non-zero data buffer counter makes
it appear that this trailing data will be used if there are subsequent
writes made to FP registers, which is going to be the case with the FCSR
once the missing write to that register has been fixed.
Fixes: d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17927/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count > 0; i++) {
err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
(i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 11/96] MIPS: Fix an FCSR access API regression with NT_PRFPREG and MSA
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/96] MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/96] MIPS: Also verify sizeof `elf_fpreg_t with PTRACE_SETREGSET Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alex Smith, James Hogan,
Maciej W. Rozycki, Paul Burton, Dave Martin, linux-mips,
Ralf Baechle
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
commit be07a6a1188372b6d19a3307ec33211fc9c9439d upstream.
Fix a commit 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for
FP regset") public API regression, then activated by commit 1db1af84d6df
("MIPS: Basic MSA context switching support"), that caused the FCSR
register not to be read or written for CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA kernel
configurations (regardless of actual presence or absence of the MSA
feature in a given processor) with ptrace(2) PTRACE_GETREGSET and
PTRACE_SETREGSET requests nor recorded in core dumps.
This is because with !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA configurations the whole of
`elf_fpregset_t' array is bulk-copied as it is, which includes the FCSR
in one half of the last, 33rd slot, whereas with CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA
configurations array elements are copied individually, and then only the
leading 32 FGR slots while the remaining slot is ignored.
Correct the code then such that only FGR slots are copied in the
respective !MSA and MSA helpers an then the FCSR slot is handled
separately in common code. Use `ptrace_setfcr31' to update the FCSR
too, so that the read-only mask is respected.
Retrieving a correct value of FCSR is important in debugging not only
for the human to be able to get the right interpretation of the
situation, but for correct operation of GDB as well. This is because
the condition code bits in FSCR are used by GDB to determine the
location to place a breakpoint at when single-stepping through an FPU
branch instruction. If such a breakpoint is placed incorrectly (i.e.
with the condition reversed), then it will be missed, likely causing the
debuggee to run away from the control of GDB and consequently breaking
the process of investigation.
Fortunately GDB continues using the older PTRACE_GETFPREGS ptrace(2)
request which is unaffected, so the regression only really hits with
post-mortem debug sessions using a core dump file, in which case
execution, and consequently single-stepping through branches is not
possible. Of course core files created by buggy kernels out there will
have the value of FCSR recorded clobbered, but such core files cannot be
corrected and the person using them simply will have to be aware that
the value of FCSR retrieved is not reliable.
Which also means we can likely get away without defining a replacement
API which would ensure a correct value of FSCR to be retrieved, or none
at all.
This is based on previous work by Alex Smith, extensively rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17928/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct
/*
* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
* !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. FP context's general register slots
- * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.
+ * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots. Only general registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -450,13 +450,14 @@ static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struc
{
return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+ 0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
}
/*
* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
* CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
- * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.
+ * general register slots are copied to buffer slots. Only general
+ * registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -478,20 +479,29 @@ static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struc
return 0;
}
-/* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer. */
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer.
+ * Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
+ * the FCSR register separately.
+ */
static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
+ const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
int err;
- /* XXX fcr31 */
-
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ &target->thread.fpu.fcr31,
+ fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
return err;
}
@@ -499,7 +509,7 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *t
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
* !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
- * context's general register slots.
+ * context's general register slots. Only general registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -507,13 +517,14 @@ static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struc
{
return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
&target->thread.fpu,
- 0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+ 0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
}
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
* CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant. Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
- * bits only of FP context's general register slots.
+ * bits only of FP context's general register slots. Only general
+ * registers are copied.
*/
static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -538,6 +549,8 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
/*
* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.
+ * Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
+ * the FCSR register separately.
*
* We optimize for the case where `count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t) == 0',
* which is supposed to have been guaranteed by the kernel before
@@ -550,18 +563,30 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
+ const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
+ u32 fcr31;
int err;
BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
- /* XXX fcr31 */
-
init_fp_ctx(target);
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
else
err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (count > 0) {
+ err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+ &fcr31,
+ fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ptrace_setfcr31(target, fcr31);
+ }
return err;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 12/96] MIPS: Also verify sizeof `elf_fpreg_t with PTRACE_SETREGSET
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/96] MIPS: Fix an FCSR access API regression with NT_PRFPREG and MSA Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/96] MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maciej W. Rozycki, James Hogan,
Paul Burton, Alex Smith, Dave Martin, linux-mips, Ralf Baechle
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
commit 006501e039eec411842bb3150c41358867d320c2 upstream.
Complement commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous
registers for short regset write") and like with the PTRACE_GETREGSET
ptrace(2) request also apply a BUILD_BUG_ON check for the size of the
`elf_fpreg_t' type in the PTRACE_SETREGSET request handler.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17929/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -467,6 +467,7 @@ static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struc
u64 fpr_val;
int err;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS; i++) {
fpr_val = get_fpr64(&target->thread.fpu.fpr[i], 0);
err = user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 13/96] MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/96] MIPS: Also verify sizeof `elf_fpreg_t with PTRACE_SETREGSET Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/96] kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maciej W. Rozycki, James Hogan,
Paul Burton, Alex Smith, Dave Martin, linux-mips, Ralf Baechle
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
commit c8c5a3a24d395b14447a9a89d61586a913840a3b upstream.
Complement commit c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use
correct core dump register layout") and also reject outsized
PTRACE_SETREGSET requests to the NT_PRFPREG regset, like with the
NT_PRSTATUS regset.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use correct core dump register layout")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17930/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -570,6 +570,9 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
+ if (pos + count > sizeof(elf_fpregset_t))
+ return -EIO;
+
init_fp_ctx(target);
if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 14/96] kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/96] MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/96] platform/x86: wmi: Call acpi_wmi_init() later Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Northup, Jim Mattson,
Benjamin Serebrin, Andrew Honig, Paolo Bonzini
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
commit 0cb5b30698fdc8f6b4646012e3acb4ddce430788 upstream.
Guest GPR values are live in the hardware GPRs at VM-exit. Do not
leave any guest values in hardware GPRs after the guest GPR values are
saved to the vcpu_vmx structure.
This is a partial mitigation for CVE 2017-5715 and CVE 2017-5753.
Specifically, it defeats the Project Zero PoC for CVE 2017-5715.
Suggested-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
[Paolo: Add AMD bits, Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -4869,6 +4869,25 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%[svm]) \n\t"
"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%[svm]) \n\t"
#endif
+ /*
+ * Clear host registers marked as clobbered to prevent
+ * speculative use.
+ */
+ "xor %%" _ASM_BX ", %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
+ "xor %%" _ASM_CX ", %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t"
+ "xor %%" _ASM_DX ", %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
+ "xor %%" _ASM_SI ", %%" _ASM_SI " \n\t"
+ "xor %%" _ASM_DI ", %%" _ASM_DI " \n\t"
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ "xor %%r8, %%r8 \n\t"
+ "xor %%r9, %%r9 \n\t"
+ "xor %%r10, %%r10 \n\t"
+ "xor %%r11, %%r11 \n\t"
+ "xor %%r12, %%r12 \n\t"
+ "xor %%r13, %%r13 \n\t"
+ "xor %%r14, %%r14 \n\t"
+ "xor %%r15, %%r15 \n\t"
+#endif
"pop %%" _ASM_BP
:
: [svm]"a"(svm),
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8948,6 +8948,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
/* Save guest registers, load host registers, keep flags */
"mov %0, %c[wordsize](%%" _ASM_SP ") \n\t"
"pop %0 \n\t"
+ "setbe %c[fail](%0)\n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[rax](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BX ", %c[rbx](%0) \n\t"
__ASM_SIZE(pop) " %c[rcx](%0) \n\t"
@@ -8964,12 +8965,23 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
"mov %%r13, %c[r13](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%0) \n\t"
+ "xor %%r8d, %%r8d \n\t"
+ "xor %%r9d, %%r9d \n\t"
+ "xor %%r10d, %%r10d \n\t"
+ "xor %%r11d, %%r11d \n\t"
+ "xor %%r12d, %%r12d \n\t"
+ "xor %%r13d, %%r13d \n\t"
+ "xor %%r14d, %%r14d \n\t"
+ "xor %%r15d, %%r15d \n\t"
#endif
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[cr2](%0) \n\t"
+ "xor %%eax, %%eax \n\t"
+ "xor %%ebx, %%ebx \n\t"
+ "xor %%esi, %%esi \n\t"
+ "xor %%edi, %%edi \n\t"
"pop %%" _ASM_BP "; pop %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
- "setbe %c[fail](%0) \n\t"
".pushsection .rodata \n\t"
".global vmx_return \n\t"
"vmx_return: " _ASM_PTR " 2b \n\t"
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 15/96] platform/x86: wmi: Call acpi_wmi_init() later
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/96] kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/96] x86/acpi: Handle SCI interrupts above legacy space gracefully Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jonathan McDowell, Joonsoo Kim,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Darren Hart (VMware)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
commit 98b8e4e5c17bf87c1b18ed929472051dab39878c upstream.
Calling acpi_wmi_init() at the subsys_initcall() level causes ordering
issues to appear on some systems and they are difficult to reproduce,
because there is no guaranteed ordering between subsys_initcall()
calls, so they may occur in different orders on different systems.
In particular, commit 86d9f48534e8 (mm/slab: fix kmemcg cache
creation delayed issue) exposed one of these issues where genl_init()
and acpi_wmi_init() are both called at the same initcall level, but
the former must run before the latter so as to avoid a NULL pointer
dereference.
For this reason, move the acpi_wmi_init() invocation to the
initcall_sync level which should still be early enough for things
to work correctly in the WMI land.
Link: https://marc.info/?t=151274596700002&r=1&w=2
Reported-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Reported-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c
@@ -848,5 +848,5 @@ static void __exit acpi_wmi_exit(void)
pr_info("Mapper unloaded\n");
}
-subsys_initcall(acpi_wmi_init);
+subsys_initcall_sync(acpi_wmi_init);
module_exit(acpi_wmi_exit);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 16/96] x86/acpi: Handle SCI interrupts above legacy space gracefully
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/96] platform/x86: wmi: Call acpi_wmi_init() later Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/96] ALSA: pcm: Remove incorrect snd_BUG_ON() usages Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vikas C Sajjan, Sunil V L,
Thomas Gleixner, Abdul Lateef Attar, Rafael J. Wysocki, linux-pm,
kkamagui, linux-acpi, Jean Delvare
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
commit 252714155f04c5d16989cb3aadb85fd1b5772f99 upstream.
Platforms which support only IOAPIC mode, pass the SCI information above
the legacy space (0-15) via the FADT mechanism and not via MADT.
In such cases mp_override_legacy_irq() which is invoked from
acpi_sci_ioapic_setup() to register SCI interrupts fails for interrupts
greater equal 16, since it is meant to handle only the legacy space and
emits error "Invalid bus_irq %u for legacy override".
Add a new function to handle SCI interrupts >= 16 and invoke it
conditionally in acpi_sci_ioapic_setup().
The code duplication due to this new function will be cleaned up in a
separate patch.
Co-developed-by: Sunil V L <sunil.vl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <sunil.vl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Abdul Lateef Attar <abdul-lateef.attar@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kkamagui@gmail.com
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510848825-21965-2-git-send-email-vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -422,6 +422,34 @@ static int mp_config_acpi_gsi(struct dev
return 0;
}
+static int __init mp_register_ioapic_irq(u8 bus_irq, u8 polarity,
+ u8 trigger, u32 gsi)
+{
+ struct mpc_intsrc mp_irq;
+ int ioapic, pin;
+
+ /* Convert 'gsi' to 'ioapic.pin'(INTIN#) */
+ ioapic = mp_find_ioapic(gsi);
+ if (ioapic < 0) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to find ioapic for gsi : %u\n", gsi);
+ return ioapic;
+ }
+
+ pin = mp_find_ioapic_pin(ioapic, gsi);
+
+ mp_irq.type = MP_INTSRC;
+ mp_irq.irqtype = mp_INT;
+ mp_irq.irqflag = (trigger << 2) | polarity;
+ mp_irq.srcbus = MP_ISA_BUS;
+ mp_irq.srcbusirq = bus_irq;
+ mp_irq.dstapic = mpc_ioapic_id(ioapic);
+ mp_irq.dstirq = pin;
+
+ mp_save_irq(&mp_irq);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __init
acpi_parse_ioapic(struct acpi_subtable_header * header, const unsigned long end)
{
@@ -466,7 +494,11 @@ static void __init acpi_sci_ioapic_setup
if (acpi_sci_flags & ACPI_MADT_POLARITY_MASK)
polarity = acpi_sci_flags & ACPI_MADT_POLARITY_MASK;
- mp_override_legacy_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi);
+ if (bus_irq < NR_IRQS_LEGACY)
+ mp_override_legacy_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi);
+ else
+ mp_register_ioapic_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi);
+
acpi_penalize_sci_irq(bus_irq, trigger, polarity);
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 17/96] ALSA: pcm: Remove incorrect snd_BUG_ON() usages
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/96] x86/acpi: Handle SCI interrupts above legacy space gracefully Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/96] ALSA: pcm: Add missing error checks in OSS emulation plugin builder Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+6f11c7e2a1b91d466432, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit fe08f34d066f4404934a509b6806db1a4f700c86 upstream.
syzkaller triggered kernel warnings through PCM OSS emulation at
closing a stream:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3502 at sound/core/pcm_lib.c:1635
snd_pcm_hw_param_first+0x289/0x690 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:1635
Call Trace:
....
snd_pcm_hw_param_near.constprop.27+0x78d/0x9a0 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:457
snd_pcm_oss_change_params+0x17d3/0x3720 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:969
snd_pcm_oss_make_ready+0xaa/0x130 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1128
snd_pcm_oss_sync+0x257/0x830 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1638
snd_pcm_oss_release+0x20b/0x280 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:2431
__fput+0x327/0x7e0 fs/file_table.c:210
....
This happens while it tries to open and set up the aloop device
concurrently. The warning above (invoked from snd_BUG_ON() macro) is
to detect the unexpected logical error where snd_pcm_hw_refine() call
shouldn't fail. The theory is true for the case where the hw_params
config rules are static. But for an aloop device, the hw_params rule
condition does vary dynamically depending on the connected target;
when another device is opened and changes the parameters, the device
connected in another side is also affected, and it caused the error
from snd_pcm_hw_refine().
That is, the simplest "solution" for this is to remove the incorrect
assumption of static rules, and treat such an error as a normal error
path. As there are a couple of other places using snd_BUG_ON()
incorrectly, this patch removes these spurious snd_BUG_ON() calls.
Reported-by: syzbot+6f11c7e2a1b91d466432@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 1 -
sound/core/pcm_lib.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -466,7 +466,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_hw_param_near(struct
v = snd_pcm_hw_param_last(pcm, params, var, dir);
else
v = snd_pcm_hw_param_first(pcm, params, var, dir);
- snd_BUG_ON(v < 0);
return v;
}
--- a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
@@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ int snd_pcm_hw_param_first(struct snd_pc
return changed;
if (params->rmask) {
int err = snd_pcm_hw_refine(pcm, params);
- if (snd_BUG_ON(err < 0))
+ if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return snd_pcm_hw_param_value(params, var, dir);
@@ -1711,7 +1711,7 @@ int snd_pcm_hw_param_last(struct snd_pcm
return changed;
if (params->rmask) {
int err = snd_pcm_hw_refine(pcm, params);
- if (snd_BUG_ON(err < 0))
+ if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return snd_pcm_hw_param_value(params, var, dir);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 18/96] ALSA: pcm: Add missing error checks in OSS emulation plugin builder
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/96] ALSA: pcm: Remove incorrect snd_BUG_ON() usages Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/96] ALSA: pcm: Abort properly at pending signal in OSS read/write loops Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 6708913750344a900f2e73bfe4a4d6dbbce4fe8d upstream.
In the OSS emulation plugin builder where the frame size is parsed in
the plugin chain, some places miss the possible errors returned from
the plugin src_ or dst_frames callback.
This patch papers over such places.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c
@@ -591,18 +591,26 @@ snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_plug_write_tra
snd_pcm_sframes_t frames = size;
plugin = snd_pcm_plug_first(plug);
- while (plugin && frames > 0) {
+ while (plugin) {
+ if (frames <= 0)
+ return frames;
if ((next = plugin->next) != NULL) {
snd_pcm_sframes_t frames1 = frames;
- if (plugin->dst_frames)
+ if (plugin->dst_frames) {
frames1 = plugin->dst_frames(plugin, frames);
+ if (frames1 <= 0)
+ return frames1;
+ }
if ((err = next->client_channels(next, frames1, &dst_channels)) < 0) {
return err;
}
if (err != frames1) {
frames = err;
- if (plugin->src_frames)
+ if (plugin->src_frames) {
frames = plugin->src_frames(plugin, frames1);
+ if (frames <= 0)
+ return frames;
+ }
}
} else
dst_channels = NULL;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 19/96] ALSA: pcm: Abort properly at pending signal in OSS read/write loops
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/96] ALSA: pcm: Add missing error checks in OSS emulation plugin builder Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/96] ALSA: pcm: Allow aborting mutex lock at " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+993cb4cfcbbff3947c21, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 29159a4ed7044c52e3e2cf1a9fb55cec4745c60b upstream.
The loops for read and write in PCM OSS emulation have no proper check
of pending signals, and they keep processing even after user tries to
break. This results in a very long delay, often seen as RCU stall
when a huge unprocessed bytes remain queued. The bug could be easily
triggered by syzkaller.
As a simple workaround, this patch adds the proper check of pending
signals and aborts the loop appropriately.
Reported-by: syzbot+993cb4cfcbbff3947c21@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -1416,6 +1416,10 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
tmp != runtime->oss.period_bytes)
break;
}
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto err;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
return xfer;
@@ -1501,6 +1505,10 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
bytes -= tmp;
xfer += tmp;
}
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto err;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
return xfer;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 20/96] ALSA: pcm: Allow aborting mutex lock at OSS read/write loops
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/96] ALSA: pcm: Abort properly at pending signal in OSS read/write loops Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/96] ALSA: aloop: Release cable upon open error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 900498a34a3ac9c611e9b425094c8106bdd7dc1c upstream.
PCM OSS read/write loops keep taking the mutex lock for the whole
read/write, and this might take very long when the exceptionally high
amount of data is given. Also, since it invokes with mutex_lock(),
the concurrent read/write becomes unbreakable.
This patch tries to address these issues by replacing mutex_lock()
with mutex_lock_interruptible(), and also splits / re-takes the lock
at each read/write period chunk, so that it can switch the context
more finely if requested.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -1369,8 +1369,11 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
return tmp;
- mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
while (bytes > 0) {
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
+ tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ break;
+ }
if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
tmp = bytes;
if (tmp + runtime->oss.buffer_used > runtime->oss.period_bytes)
@@ -1414,18 +1417,18 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
xfer += tmp;
if ((substream->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 &&
tmp != runtime->oss.period_bytes)
- break;
+ tmp = -EAGAIN;
}
+ err:
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ if (tmp < 0)
+ break;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
- goto err;
+ break;
}
+ tmp = 0;
}
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
- return xfer;
-
- err:
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp;
}
@@ -1473,8 +1476,11 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
return tmp;
- mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
while (bytes > 0) {
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
+ tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ break;
+ }
if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
if (runtime->oss.buffer_used == 0) {
tmp = snd_pcm_oss_read2(substream, runtime->oss.buffer, runtime->oss.period_bytes, 1);
@@ -1505,16 +1511,16 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
bytes -= tmp;
xfer += tmp;
}
+ err:
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ if (tmp < 0)
+ break;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
- goto err;
+ break;
}
+ tmp = 0;
}
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
- return xfer;
-
- err:
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 21/96] ALSA: aloop: Release cable upon open error path
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/96] ALSA: pcm: Allow aborting mutex lock at " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/96] ALSA: aloop: Fix inconsistent format due to incomplete rule Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 9685347aa0a5c2869058ca6ab79fd8e93084a67f upstream.
The aloop runtime object and its assignment in the cable are left even
when opening a substream fails. This doesn't mean any memory leak,
but it still keeps the invalid pointer that may be referred by the
another side of the cable spontaneously, which is a potential Oops
cause.
Clean up the cable assignment and the empty cable upon the error path
properly.
Fixes: 597603d615d2 ("ALSA: introduce the snd-aloop module for the PCM loopback")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/drivers/aloop.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/drivers/aloop.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/aloop.c
@@ -658,12 +658,31 @@ static int rule_channels(struct snd_pcm_
return snd_interval_refine(hw_param_interval(params, rule->var), &t);
}
+static void free_cable(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
+{
+ struct loopback *loopback = substream->private_data;
+ int dev = get_cable_index(substream);
+ struct loopback_cable *cable;
+
+ cable = loopback->cables[substream->number][dev];
+ if (!cable)
+ return;
+ if (cable->streams[!substream->stream]) {
+ /* other stream is still alive */
+ cable->streams[substream->stream] = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /* free the cable */
+ loopback->cables[substream->number][dev] = NULL;
+ kfree(cable);
+ }
+}
+
static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
struct loopback *loopback = substream->private_data;
struct loopback_pcm *dpcm;
- struct loopback_cable *cable;
+ struct loopback_cable *cable = NULL;
int err = 0;
int dev = get_cable_index(substream);
@@ -682,7 +701,6 @@ static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_
if (!cable) {
cable = kzalloc(sizeof(*cable), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cable) {
- kfree(dpcm);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto unlock;
}
@@ -724,6 +742,10 @@ static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_
else
runtime->hw = cable->hw;
unlock:
+ if (err < 0) {
+ free_cable(substream);
+ kfree(dpcm);
+ }
mutex_unlock(&loopback->cable_lock);
return err;
}
@@ -732,20 +754,10 @@ static int loopback_close(struct snd_pcm
{
struct loopback *loopback = substream->private_data;
struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = substream->runtime->private_data;
- struct loopback_cable *cable;
- int dev = get_cable_index(substream);
loopback_timer_stop(dpcm);
mutex_lock(&loopback->cable_lock);
- cable = loopback->cables[substream->number][dev];
- if (cable->streams[!substream->stream]) {
- /* other stream is still alive */
- cable->streams[substream->stream] = NULL;
- } else {
- /* free the cable */
- loopback->cables[substream->number][dev] = NULL;
- kfree(cable);
- }
+ free_cable(substream);
mutex_unlock(&loopback->cable_lock);
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 22/96] ALSA: aloop: Fix inconsistent format due to incomplete rule
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/96] ALSA: aloop: Release cable upon open error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/96] ALSA: aloop: Fix racy hw constraints adjustment Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+3902b5220e8ca27889ca, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit b088b53e20c7d09b5ab84c5688e609f478e5c417 upstream.
The extra hw constraint rule for the formats the aloop driver
introduced has a slight flaw, where it doesn't return a positive value
when the mask got changed. It came from the fact that it's basically
a copy&paste from snd_hw_constraint_mask64(). The original code is
supposed to be a single-shot and it modifies the mask bits only once
and never after, while what we need for aloop is the dynamic hw rule
that limits the mask bits.
This difference results in the inconsistent state, as the hw_refine
doesn't apply the dependencies fully. The worse and surprisingly
result is that it causes a crash in OSS emulation when multiple
full-duplex reads/writes are performed concurrently (I leave why it
triggers Oops to readers as a homework).
For fixing this, replace a few open-codes with the standard
snd_mask_*() macros.
Reported-by: syzbot+3902b5220e8ca27889ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b1c73fc8e697 ("ALSA: snd-aloop: Fix hw_params restrictions and checking")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/drivers/aloop.c | 13 ++++++-------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/drivers/aloop.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/aloop.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include <sound/core.h>
#include <sound/control.h>
#include <sound/pcm.h>
+#include <sound/pcm_params.h>
#include <sound/info.h>
#include <sound/initval.h>
@@ -622,14 +623,12 @@ static int rule_format(struct snd_pcm_hw
{
struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
- struct snd_mask *maskp = hw_param_mask(params, rule->var);
+ struct snd_mask m;
- maskp->bits[0] &= (u_int32_t)hw->formats;
- maskp->bits[1] &= (u_int32_t)(hw->formats >> 32);
- memset(maskp->bits + 2, 0, (SNDRV_MASK_MAX-64) / 8); /* clear rest */
- if (! maskp->bits[0] && ! maskp->bits[1])
- return -EINVAL;
- return 0;
+ snd_mask_none(&m);
+ m.bits[0] = (u_int32_t)hw->formats;
+ m.bits[1] = (u_int32_t)(hw->formats >> 32);
+ return snd_mask_refine(hw_param_mask(params, rule->var), &m);
}
static int rule_rate(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 23/96] ALSA: aloop: Fix racy hw constraints adjustment
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/96] ALSA: aloop: Fix inconsistent format due to incomplete rule Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/96] x86/acpi: Reduce code duplication in mp_override_legacy_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 898dfe4687f460ba337a01c11549f87269a13fa2 upstream.
The aloop driver tries to update the hw constraints of the connected
target on the cable of the opened PCM substream. This is done by
adding the extra hw constraints rules referring to the substream
runtime->hw fields, while the other substream may update the runtime
hw of another side on the fly.
This is, however, racy and may result in the inconsistent values when
both PCM streams perform the prepare concurrently. One of the reason
is that it overwrites the other's runtime->hw field; which is not only
racy but also broken when it's called before the open of another side
finishes. And, since the reference to runtime->hw isn't protected,
the concurrent write may give the partial value update and become
inconsistent.
This patch is an attempt to fix and clean up:
- The prepare doesn't change the runtime->hw of other side any longer,
but only update the cable->hw that is referred commonly.
- The extra rules refer to the loopback_pcm object instead of the
runtime->hw. The actual hw is deduced from cable->hw.
- The extra rules take the cable_lock to protect against the race.
Fixes: b1c73fc8e697 ("ALSA: snd-aloop: Fix hw_params restrictions and checking")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/drivers/aloop.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/drivers/aloop.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/aloop.c
@@ -306,19 +306,6 @@ static int loopback_trigger(struct snd_p
return 0;
}
-static void params_change_substream(struct loopback_pcm *dpcm,
- struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime)
-{
- struct snd_pcm_runtime *dst_runtime;
-
- if (dpcm == NULL || dpcm->substream == NULL)
- return;
- dst_runtime = dpcm->substream->runtime;
- if (dst_runtime == NULL)
- return;
- dst_runtime->hw = dpcm->cable->hw;
-}
-
static void params_change(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
@@ -330,10 +317,6 @@ static void params_change(struct snd_pcm
cable->hw.rate_max = runtime->rate;
cable->hw.channels_min = runtime->channels;
cable->hw.channels_max = runtime->channels;
- params_change_substream(cable->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK],
- runtime);
- params_change_substream(cable->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE],
- runtime);
}
static int loopback_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
@@ -621,24 +604,29 @@ static unsigned int get_cable_index(stru
static int rule_format(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
{
-
- struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
+ struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = rule->private;
+ struct loopback_cable *cable = dpcm->cable;
struct snd_mask m;
snd_mask_none(&m);
- m.bits[0] = (u_int32_t)hw->formats;
- m.bits[1] = (u_int32_t)(hw->formats >> 32);
+ mutex_lock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
+ m.bits[0] = (u_int32_t)cable->hw.formats;
+ m.bits[1] = (u_int32_t)(cable->hw.formats >> 32);
+ mutex_unlock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
return snd_mask_refine(hw_param_mask(params, rule->var), &m);
}
static int rule_rate(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
{
- struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
+ struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = rule->private;
+ struct loopback_cable *cable = dpcm->cable;
struct snd_interval t;
- t.min = hw->rate_min;
- t.max = hw->rate_max;
+ mutex_lock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
+ t.min = cable->hw.rate_min;
+ t.max = cable->hw.rate_max;
+ mutex_unlock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
t.openmin = t.openmax = 0;
t.integer = 0;
return snd_interval_refine(hw_param_interval(params, rule->var), &t);
@@ -647,11 +635,14 @@ static int rule_rate(struct snd_pcm_hw_p
static int rule_channels(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
{
- struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
+ struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = rule->private;
+ struct loopback_cable *cable = dpcm->cable;
struct snd_interval t;
- t.min = hw->channels_min;
- t.max = hw->channels_max;
+ mutex_lock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
+ t.min = cable->hw.channels_min;
+ t.max = cable->hw.channels_max;
+ mutex_unlock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
t.openmin = t.openmax = 0;
t.integer = 0;
return snd_interval_refine(hw_param_interval(params, rule->var), &t);
@@ -717,19 +708,19 @@ static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_
/* are cached -> they do not reflect the actual state */
err = snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, 0,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_FORMAT,
- rule_format, &runtime->hw,
+ rule_format, dpcm,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_FORMAT, -1);
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
err = snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, 0,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE,
- rule_rate, &runtime->hw,
+ rule_rate, dpcm,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE, -1);
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
err = snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, 0,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_CHANNELS,
- rule_channels, &runtime->hw,
+ rule_channels, dpcm,
SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_CHANNELS, -1);
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 24/96] x86/acpi: Reduce code duplication in mp_override_legacy_irq()
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/96] ALSA: aloop: Fix racy hw constraints adjustment Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/96] zswap: dont param_set_charp while holding spinlock Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vikas C Sajjan, Thomas Gleixner,
Rafael J. Wysocki, linux-pm, kkamagui, linux-acpi, Jean Delvare
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
commit 4ee2ec1b122599f7b10c849fa7915cebb37b7edb upstream.
The new function mp_register_ioapic_irq() is a subset of the code in
mp_override_legacy_irq().
Replace the code duplication by invoking mp_register_ioapic_irq() from
mp_override_legacy_irq().
Signed-off-by: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kkamagui@gmail.com
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510848825-21965-3-git-send-email-vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 27 +++++----------------------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -335,13 +335,12 @@ acpi_parse_lapic_nmi(struct acpi_subtabl
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
#define MP_ISA_BUS 0
+static int __init mp_register_ioapic_irq(u8 bus_irq, u8 polarity,
+ u8 trigger, u32 gsi);
+
static void __init mp_override_legacy_irq(u8 bus_irq, u8 polarity, u8 trigger,
u32 gsi)
{
- int ioapic;
- int pin;
- struct mpc_intsrc mp_irq;
-
/*
* Check bus_irq boundary.
*/
@@ -351,14 +350,6 @@ static void __init mp_override_legacy_ir
}
/*
- * Convert 'gsi' to 'ioapic.pin'.
- */
- ioapic = mp_find_ioapic(gsi);
- if (ioapic < 0)
- return;
- pin = mp_find_ioapic_pin(ioapic, gsi);
-
- /*
* TBD: This check is for faulty timer entries, where the override
* erroneously sets the trigger to level, resulting in a HUGE
* increase of timer interrupts!
@@ -366,16 +357,8 @@ static void __init mp_override_legacy_ir
if ((bus_irq == 0) && (trigger == 3))
trigger = 1;
- mp_irq.type = MP_INTSRC;
- mp_irq.irqtype = mp_INT;
- mp_irq.irqflag = (trigger << 2) | polarity;
- mp_irq.srcbus = MP_ISA_BUS;
- mp_irq.srcbusirq = bus_irq; /* IRQ */
- mp_irq.dstapic = mpc_ioapic_id(ioapic); /* APIC ID */
- mp_irq.dstirq = pin; /* INTIN# */
-
- mp_save_irq(&mp_irq);
-
+ if (mp_register_ioapic_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi) < 0)
+ return;
/*
* Reset default identity mapping if gsi is also an legacy IRQ,
* otherwise there will be more than one entry with the same GSI
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 25/96] zswap: dont param_set_charp while holding spinlock
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
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@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/96] lan78xx: use skb_cow_head() to deal with cloned skbs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dan Streetman, Sergey Senozhatsky,
Michal Hocko, Minchan Kim, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds,
Vlastimil Babka
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
commit fd5bb66cd934987e49557455b6497fc006521940 upstream.
Change the zpool/compressor param callback function to release the
zswap_pools_lock spinlock before calling param_set_charp, since that
function may sleep when it calls kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
While this problem has existed for a while, I wasn't able to trigger it
using a tight loop changing either/both the zpool and compressor params; I
think it's very unlikely to be an issue on the stable kernels, especially
since most zswap users will change the compressor and/or zpool from sysfs
only one time each boot - or zero times, if they add the params to the
kernel boot.
Fixes: c99b42c3529e ("zswap: use charp for zswap param strings")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170126155821.4545-1-ddstreet@ieee.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman <dan.streetman@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/zswap.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/zswap.c
+++ b/mm/zswap.c
@@ -752,18 +752,22 @@ static int __zswap_param_set(const char
pool = zswap_pool_find_get(type, compressor);
if (pool) {
zswap_pool_debug("using existing", pool);
+ WARN_ON(pool == zswap_pool_current());
list_del_rcu(&pool->list);
- } else {
- spin_unlock(&zswap_pools_lock);
- pool = zswap_pool_create(type, compressor);
- spin_lock(&zswap_pools_lock);
}
+ spin_unlock(&zswap_pools_lock);
+
+ if (!pool)
+ pool = zswap_pool_create(type, compressor);
+
if (pool)
ret = param_set_charp(s, kp);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
+ spin_lock(&zswap_pools_lock);
+
if (!ret) {
put_pool = zswap_pool_current();
list_add_rcu(&pool->list, &zswap_pools);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 26/96] lan78xx: use skb_cow_head() to deal with cloned skbs
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/96] zswap: dont param_set_charp while holding spinlock Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/96] sr9700: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, James Hughes,
Woojung Huh, David S. Miller, Oliver Neukum
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit d4ca73591916b760478d2b04334d5dcadc028e9c upstream.
We need to ensure there is enough headroom to push extra header,
but we also need to check if we are allowed to change headers.
skb_cow_head() is the proper helper to deal with this.
Fixes: 55d7de9de6c3 ("Microchip's LAN7800 family USB 2/3 to 10/100/1000 Ethernet device driver")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Hughes <james.hughes@raspberrypi.org>
Cc: Woojung Huh <woojung.huh@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 9 ++-------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
@@ -2419,14 +2419,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *lan78xx_tx_prep(s
{
u32 tx_cmd_a, tx_cmd_b;
- if (skb_headroom(skb) < TX_OVERHEAD) {
- struct sk_buff *skb2;
-
- skb2 = skb_copy_expand(skb, TX_OVERHEAD, 0, flags);
+ if (skb_cow_head(skb, TX_OVERHEAD)) {
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
- skb = skb2;
- if (!skb)
- return NULL;
+ return NULL;
}
if (lan78xx_linearize(skb) < 0)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 27/96] sr9700: use skb_cow_head() to deal with cloned skbs
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/96] lan78xx: use skb_cow_head() to deal with cloned skbs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/96] smsc75xx: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, James Hughes,
David S. Miller, Oliver Neukum
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit d532c1082f68176363ed766d09bf187616e282fe upstream.
We need to ensure there is enough headroom to push extra header,
but we also need to check if we are allowed to change headers.
skb_cow_head() is the proper helper to deal with this.
Fixes: c9b37458e956 ("USB2NET : SR9700 : One chip USB 1.1 USB2NET SR9700Device Driver Support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Hughes <james.hughes@raspberrypi.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c | 9 ++-------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c
@@ -456,14 +456,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *sr9700_tx_fixup(s
len = skb->len;
- if (skb_headroom(skb) < SR_TX_OVERHEAD) {
- struct sk_buff *skb2;
-
- skb2 = skb_copy_expand(skb, SR_TX_OVERHEAD, 0, flags);
+ if (skb_cow_head(skb, SR_TX_OVERHEAD)) {
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
- skb = skb2;
- if (!skb)
- return NULL;
+ return NULL;
}
__skb_push(skb, SR_TX_OVERHEAD);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 28/96] smsc75xx: use skb_cow_head() to deal with cloned skbs
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/96] sr9700: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/96] cx82310_eth: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, James Hughes,
David S. Miller, Oliver Neukum
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit b7c6d2675899cfff0180412c63fc9cbd5bacdb4d upstream.
We need to ensure there is enough headroom to push extra header,
but we also need to check if we are allowed to change headers.
skb_cow_head() is the proper helper to deal with this.
Fixes: d0cad871703b ("smsc75xx: SMSC LAN75xx USB gigabit ethernet adapter driver")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Hughes <james.hughes@raspberrypi.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/usb/smsc75xx.c | 8 ++------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/usb/smsc75xx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/smsc75xx.c
@@ -2205,13 +2205,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *smsc75xx_tx_fixup
{
u32 tx_cmd_a, tx_cmd_b;
- if (skb_headroom(skb) < SMSC75XX_TX_OVERHEAD) {
- struct sk_buff *skb2 =
- skb_copy_expand(skb, SMSC75XX_TX_OVERHEAD, 0, flags);
+ if (skb_cow_head(skb, SMSC75XX_TX_OVERHEAD)) {
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
- skb = skb2;
- if (!skb)
- return NULL;
+ return NULL;
}
tx_cmd_a = (u32)(skb->len & TX_CMD_A_LEN) | TX_CMD_A_FCS;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 29/96] cx82310_eth: use skb_cow_head() to deal with cloned skbs
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/96] smsc75xx: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/96] xhci: Fix ring leak in failure path of xhci_alloc_virt_device() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, James Hughes,
David S. Miller, Oliver Neukum
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit a9e840a2081ed28c2b7caa6a9a0041c950b3c37d upstream.
We need to ensure there is enough headroom to push extra header,
but we also need to check if we are allowed to change headers.
skb_cow_head() is the proper helper to deal with this.
Fixes: cc28a20e77b2 ("introduce cx82310_eth: Conexant CX82310-based ADSL router USB ethernet driver")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Hughes <james.hughes@raspberrypi.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/usb/cx82310_eth.c | 7 ++-----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/usb/cx82310_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/cx82310_eth.c
@@ -293,12 +293,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *cx82310_tx_fixup(
{
int len = skb->len;
- if (skb_headroom(skb) < 2) {
- struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_copy_expand(skb, 2, 0, flags);
+ if (skb_cow_head(skb, 2)) {
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
- skb = skb2;
- if (!skb)
- return NULL;
+ return NULL;
}
skb_push(skb, 2);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 30/96] xhci: Fix ring leak in failure path of xhci_alloc_virt_device()
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/96] cx82310_eth: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/96] 8021q: fix a memory leak for VLAN 0 device Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ben Hutchings, Mathias Nyman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
This is a stable-only fix for the backport of commit 5d9b70f7d52e
("xhci: Don't add a virt_dev to the devs array before it's fully
allocated").
In branches that predate commit c5628a2af83a ("xhci: remove endpoint
ring cache") there is an additional failure path in
xhci_alloc_virt_device() where ring cache allocation fails, in
which case we need to free the ring allocated for endpoint 0.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@intel.com>
---
This is build-tested only.
Ben.
drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
@@ -1086,7 +1086,8 @@ int xhci_alloc_virt_device(struct xhci_h
return 1;
fail:
-
+ if (dev->eps[0].ring)
+ xhci_ring_free(xhci, dev->eps[0].ring);
if (dev->in_ctx)
xhci_free_container_ctx(xhci, dev->in_ctx);
if (dev->out_ctx)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 31/96] 8021q: fix a memory leak for VLAN 0 device
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/96] xhci: Fix ring leak in failure path of xhci_alloc_virt_device() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/96] ip6_tunnel: disable dst caching if tunnel is dual-stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Vyukov, Vlad Yasevich,
Ben Hutchings, Cong Wang, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 78bbb15f2239bc8e663aa20bbe1987c91a0b75f6 ]
A vlan device with vid 0 is allow to creat by not able to be fully
cleaned up by unregister_vlan_dev() which checks for vlan_id!=0.
Also, VLAN 0 is probably not a valid number and it is kinda
"reserved" for HW accelerating devices, but it is probably too
late to reject it from creation even if makes sense. Instead,
just remove the check in unregister_vlan_dev().
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: ad1afb003939 ("vlan_dev: VLAN 0 should be treated as "no vlan tag" (802.1p packet)")
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/8021q/vlan.c | 7 +------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/net/8021q/vlan.c
+++ b/net/8021q/vlan.c
@@ -111,12 +111,7 @@ void unregister_vlan_dev(struct net_devi
vlan_gvrp_uninit_applicant(real_dev);
}
- /* Take it out of our own structures, but be sure to interlock with
- * HW accelerating devices or SW vlan input packet processing if
- * VLAN is not 0 (leave it there for 802.1p).
- */
- if (vlan_id)
- vlan_vid_del(real_dev, vlan->vlan_proto, vlan_id);
+ vlan_vid_del(real_dev, vlan->vlan_proto, vlan_id);
/* Get rid of the vlan's reference to real_dev */
dev_put(real_dev);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 32/96] ip6_tunnel: disable dst caching if tunnel is dual-stack
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/96] 8021q: fix a memory leak for VLAN 0 device Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/96] net: core: fix module type in sock_diag_bind Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eli Cooper, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
[ Upstream commit 23263ec86a5f44312d2899323872468752324107 ]
When an ip6_tunnel is in mode 'any', where the transport layer
protocol can be either 4 or 41, dst_cache must be disabled.
This is because xfrm policies might apply to only one of the two
protocols. Caching dst would cause xfrm policies for one protocol
incorrectly used for the other.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -1080,10 +1080,11 @@ int ip6_tnl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, st
memcpy(&fl6->daddr, addr6, sizeof(fl6->daddr));
neigh_release(neigh);
}
- } else if (!(t->parms.flags &
- (IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_TCLASS | IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_FWMARK))) {
- /* enable the cache only only if the routing decision does
- * not depend on the current inner header value
+ } else if (t->parms.proto != 0 && !(t->parms.flags &
+ (IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_TCLASS |
+ IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_FWMARK))) {
+ /* enable the cache only if neither the outer protocol nor the
+ * routing decision depends on the current inner header value
*/
use_cache = true;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 33/96] net: core: fix module type in sock_diag_bind
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/96] ip6_tunnel: disable dst caching if tunnel is dual-stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/96] RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrii Vladyka, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrii Vladyka <tulup@mail.ru>
[ Upstream commit b8fd0823e0770c2d5fdbd865bccf0d5e058e5287 ]
Use AF_INET6 instead of AF_INET in IPv6-related code path
Signed-off-by: Andrii Vladyka <tulup@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/sock_diag.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ static int sock_diag_bind(struct net *ne
case SKNLGRP_INET6_UDP_DESTROY:
if (!sock_diag_handlers[AF_INET6])
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d", PF_NETLINK,
- NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET);
+ NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET6);
break;
}
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 34/96] RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/96] net: core: fix module type in sock_diag_bind Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/96] RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mohamed Ghannam, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit c095508770aebf1b9218e77026e48345d719b17c ]
When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/rds/rdma.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/rds/rdma.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma.c
@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
+ if (args->nr_local == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 35/96] RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/96] RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/96] sh_eth: fix TSU resource handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mohamed Ghannam, Santosh Shilimkar,
David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 7d11f77f84b27cef452cee332f4e469503084737 ]
set rm->atomic.op_active to 0 when rds_pin_pages() fails
or the user supplied address is invalid,
this prevents a NULL pointer usage in rds_atomic_free_op()
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/rds/rdma.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/rds/rdma.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma.c
@@ -876,6 +876,7 @@ int rds_cmsg_atomic(struct rds_sock *rs,
err:
if (page)
put_page(page);
+ rm->atomic.op_active = 0;
kfree(rm->atomic.op_notifier);
return ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 36/96] sh_eth: fix TSU resource handling
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/96] RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/96] sh_eth: fix SH7757 GEther initialization Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nobuhiro Iwamatsu, Sergei Shtylyov,
David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
[ Upstream commit dfe8266b8dd10e12a731c985b725fcf7f0e537f0 ]
When switching the driver to the managed device API, I managed to break
the case of a dual Ether devices sharing a single TSU: the 2nd Ether port
wouldn't probe. Iwamatsu-san has tried to fix this but his patch was buggy
and he then dropped the ball...
The solution is to limit calling devm_request_mem_region() to the first
of the two ports sharing the same TSU, so devm_ioremap_resource() can't
be used anymore for the TSU resource...
Fixes: d5e07e69218f ("sh_eth: use managed device API")
Reported-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu.yj@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
@@ -3087,10 +3087,29 @@ static int sh_eth_drv_probe(struct platf
/* ioremap the TSU registers */
if (mdp->cd->tsu) {
struct resource *rtsu;
+
rtsu = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 1);
- mdp->tsu_addr = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, rtsu);
- if (IS_ERR(mdp->tsu_addr)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(mdp->tsu_addr);
+ if (!rtsu) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no TSU resource\n");
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
+ /* We can only request the TSU region for the first port
+ * of the two sharing this TSU for the probe to succeed...
+ */
+ if (devno % 2 == 0 &&
+ !devm_request_mem_region(&pdev->dev, rtsu->start,
+ resource_size(rtsu),
+ dev_name(&pdev->dev))) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "can't request TSU resource.\n");
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
+ mdp->tsu_addr = devm_ioremap(&pdev->dev, rtsu->start,
+ resource_size(rtsu));
+ if (!mdp->tsu_addr) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "TSU region ioremap() failed.\n");
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_release;
}
mdp->port = devno % 2;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 37/96] sh_eth: fix SH7757 GEther initialization
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/96] sh_eth: fix TSU resource handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/96] net: stmmac: enable EEE in MII, GMII or RGMII only Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sergei Shtylyov, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
[ Upstream commit 5133550296d43236439494aa955bfb765a89f615 ]
Renesas SH7757 has 2 Fast and 2 Gigabit Ether controllers, while the
'sh_eth' driver can only reset and initialize TSU of the first controller
pair. Shimoda-san tried to solve that adding the 'needs_init' member to the
'struct sh_eth_plat_data', however the platform code still never sets this
flag. I think that we can infer this information from the 'devno' variable
(set to 'platform_device::id') and reset/init the Ether controller pair
only for an even 'devno'; therefore 'sh_eth_plat_data::needs_init' can be
removed...
Fixes: 150647fb2c31 ("net: sh_eth: change the condition of initialization")
Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/sh_eth.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
@@ -3116,8 +3116,8 @@ static int sh_eth_drv_probe(struct platf
ndev->features = NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER;
}
- /* initialize first or needed device */
- if (!devno || pd->needs_init) {
+ /* Need to init only the first port of the two sharing a TSU */
+ if (devno % 2 == 0) {
if (mdp->cd->chip_reset)
mdp->cd->chip_reset(ndev);
--- a/include/linux/sh_eth.h
+++ b/include/linux/sh_eth.h
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ struct sh_eth_plat_data {
unsigned char mac_addr[ETH_ALEN];
unsigned no_ether_link:1;
unsigned ether_link_active_low:1;
- unsigned needs_init:1;
};
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 38/96] net: stmmac: enable EEE in MII, GMII or RGMII only
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/96] sh_eth: fix SH7757 GEther initialization Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/96] ipv6: fix possible mem leaks in ipv6_make_skb() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jerome Brunet, Arnaud Patard,
David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>
[ Upstream commit 879626e3a52630316d817cbda7cec9a5446d1d82 ]
Note in the databook - Section 4.4 - EEE :
" The EEE feature is not supported when the MAC is configured to use the
TBI, RTBI, SMII, RMII or SGMII single PHY interface. Even if the MAC
supports multiple PHY interfaces, you should activate the EEE mode only
when the MAC is operating with GMII, MII, or RGMII interface."
Applying this restriction solves a stability issue observed on Amlogic
gxl platforms operating with RMII interface and the internal PHY.
Fixes: 83bf79b6bb64 ("stmmac: disable at run-time the EEE if not supported")
Signed-off-by: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>
Tested-by: Arnaud Patard <arnaud.patard@rtp-net.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/phy.h | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
@@ -280,8 +280,14 @@ static void stmmac_eee_ctrl_timer(unsign
bool stmmac_eee_init(struct stmmac_priv *priv)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ int interface = priv->plat->interface;
bool ret = false;
+ if ((interface != PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_MII) &&
+ (interface != PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_GMII) &&
+ !phy_interface_mode_is_rgmii(interface))
+ goto out;
+
/* Using PCS we cannot dial with the phy registers at this stage
* so we do not support extra feature like EEE.
*/
--- a/include/linux/phy.h
+++ b/include/linux/phy.h
@@ -684,6 +684,17 @@ static inline bool phy_is_internal(struc
}
/**
+ * phy_interface_mode_is_rgmii - Convenience function for testing if a
+ * PHY interface mode is RGMII (all variants)
+ * @mode: the phy_interface_t enum
+ */
+static inline bool phy_interface_mode_is_rgmii(phy_interface_t mode)
+{
+ return mode >= PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII &&
+ mode <= PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_TXID;
+};
+
+/**
* phy_interface_is_rgmii - Convenience function for testing if a PHY interface
* is RGMII (all variants)
* @phydev: the phy_device struct
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 39/96] ipv6: fix possible mem leaks in ipv6_make_skb()
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/96] net: stmmac: enable EEE in MII, GMII or RGMII only Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/96] ethtool: do not print warning for applications using legacy API Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Vlad Yasevich,
Mike Maloney, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 862c03ee1deb7e19e0f9931682e0294ecd1fcaf9 ]
ip6_setup_cork() might return an error, while memory allocations have
been done and must be rolled back.
Fixes: 6422398c2ab0 ("ipv6: introduce ipv6_make_skb")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
Acked-by: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1800,9 +1800,10 @@ struct sk_buff *ip6_make_skb(struct sock
cork.base.opt = NULL;
v6_cork.opt = NULL;
err = ip6_setup_cork(sk, &cork, &v6_cork, ipc6, rt, fl6);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ ip6_cork_release(&cork, &v6_cork);
return ERR_PTR(err);
-
+ }
if (ipc6->dontfrag < 0)
ipc6->dontfrag = inet6_sk(sk)->dontfrag;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 40/96] ethtool: do not print warning for applications using legacy API
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/96] ipv6: fix possible mem leaks in ipv6_make_skb() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/96] mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix NULL pointer deref Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Stephen Hemminger, David Decotigny,
David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
[ Upstream commit 71891e2dab6b55a870f8f7735e44a2963860b5c6 ]
In kernel log ths message appears on every boot:
"warning: `NetworkChangeNo' uses legacy ethtool link settings API,
link modes are only partially reported"
When ethtool link settings API changed, it started complaining about
usages of old API. Ironically, the original patch was from google but
the application using the legacy API is chrome.
Linux ABI is fixed as much as possible. The kernel must not break it
and should not complain about applications using legacy API's.
This patch just removes the warning since using legacy API's
in Linux is perfectly acceptable.
Fixes: 3f1ac7a700d0 ("net: ethtool: add new ETHTOOL_xLINKSETTINGS API")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David Decotigny <decot@googlers.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/ethtool.c | 15 ++-------------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -742,15 +742,6 @@ static int ethtool_set_link_ksettings(st
return dev->ethtool_ops->set_link_ksettings(dev, &link_ksettings);
}
-static void
-warn_incomplete_ethtool_legacy_settings_conversion(const char *details)
-{
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-
- pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses legacy ethtool link settings API, %s\n",
- get_task_comm(name, current), details);
-}
-
/* Query device for its ethtool_cmd settings.
*
* Backward compatibility note: for compatibility with legacy ethtool,
@@ -777,10 +768,8 @@ static int ethtool_get_settings(struct n
&link_ksettings);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- if (!convert_link_ksettings_to_legacy_settings(&cmd,
- &link_ksettings))
- warn_incomplete_ethtool_legacy_settings_conversion(
- "link modes are only partially reported");
+ convert_link_ksettings_to_legacy_settings(&cmd,
+ &link_ksettings);
/* send a sensible cmd tag back to user */
cmd.cmd = ETHTOOL_GSET;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 41/96] mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix NULL pointer deref
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/96] ethtool: do not print warning for applications using legacy API Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/96] net/sched: Fix update of lastuse in act modules implementing stats_update Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ido Schimmel, Alexander Petrovskiy,
Jiri Pirko, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
[ Upstream commit 8764a8267b128405cf383157d5e9a4a3735d2409 ]
When we remove the neighbour associated with a nexthop we should always
refuse to write the nexthop to the adjacency table. Regardless if it is
already present in the table or not.
Otherwise, we risk dereferencing the NULL pointer that was set instead
of the neighbour.
Fixes: a7ff87acd995 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Implement next-hop routing")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Petrovskiy <alexpe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c
@@ -1328,9 +1328,9 @@ set_trap:
static void __mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_update(struct mlxsw_sp_nexthop *nh,
bool removing)
{
- if (!removing && !nh->should_offload)
+ if (!removing)
nh->should_offload = 1;
- else if (removing && nh->offloaded)
+ else
nh->should_offload = 0;
nh->update = 1;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 42/96] net/sched: Fix update of lastuse in act modules implementing stats_update
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/96] mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix NULL pointer deref Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/96] crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns() Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Roi Dayan, Paul Blakey, Jiri Pirko,
David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
[ Upstream commit 3bb23421a504f01551b7cb9dff0e41dbf16656b0 ]
We need to update lastuse to to the most updated value between what
is already set and the new value.
If HW matching fails, i.e. because of an issue, the stats are not updated
but it could be that software did match and updated lastuse.
Fixes: 5712bf9c5c30 ("net/sched: act_mirred: Use passed lastuse argument")
Fixes: 9fea47d93bcc ("net/sched: act_gact: Update statistics when offloaded to hardware")
Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Blakey <paulb@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/sched/act_gact.c | 2 +-
net/sched/act_mirred.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sched/act_gact.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_gact.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static void tcf_gact_stats_update(struct
if (action == TC_ACT_SHOT)
this_cpu_ptr(gact->common.cpu_qstats)->drops += packets;
- tm->lastuse = lastuse;
+ tm->lastuse = max_t(u64, tm->lastuse, lastuse);
}
static int tcf_gact_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a,
--- a/net/sched/act_mirred.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_mirred.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static void tcf_stats_update(struct tc_a
struct tcf_t *tm = &m->tcf_tm;
_bstats_cpu_update(this_cpu_ptr(a->cpu_bstats), bytes, packets);
- tm->lastuse = lastuse;
+ tm->lastuse = max_t(u64, tm->lastuse, lastuse);
}
static int tcf_mirred_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a, int bind,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 43/96] crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/96] net/sched: Fix update of lastuse in act modules implementing stats_update Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/96] rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 subsequent siblings)
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot, Eric Biggers, Herbert Xu
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit 9a00674213a3f00394f4e3221b88f2d21fc05789 upstream.
syzkaller triggered a NULL pointer dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
via a program that repeatedly and concurrently requests AEADs
"authenc(cmac(des3_ede-asm),pcbc-aes-aesni)" and hashes "cmac(des3_ede)"
through AF_ALG, where the hashes are requested as "untested"
(CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED is set in ->salg_mask but clear in ->salg_feat; this
causes the template to be instantiated for every request).
Although AF_ALG users really shouldn't be able to request an "untested"
algorithm, the NULL pointer dereference is actually caused by a
longstanding race condition where crypto_remove_spawns() can encounter
an instance which has had spawn(s) "grabbed" but hasn't yet been
registered, resulting in ->cra_users still being NULL.
We probably should properly initialize ->cra_users earlier, but that
would require updating many templates individually. For now just fix
the bug in a simple way that can easily be backported: make
crypto_remove_spawns() treat a NULL ->cra_users list as empty.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
crypto/algapi.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -167,6 +167,18 @@ void crypto_remove_spawns(struct crypto_
spawn->alg = NULL;
spawns = &inst->alg.cra_users;
+
+ /*
+ * We may encounter an unregistered instance here, since
+ * an instance's spawns are set up prior to the instance
+ * being registered. An unregistered instance will have
+ * NULL ->cra_users.next, since ->cra_users isn't
+ * properly initialized until registration. But an
+ * unregistered instance cannot have any users, so treat
+ * it the same as ->cra_users being empty.
+ */
+ if (spawns->next == NULL)
+ break;
}
} while ((spawns = crypto_more_spawns(alg, &stack, &top,
&secondary_spawns)));
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 44/96] rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
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@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/96] x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Alex Elder
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 upstream.
Commit d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments") bumped
max_segments (unsigned short) to max_hw_sectors (unsigned int).
max_hw_sectors is set to the number of 512-byte sectors in an object
and overflows unsigned short for 32M (largest possible) objects, making
the block layer resort to handing us single segment (i.e. single page
or even smaller) bios in that case.
Fixes: d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/block/rbd.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -4511,7 +4511,7 @@ static int rbd_init_disk(struct rbd_devi
segment_size = rbd_obj_bytes(&rbd_dev->header);
blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
q->limits.max_sectors = queue_max_hw_sectors(q);
- blk_queue_max_segments(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
+ blk_queue_max_segments(q, USHRT_MAX);
blk_queue_max_segment_size(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_min(q, segment_size);
blk_queue_io_opt(q, segment_size);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 45/96] x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/96] rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/96] KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jia Zhang, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Tony Luck, x86-ml
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
commit b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 upstream.
Instead of blacklisting all model 79 CPUs when attempting a late
microcode loading, limit that only to CPUs with microcode revisions <
0x0b000021 because only on those late loading may cause a system hang.
For such processors either:
a) a BIOS update which might contain a newer microcode revision
or
b) the early microcode loading method
should be considered.
Processors with revisions 0x0b000021 or higher will not experience such
hangs.
For more details, see erratum BDF90 in document #334165 (Intel Xeon
Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family Specification Update) from
September 2017.
[ bp: Heavily massage commit message and pr_* statements. ]
Fixes: 723f2828a98c ("x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514772287-92959-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -1051,8 +1051,17 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X) {
- pr_err_once("late loading on model 79 is disabled.\n");
+ /*
+ * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+ * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
+ * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+ c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X &&
+ c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+ pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+ pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
return true;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 46/96] KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
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@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 47/96] drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add() Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
commit 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 upstream.
This adds a memory barrier when performing a lookup into
the vmcs_field_to_offset_table. This is related to
CVE-2017-5753.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -857,8 +857,16 @@ static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
- if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) ||
- vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
+ * generic mechanism.
+ */
+ asm("lfence");
+
+ if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
return -ENOENT;
return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 47/96] drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/96] KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/96] kaiser: Set _PAGE_NX only if supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dan Carpenter, Thomas Hellstrom
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
commit 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 upstream.
The vmw_view_cmd_to_type() function returns vmw_view_max (3) on error.
It's one element beyond the end of the vmw_view_cotables[] table.
My read on this is that it's possible to hit this failure. header->id
comes from vmw_cmd_check() and it's a user controlled number between
1040 and 1225 so we can hit that error. But I don't have the hardware
to test this code.
Fixes: d80efd5cb3de ("drm/vmwgfx: Initial DX support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
@@ -2729,6 +2729,8 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dx_view_define(struct
}
view_type = vmw_view_cmd_to_type(header->id);
+ if (view_type == vmw_view_max)
+ return -EINVAL;
cmd = container_of(header, typeof(*cmd), header);
ret = vmw_cmd_res_check(dev_priv, sw_context, vmw_res_surface,
user_surface_converter,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 48/96] kaiser: Set _PAGE_NX only if supported
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
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@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 49/96] iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Guenter Roeck, Lepton Wu
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lepton Wu <ytht.net@gmail.com>
This finally resolve crash if loaded under qemu + haxm. Haitao Shan pointed
out that the reason of that crash is that NX bit get set for page tables.
It seems we missed checking if _PAGE_NX is supported in kaiser_add_user_map
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2689835.html
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Lepton Wu <ytht.net@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ static int kaiser_add_user_map(const voi
* requires that not to be #defined to 0): so mask it off here.
*/
flags &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
+ if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
+ flags &= ~_PAGE_NX;
for (; address < end_addr; address += PAGE_SIZE) {
target_address = get_pa_from_mapping(address);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 49/96] iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/96] kaiser: Set _PAGE_NX only if supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/96] target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Donald White, Mike Christie,
Hannes Reinecke, Nicholas Bellinger
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
commit ae072726f6109bb1c94841d6fb3a82dde298ea85 upstream.
Since commit 59b6986dbf fixed a potential NULL pointer dereference
by allocating a se_tmr_req for ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN, the
se_tmr_req is currently leaked by iscsit_free_cmd() because no
iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo was associated.
To address this, treat ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN like any other
TMR and call transport_init_se_cmd() + target_get_sess_cmd() to
setup iscsi_cmd->se_cmd.se_tfo with se_cmd->cmd_kref of 2.
This will ensure normal release operation once se_cmd->cmd_kref
reaches zero and target_release_cmd_kref() is invoked, se_tmr_req
will be released via existing target_free_cmd_mem() and
core_tmr_release_req() code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew@datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew@datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 20 +++++++-------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -1940,7 +1940,6 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
struct iscsi_tmr_req *tmr_req;
struct iscsi_tm *hdr;
int out_of_order_cmdsn = 0, ret;
- bool sess_ref = false;
u8 function, tcm_function = TMR_UNKNOWN;
hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *) buf;
@@ -1982,18 +1981,17 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
buf);
}
+ transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
+ conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
+ TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
+
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
+
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
* LIO-Target $FABRIC_MOD
*/
if (function != ISCSI_TM_FUNC_TASK_REASSIGN) {
- transport_init_se_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, &iscsi_ops,
- conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
- TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
-
- target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
- sess_ref = true;
-
switch (function) {
case ISCSI_TM_FUNC_ABORT_TASK:
tcm_function = TMR_ABORT_TASK;
@@ -2132,12 +2130,8 @@ attach:
* For connection recovery, this is also the default action for
* TMR TASK_REASSIGN.
*/
- if (sess_ref) {
- pr_debug("Handle TMR, using sess_ref=true check\n");
- target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
- }
-
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, conn, cmd->i_state);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 50/96] target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 49/96] iscsi-target: Make TASK_REASSIGN use proper se_cmd->cmd_kref Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/96] bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Donald White, Mike Christie,
Hannes Reinecke, Nicholas Bellinger
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
commit 1c21a48055a67ceb693e9c2587824a8de60a217c upstream.
This patch fixes bug where early se_cmd exceptions that occur
before backend execution can result in use-after-free if/when
a subsequent ABORT_TASK occurs for the same tag.
Since an early se_cmd exception will have had se_cmd added to
se_session->sess_cmd_list via target_get_sess_cmd(), it will
not have CMD_T_COMPLETE set by the usual target_complete_cmd()
backend completion path.
This causes a subsequent ABORT_TASK + __target_check_io_state()
to signal ABORT_TASK should proceed. As core_tmr_abort_task()
executes, it will bring the outstanding se_cmd->cmd_kref count
down to zero releasing se_cmd, after se_cmd has already been
queued with error status into fabric driver response path code.
To address this bug, introduce a CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE bit that is
set at target_get_sess_cmd() time, and cleared immediately before
backend driver dispatch in target_execute_cmd() once CMD_T_ACTIVE
is set.
Then, check CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE within __target_check_io_state() to
determine when an early exception has occured, and avoid aborting
this se_cmd since it will have already been queued into fabric
driver response path code.
Reported-by: Donald White <dew@datera.io>
Cc: Donald White <dew@datera.io>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 2 ++
include/target/target_core_base.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(stru
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE) {
+ if (se_cmd->scsi_status) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu early failure"
+ " status: 0x%02x\n", se_cmd->tag,
+ se_cmd->scsi_status);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %llu already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->tag);
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1939,6 +1939,7 @@ void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *c
}
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_PROCESSING;
+ cmd->transport_state &= ~CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ACTIVE|CMD_T_BUSY|CMD_T_SENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
@@ -2592,6 +2593,7 @@ int target_get_sess_cmd(struct se_cmd *s
ret = -ESHUTDOWN;
goto out;
}
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE;
list_add_tail(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_cmd_list);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
+#define CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE (1 << 12)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct kref cmd_kref;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 51/96] bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/96] target: Avoid early CMD_T_PRE_EXECUTE failures during ABORT_TASK Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/96] bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
David S. Miller, Jiri Slaby
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
commit e245c5c6a5656e4d61aa7bb08e9694fd6e5b2b9d upstream.
no functional change.
move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c
it's being refactored in the next patch
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
[backported to 4.9 - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 54 --------------------------------------------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -565,57 +565,6 @@ void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_p
list_add(&tl->list_node, &bpf_prog_types);
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
- *
- * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
- */
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
-
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
- }
- }
-}
-
/* drop refcnt on maps used by eBPF program and free auxilary data */
static void free_used_maps(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
@@ -808,9 +757,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr
if (err < 0)
goto free_used_maps;
- /* fixup BPF_CALL->imm field */
- fixup_bpf_calls(prog);
-
/* eBPF program is ready to be JITed */
prog = bpf_prog_select_runtime(prog, &err);
if (err < 0)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3362,6 +3362,57 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
return 0;
}
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
+ * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
+ * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
+ * else ...
+ *
+ * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
+ */
+static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
+
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
+ /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
+ * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
+ * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
+ * to avoid conditional branch in
+ * interpeter for every normal call
+ * and to prevent accidental JITing by
+ * JIT compiler that doesn't support
+ * bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!fn->func);
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
@@ -3463,6 +3514,9 @@ skip_full_check:
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 52/96] bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls()
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/96] bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/96] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
David S. Miller, Jiri Slaby
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
commit 79741b3bdec01a8628368fbcfccc7d189ed606cb upstream.
reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to
convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
[Backported to 4.9.y - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3362,55 +3362,50 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
return 0;
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions:
- * if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_lookup_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
- * insn->imm = bpf_map_update_elem - __bpf_call_base;
- * else ...
+/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
*
* this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
*/
-static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
+ struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
+ const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
- struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[i];
-
- if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) {
- /* we reach here when program has bpf_call instructions
- * and it passed bpf_check(), means that
- * ops->get_func_proto must have been supplied, check it
- */
- BUG_ON(!prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto);
-
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
- prog->dst_needed = 1;
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
- bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
- if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
- /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode
- * to avoid conditional branch in
- * interpeter for every normal call
- * and to prevent accidental JITing by
- * JIT compiler that doesn't support
- * bpf_tail_call yet
- */
- insn->imm = 0;
- insn->code |= BPF_X;
- continue;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
+ continue;
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
+ prog->dst_needed = 1;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
+ bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
+ * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
+ * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
+ * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
+ */
+ insn->imm = 0;
+ insn->code |= BPF_X;
+ continue;
+ }
- fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
- /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
- * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
- */
- BUG_ON(!fn->func);
- insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
+ fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
+ /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
+ * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
+ */
+ if (!fn->func) {
+ verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %d\n",
+ insn->imm);
+ return -EFAULT;
}
+ insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
}
+
+ return 0;
}
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
@@ -3515,7 +3510,7 @@ skip_full_check:
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
if (ret == 0)
- fixup_bpf_calls(env->prog);
+ ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 53/96] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/96] bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/96] bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexei Starovoitov, John Fastabend,
Daniel Borkmann, Jiri Slaby
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.
Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.
If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
if (index >= max_entries) {
index &= map->index_mask;
bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
}
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.
Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.
That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.
v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
[ Backported to 4.9 - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
4 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
u32 max_entries;
u32 map_flags;
u32 pages;
+ bool unpriv_array;
struct user_struct *user;
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
struct work_struct work;
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
u32 elem_size;
+ u32 index_mask;
/* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
* is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
* in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
};
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
- enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ union {
+ enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr; /* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
+ };
bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
};
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -46,9 +46,10 @@ static int bpf_array_alloc_percpu(struct
static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
bool percpu = attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY;
+ u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
+ bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
u64 array_size;
- u32 elem_size;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -63,11 +64,20 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
+ max_entries = attr->max_entries;
+ index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
+
+ if (unpriv)
+ /* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
+ * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
+ */
+ max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+
array_size = sizeof(*array);
if (percpu)
- array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * sizeof(void *);
+ array_size += (u64) max_entries * sizeof(void *);
else
- array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * elem_size;
+ array_size += (u64) max_entries * elem_size;
/* make sure there is no u32 overflow later in round_up() */
if (array_size >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -77,6 +87,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
array = bpf_map_area_alloc(array_size);
if (!array)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ array->index_mask = index_mask;
+ array->map.unpriv_array = unpriv;
/* copy mandatory map attributes */
array->map.map_type = attr->map_type;
@@ -110,7 +122,7 @@ static void *array_map_lookup_elem(struc
if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
return NULL;
- return array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+ return array->value + array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask);
}
/* Called from eBPF program */
@@ -122,7 +134,7 @@ static void *percpu_array_map_lookup_ele
if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
return NULL;
- return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]);
+ return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]);
}
int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value)
@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map
*/
size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
rcu_read_lock();
- pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+ pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
bpf_long_memcpy(value + off, per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), size);
off += size;
@@ -190,10 +202,11 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct
return -EEXIST;
if (array->map.map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY)
- memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]),
+ memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]),
value, map->value_size);
else
- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index,
+ memcpy(array->value +
+ array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask),
value, map->value_size);
return 0;
}
@@ -227,7 +240,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_update(struct bpf_m
*/
size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
rcu_read_lock();
- pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+ pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
bpf_long_memcpy(per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), value + off, size);
off += size;
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struc
}
}
-static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
+static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
@@ -1238,6 +1238,13 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifie
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
+ if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+ if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
+ verbose("verifier bug\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
+ }
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3019,7 +3026,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
return -EINVAL;
}
- err = check_call(env, insn->imm);
+ err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3372,7 +3379,11 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
- int i;
+ struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
+ struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
+ struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
+ int i, cnt, delta = 0;
+
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
@@ -3390,6 +3401,31 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
*/
insn->imm = 0;
insn->code |= BPF_X;
+
+ /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
+ * emit two extra insns:
+ * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
+ * index &= array->index_mask;
+ * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
+ */
+ map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
+ if (!map_ptr->unpriv_array)
+ continue;
+ insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
+ map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
+ insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
+ container_of(map_ptr,
+ struct bpf_array,
+ map)->index_mask);
+ insn_buf[2] = *insn;
+ cnt = 3;
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
continue;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 54/96] bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/96] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/96] USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0,
syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773, syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee,
syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b, syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01,
Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.
syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.
However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.
Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.
This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
- u64 array_size;
+ u64 array_size, mask64;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -65,13 +65,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
max_entries = attr->max_entries;
- index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
- if (unpriv)
+ /* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has
+ * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to
+ * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space.
+ */
+ mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1);
+ mask64 = 1ULL << mask64;
+ mask64 -= 1;
+
+ index_mask = mask64;
+ if (unpriv) {
/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
* since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
*/
max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+ /* Check for overflows. */
+ if (max_entries < attr->max_entries)
+ return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+ }
array_size = sizeof(*array);
if (percpu)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 55/96] USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/96] bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/96] USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Diego Elio Pettenò, Johan Hovold
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.eu>
commit 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 upstream.
Add IDs for the OneTouch Verio IQ that comes with an embedded
USB-to-serial converter.
Signed-off-by: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.eu>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8470) }, /* Juniper Networks BX Series System Console */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8477) }, /* Balluff RFID */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x84B6) }, /* Starizona Hyperion */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85A7) }, /* LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EA) }, /* AC-Services IBUS-IF */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EB) }, /* AC-Services CIS-IBUS */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85F8) }, /* Virtenio Preon32 */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 56/96] USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/96] USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/96] usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Christian Holl, Johan Hovold
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1@gmail.com>
commit d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 upstream.
This adds the ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charging device
to the list of USB IDs of drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
Signed-off-by: Christian Holl <cyborgx1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1843, 0x0200) }, /* Vaisala USB Instrument Cable */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE00F) }, /* ELV USB-I2C-Interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE025) }, /* ELV Marble Sound Board 1 */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE030) }, /* ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE032) }, /* ELV TFD500 Data Logger */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0190) }, /* GE B850 CP2105 Recorder interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0193) }, /* GE B650 CP2104 PMC interface */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 57/96] usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/96] USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/96] USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Stefan Agner
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
commit b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c upstream.
When using a GPIO which is high by default, and initialize the
driver in USB Hub mode, initialization fails with:
[ 111.757794] usb3503 0-0008: SP_ILOCK failed (-5)
The reason seems to be that the chip is not properly reset.
Probe does initialize reset low, however some lines later the
code already set it back high, which is not long enouth.
Make sure reset is asserted for at least 100us by inserting a
delay after initializing the reset pin during probe.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ static int usb3503_probe(struct usb3503
if (gpio_is_valid(hub->gpio_reset)) {
err = devm_gpio_request_one(dev, hub->gpio_reset,
GPIOF_OUT_INIT_LOW, "usb3503 reset");
+ /* Datasheet defines a hardware reset to be at least 100us */
+ usleep_range(100, 10000);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev,
"unable to request GPIO %d as reset pin (%d)\n",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 58/96] USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/96] usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/96] usbip: remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc, Pete Zaitcev
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com>
commit 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b upstream.
Automated tests triggered this by opening usbmon and accessing the
mmap while simultaneously resizing the buffers. This bug was with
us since 2006, because typically applications only size the buffers
once and thus avoid racing. Reported by Kirill A. Shutemov.
Reported-by: <syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
@@ -1002,7 +1002,9 @@ static long mon_bin_ioctl(struct file *f
break;
case MON_IOCQ_RING_SIZE:
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
ret = rp->b_size;
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
break;
case MON_IOCT_RING_SIZE:
@@ -1229,12 +1231,16 @@ static int mon_bin_vma_fault(struct vm_a
unsigned long offset, chunk_idx;
struct page *pageptr;
+ mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (offset >= rp->b_size)
+ if (offset >= rp->b_size) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
chunk_idx = offset / CHUNK_SIZE;
pageptr = rp->b_vec[chunk_idx].pg;
get_page(pageptr);
+ mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
vmf->page = pageptr;
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 59/96] usbip: remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/96] USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/96] usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
commit e1346fd87c71a1f61de1fe476ec8df1425ac931c upstream.
usbip_dump_usb_device() and usbip_dump_urb() print kernel addresses.
Remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs and improve
the message content.
Instead of printing parent device and bus addresses, print parent device
and bus names.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 17 +++--------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static void usbip_dump_usb_device(struct
dev_dbg(dev, " devnum(%d) devpath(%s) usb speed(%s)",
udev->devnum, udev->devpath, usb_speed_string(udev->speed));
- pr_debug("tt %p, ttport %d\n", udev->tt, udev->ttport);
+ pr_debug("tt hub ttport %d\n", udev->ttport);
dev_dbg(dev, " ");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
@@ -138,12 +138,8 @@ static void usbip_dump_usb_device(struct
}
pr_debug("\n");
- dev_dbg(dev, "parent %p, bus %p\n", udev->parent, udev->bus);
-
- dev_dbg(dev,
- "descriptor %p, config %p, actconfig %p, rawdescriptors %p\n",
- &udev->descriptor, udev->config,
- udev->actconfig, udev->rawdescriptors);
+ dev_dbg(dev, "parent %s, bus %s\n", dev_name(&udev->parent->dev),
+ udev->bus->bus_name);
dev_dbg(dev, "have_langid %d, string_langid %d\n",
udev->have_langid, udev->string_langid);
@@ -251,9 +247,6 @@ void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
dev = &urb->dev->dev;
- dev_dbg(dev, " urb :%p\n", urb);
- dev_dbg(dev, " dev :%p\n", urb->dev);
-
usbip_dump_usb_device(urb->dev);
dev_dbg(dev, " pipe :%08x ", urb->pipe);
@@ -262,11 +255,9 @@ void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
dev_dbg(dev, " status :%d\n", urb->status);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_flags :%08X\n", urb->transfer_flags);
- dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_buffer :%p\n", urb->transfer_buffer);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_buffer_length:%d\n",
urb->transfer_buffer_length);
dev_dbg(dev, " actual_length :%d\n", urb->actual_length);
- dev_dbg(dev, " setup_packet :%p\n", urb->setup_packet);
if (urb->setup_packet && usb_pipetype(urb->pipe) == PIPE_CONTROL)
usbip_dump_usb_ctrlrequest(
@@ -276,8 +267,6 @@ void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
dev_dbg(dev, " number_of_packets :%d\n", urb->number_of_packets);
dev_dbg(dev, " interval :%d\n", urb->interval);
dev_dbg(dev, " error_count :%d\n", urb->error_count);
- dev_dbg(dev, " context :%p\n", urb->context);
- dev_dbg(dev, " complete :%p\n", urb->complete);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usbip_dump_urb);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 60/96] usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/96] usbip: remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/96] usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
commit b78d830f0049ef1966dc1e0ebd1ec2a594e2cf25 upstream.
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
@@ -132,6 +132,25 @@ static int v_recv_cmd_submit(struct vudc
urb_p->new = 1;
urb_p->seqnum = pdu->base.seqnum;
+ if (urb_p->ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
+ /* validate packet size and number of packets */
+ unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+ maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(urb_p->ep->desc);
+ maxp *= usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(urb_p->ep->desc);
+ bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+ packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+ dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto free_urbp;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = alloc_urb_from_cmd(&urb_p->urb, pdu, urb_p->ep->type);
if (ret) {
usbip_event_add(&udc->ud, VUDC_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 61/96] usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:34 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/96] usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/96] staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
commit 5fd77a3a0e408c23ab4002a57db980e46bc16e72 upstream.
v_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a null transfer_buffer, when it
replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain a
null buffer.
Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and transfer_buffer
is null.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
memset(&pdu_header, 0, sizeof(pdu_header));
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ if (urb->actual_length > 0 && !urb->transfer_buffer) {
+ dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+ "urb: actual_length %d transfer_buffer null\n",
+ urb->actual_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (urb_p->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC)
iovnum = 2 + urb->number_of_packets;
else
@@ -112,8 +119,8 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
/* 1. setup usbip_header */
setup_ret_submit_pdu(&pdu_header, urb_p);
- usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d urb: %p\n",
- pdu_header.base.seqnum, urb);
+ usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d\n",
+ pdu_header.base.seqnum);
usbip_header_correct_endian(&pdu_header, 1);
iov[iovnum].iov_base = &pdu_header;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 62/96] staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/96] usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/96] Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Viktor Slavkovic
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com>
commit 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 upstream.
A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a
race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before
setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in
having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with
ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory
corruption.
Signed-off-by: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -774,10 +774,12 @@ static long ashmem_ioctl(struct file *fi
break;
case ASHMEM_SET_SIZE:
ret = -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&ashmem_mutex);
if (!asma->file) {
ret = 0;
asma->size = (size_t)arg;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ashmem_mutex);
break;
case ASHMEM_GET_SIZE:
ret = asma->size;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 63/96] Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/96] staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/96] uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Marcel Holtmann, Gustavo Padovan,
Johan Hedberg, Ben Seri
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:
struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...
The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).
This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3353,9 +3353,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- remote_efs = 1;
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
+ remote_efs = 1;
memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
@@ -3574,16 +3575,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
- if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+ if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
- if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
- efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
- return -ECONNREFUSED;
+ if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+ efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
+ return -ECONNREFUSED;
- l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
- (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
+ (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+ }
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 64/96] uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/96] Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/96] e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Icenowy Zheng, Hans de Goede
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io>
commit 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 upstream.
The UAS mode of Norelsys NS1068(X) is reported to fail to work on
several platforms with the following error message:
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: ERROR Transfer event for unknown stream ring slot 1 ep 8
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: @00000000bf04a400 00000000 00000000 1b000000 01098001
And when trying to mount a partition on the disk the disk will
disconnect from the USB controller, then after re-connecting the device
will be offlined and not working at all.
Falling back to USB mass storage can solve this problem, so ignore UAS
function of this chip.
Signed-off-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2109, 0x0711, 0x0000, 0x99
USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
US_FL_NO_ATA_1X),
+/* Reported-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2537, 0x1068, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+ "Norelsys",
+ "NS1068X",
+ USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+ US_FL_IGNORE_UAS),
+
/* Reported-by: Takeo Nakayama <javhera@gmx.com> */
UNUSUAL_DEV(0x357d, 0x7788, 0x0000, 0x9999,
"JMicron",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 65/96] e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/96] uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/96] x86/Documentation: Add PTI description Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Christian Hesse, Gabriel C,
Benjamin Poirier, Aaron Brown, Jeff Kirsher
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
commit 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 upstream.
e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan()
are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when
phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e:
Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the
return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first
function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise.
Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list@eworm.de>
Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047
Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list@eworm.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
@@ -1364,6 +1364,9 @@ out:
* Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed. If a
* change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers
* to get the current speed/duplex if link exists.
+ *
+ * Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link
+ * up).
**/
static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
{
@@ -1379,7 +1382,7 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt.
*/
if (!mac->get_link_status)
- return 0;
+ return 1;
/* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports
* link. If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex
@@ -1611,10 +1614,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
* different link partner.
*/
ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw);
- if (ret_val)
+ if (ret_val) {
e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n");
+ return ret_val;
+ }
- return ret_val;
+ return 1;
}
static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 66/96] x86/Documentation: Add PTI description
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/96] e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/96] x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dave Hansen, Thomas Gleixner,
Randy Dunlap, Kees Cook, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss,
Michael Schwarz, Richard Fellner, Andy Lutomirski,
Linus Torvalds, Hugh Dickins
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
commit 01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376 upstream.
Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides
are, and how to debug it when things go wrong.
Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 21 ++--
Documentation/x86/pti.txt | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2763,8 +2763,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
nojitter [IA-64] Disables jitter checking for ITC timers.
- nopti [X86-64] Disable KAISER isolation of kernel from user.
-
no-kvmclock [X86,KVM] Disable paravirtualized KVM clock driver
no-kvmapf [X86,KVM] Disable paravirtualized asynchronous page
@@ -3327,11 +3325,20 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
pt. [PARIDE]
See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.
- pti= [X86_64]
- Control KAISER user/kernel address space isolation:
- on - enable
- off - disable
- auto - default setting
+ pti= [X86_64] Control Page Table Isolation of user and
+ kernel address spaces. Disabling this feature
+ removes hardening, but improves performance of
+ system calls and interrupts.
+
+ on - unconditionally enable
+ off - unconditionally disable
+ auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+ vulnerable to issues that PTI mitigates
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to pti=auto.
+
+ nopti [X86_64]
+ Equivalent to pti=off
pty.legacy_count=
[KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+Overview
+========
+
+Page Table Isolation (pti, previously known as KAISER[1]) is a
+countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address
+space such as the "Meltdown" approach[2].
+
+To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of
+page tables for use only when running userspace applications. When
+the kernel is entered via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, the
+page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy. When the system
+switches back to user mode, the user copy is used again.
+
+The userspace page tables contain only a minimal amount of kernel
+data: only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the
+entry/exit functions themselves and the interrupt descriptor table
+(IDT). There are a few strictly unnecessary things that get mapped
+such as the first C function when entering an interrupt (see
+comments in pti.c).
+
+This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
+the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled. It can be
+enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
+Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
+'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
+
+Page Table Management
+=====================
+
+When PTI is enabled, the kernel manages two sets of page tables.
+The first set is very similar to the single set which is present in
+kernels without PTI. This includes a complete mapping of userspace
+that the kernel can use for things like copy_to_user().
+
+Although _complete_, the user portion of the kernel page tables is
+crippled by setting the NX bit in the top level. This ensures
+that any missed kernel->user CR3 switch will immediately crash
+userspace upon executing its first instruction.
+
+The userspace page tables map only the kernel data needed to enter
+and exit the kernel. This data is entirely contained in the 'struct
+cpu_entry_area' structure which is placed in the fixmap which gives
+each CPU's copy of the area a compile-time-fixed virtual address.
+
+For new userspace mappings, the kernel makes the entries in its
+page tables like normal. The only difference is when the kernel
+makes entries in the top (PGD) level. In addition to setting the
+entry in the main kernel PGD, a copy of the entry is made in the
+userspace page tables' PGD.
+
+This sharing at the PGD level also inherently shares all the lower
+layers of the page tables. This leaves a single, shared set of
+userspace page tables to manage. One PTE to lock, one set of
+accessed bits, dirty bits, etc...
+
+Overhead
+========
+
+Protection against side-channel attacks is important. But,
+this protection comes at a cost:
+
+1. Increased Memory Use
+ a. Each process now needs an order-1 PGD instead of order-0.
+ (Consumes an additional 4k per process).
+ b. The 'cpu_entry_area' structure must be 2MB in size and 2MB
+ aligned so that it can be mapped by setting a single PMD
+ entry. This consumes nearly 2MB of RAM once the kernel
+ is decompressed, but no space in the kernel image itself.
+
+2. Runtime Cost
+ a. CR3 manipulation to switch between the page table copies
+ must be done at interrupt, syscall, and exception entry
+ and exit (it can be skipped when the kernel is interrupted,
+ though.) Moves to CR3 are on the order of a hundred
+ cycles, and are required at every entry and exit.
+ b. A "trampoline" must be used for SYSCALL entry. This
+ trampoline depends on a smaller set of resources than the
+ non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer
+ things into the userspace page tables. The downside is
+ that stacks must be switched at entry time.
+ d. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
+ mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables. This
+ feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB
+ entries mapping the kernel. Losing the feature means more
+ TLB misses after a context switch. The actual loss of
+ performance is very small, however, never exceeding 1%.
+ d. Process Context IDentifiers (PCID) is a CPU feature that
+ allows us to skip flushing the entire TLB when switching page
+ tables by setting a special bit in CR3 when the page tables
+ are changed. This makes switching the page tables (at context
+ switch, or kernel entry/exit) cheaper. But, on systems with
+ PCID support, the context switch code must flush both the user
+ and kernel entries out of the TLB. The user PCID TLB flush is
+ deferred until the exit to userspace, minimizing the cost.
+ See intel.com/sdm for the gory PCID/INVPCID details.
+ e. The userspace page tables must be populated for each new
+ process. Even without PTI, the shared kernel mappings
+ are created by copying top-level (PGD) entries into each
+ new process. But, with PTI, there are now *two* kernel
+ mappings: one in the kernel page tables that maps everything
+ and one for the entry/exit structures. At fork(), we need to
+ copy both.
+ f. In addition to the fork()-time copying, there must also
+ be an update to the userspace PGD any time a set_pgd() is done
+ on a PGD used to map userspace. This ensures that the kernel
+ and userspace copies always map the same userspace
+ memory.
+ g. On systems without PCID support, each CR3 write flushes
+ the entire TLB. That means that each syscall, interrupt
+ or exception flushes the TLB.
+ h. INVPCID is a TLB-flushing instruction which allows flushing
+ of TLB entries for non-current PCIDs. Some systems support
+ PCIDs, but do not support INVPCID. On these systems, addresses
+ can only be flushed from the TLB for the current PCID. When
+ flushing a kernel address, we need to flush all PCIDs, so a
+ single kernel address flush will require a TLB-flushing CR3
+ write upon the next use of every PCID.
+
+Possible Future Work
+====================
+1. We can be more careful about not actually writing to CR3
+ unless its value is actually changed.
+2. Allow PTI to be enabled/disabled at runtime in addition to the
+ boot-time switching.
+
+Testing
+========
+
+To test stability of PTI, the following test procedure is recommended,
+ideally doing all of these in parallel:
+
+1. Set CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y
+2. Run several copies of all of the tools/testing/selftests/x86/ tests
+ (excluding MPX and protection_keys) in a loop on multiple CPUs for
+ several minutes. These tests frequently uncover corner cases in the
+ kernel entry code. In general, old kernels might cause these tests
+ themselves to crash, but they should never crash the kernel.
+3. Run the 'perf' tool in a mode (top or record) that generates many
+ frequent performance monitoring non-maskable interrupts (see "NMI"
+ in /proc/interrupts). This exercises the NMI entry/exit code which
+ is known to trigger bugs in code paths that did not expect to be
+ interrupted, including nested NMIs. Using "-c" boosts the rate of
+ NMIs, and using two -c with separate counters encourages nested NMIs
+ and less deterministic behavior.
+
+ while true; do perf record -c 10000 -e instructions,cycles -a sleep 10; done
+
+4. Launch a KVM virtual machine.
+5. Run 32-bit binaries on systems supporting the SYSCALL instruction.
+ This has been a lightly-tested code path and needs extra scrutiny.
+
+Debugging
+=========
+
+Bugs in PTI cause a few different signatures of crashes
+that are worth noting here.
+
+ * Failures of the selftests/x86 code. Usually a bug in one of the
+ more obscure corners of entry_64.S
+ * Crashes in early boot, especially around CPU bringup. Bugs
+ in the trampoline code or mappings cause these.
+ * Crashes at the first interrupt. Caused by bugs in entry_64.S,
+ like screwing up a page table switch. Also caused by
+ incorrectly mapping the IRQ handler entry code.
+ * Crashes at the first NMI. The NMI code is separate from main
+ interrupt handlers and can have bugs that do not affect
+ normal interrupts. Also caused by incorrectly mapping NMI
+ code. NMIs that interrupt the entry code must be very
+ careful and can be the cause of crashes that show up when
+ running perf.
+ * Kernel crashes at the first exit to userspace. entry_64.S
+ bugs, or failing to map some of the exit code.
+ * Crashes at first interrupt that interrupts userspace. The paths
+ in entry_64.S that return to userspace are sometimes separate
+ from the ones that return to the kernel.
+ * Double faults: overflowing the kernel stack because of page
+ faults upon page faults. Caused by touching non-pti-mapped
+ data in the entry code, or forgetting to switch to kernel
+ CR3 before calling into C functions which are not pti-mapped.
+ * Userspace segfaults early in boot, sometimes manifesting
+ as mount(8) failing to mount the rootfs. These have
+ tended to be TLB invalidation issues. Usually invalidating
+ the wrong PCID, or otherwise missing an invalidation.
+
+1. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
+2. https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 67/96] x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/96] x86/Documentation: Add PTI description Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/96] x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andy Lutomirski, Borislav Petkov,
Borislav Petkov, Brian Gerst, Dave Hansen, Fenghua Yu,
H. Peter Anvin, Linus Torvalds, Matthew Whitehead, Oleg Nesterov,
One Thousand Gnomes, Peter Zijlstra, Rik van Riel,
Thomas Gleixner, Yu-cheng Yu, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
commit 8bf1ebca215c262e48c15a4a15f175991776f57f upstream.
There are multiple call sites that apply forced CPU caps. Factor
them into a helper.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/623ff7555488122143e4417de09b18be2085ad06.1484705016.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -706,6 +706,16 @@ void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++) {
+ c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
+ c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
+ }
+}
+
void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -1086,10 +1096,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_
this_cpu->c_identify(c);
/* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe */
- for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++) {
- c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
- c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
- }
+ apply_forced_caps(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0);
@@ -1151,10 +1158,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
* before following smp all cpus cap AND.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++) {
- c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
- c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
- }
+ apply_forced_caps(c);
/*
* On SMP, boot_cpu_data holds the common feature set between
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 68/96] x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/96] x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/96] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
Andy Lutomirski, Boris Ostrovsky, Borislav Petkov,
Borislav Petkov, Brian Gerst, Dave Hansen, Dave Hansen,
David Laight, Denys Vlasenko, Eduardo Valentin, H. Peter Anvin,
Josh Poimboeuf, Juergen Gross, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra,
Rik van Riel, Will Deacon, aliguori, daniel.gruss, hughd,
keescook, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 6cbd2171e89b13377261d15e64384df60ecb530e upstream.
There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That
makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all
upcoming CPUs.
Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.992156574@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[
set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_set); \
} while (0)
+#define setup_force_cpu_bug(bit) setup_force_cpu_cap(bit)
+
#if defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO) && defined(CONFIG_X86_FAST_FEATURE_TESTS)
/*
* Static testing of CPU features. Used the same as boot_cpu_has().
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ extern struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data;
extern struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data;
extern struct tss_struct doublefault_tss;
-extern __u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS];
-extern __u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS];
+extern __u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
+extern __u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct cpuinfo_x86, cpu_info);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -480,8 +480,8 @@ static const char *table_lookup_model(st
return NULL; /* Not found */
}
-__u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS];
-__u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS];
+__u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
+__u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
void load_percpu_segment(int cpu)
{
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpu
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++) {
c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 69/96] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/96] x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/96] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Andy Lutomirski,
Boris Ostrovsky, Borislav Petkov, Brian Gerst, Dave Hansen,
David Laight, Denys Vlasenko, Eduardo Valentin, H. Peter Anvin,
Josh Poimboeuf, Juergen Gross, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra,
Will Deacon, aliguori, daniel.gruss, hughd, keescook,
Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd upstream.
Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of
user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented
ways to exploit that.
The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space
page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime
conditional.
Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature
bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled.
Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be
made later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -316,5 +316,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -882,6 +882,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
+
+ /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+
fpu__init_system(c);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 70/96] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/96] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 71/96] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12] Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse,
Alan Cox, Jiri Koshina, Linus Torvalds, Tim Chen,
Andi Lutomirski, Andi Kleen, Peter Zijlstra, Paul Turner,
Tom Lendacky, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Razvan Ghitulete, Greg KH
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58 upstream.
Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
isolation for mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -316,6 +316,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
-#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
fpu__init_system(c);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 71/96] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/96] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 72/96] x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, Razvan Ghitulete, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa upstream.
Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all
cpus.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515239374-23361-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -317,5 +317,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -886,6 +886,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+
fpu__init_system(c);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 72/96] x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
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@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/96] sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski,
Borislav Petkov, Brian Gerst, Denys Vlasenko, H. Peter Anvin,
Josh Poimboeuf, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, Razvan Ghitulete
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
commit 62a67e123e058a67db58bc6a14354dd037bafd0a upstream.
Should be easier when following boot paths. It probably is a left over
from the x86 unification eons ago.
No functionality change.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161024173844.23038-3-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 4 +---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs_64.c | 33 ---------------------------------
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs_64.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -20,13 +20,11 @@ obj-y := intel_cacheinfo.o scattered.o
obj-y += common.o
obj-y += rdrand.o
obj-y += match.o
+obj-y += bugs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_32) += bugs.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += bugs_64.o
-
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) += intel.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD) += amd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CYRIX_32) += cyrix.o
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
@@ -28,11 +30,13 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
#endif
identify_boot_cpu();
-#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
- pr_info("CPU: ");
- print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
-#endif
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
+ pr_info("CPU: ");
+ print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
*
@@ -48,4 +52,18 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
alternative_instructions();
fpu__init_check_bugs();
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+ alternative_instructions();
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
+ * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
+ * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
+ *
+ * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
+ * very little benefit for that case.
+ */
+ if (!direct_gbpages)
+ set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
+#endif
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs_64.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
- * Copyright (C) 2000 SuSE
- */
-
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <asm/alternative.h>
-#include <asm/bugs.h>
-#include <asm/processor.h>
-#include <asm/mtrr.h>
-#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
-
-void __init check_bugs(void)
-{
- identify_boot_cpu();
-#if !defined(CONFIG_SMP)
- pr_info("CPU: ");
- print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
-#endif
- alternative_instructions();
-
- /*
- * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
- * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
- * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
- *
- * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
- * very little benefit for that case.
- */
- if (!direct_gbpages)
- set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
-}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 73/96] sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 72/96] x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 74/96] x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Peter Zijlstra, Will Deacon, Dave Hansen,
Linus Torvalds, Borislav Petkov, David Woodhouse
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream.
As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
mitigation should be common as well.
Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.
Allow architectures to override the show function.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 16 +++++++
drivers/base/Kconfig | 3 +
drivers/base/cpu.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/cpu.h | 7 +++
4 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -350,3 +350,19 @@ Contact: Linux ARM Kernel Mailing list <
Description: AArch64 CPU registers
'identification' directory exposes the CPU ID registers for
identifying model and revision of the CPU.
+
+What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+Date: Januar 2018
+Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
+
+ The files are named after the code names of CPU
+ vulnerabilities. The output of those files reflects the
+ state of the CPUs in the system. Possible output values:
+
+ "Not affected" CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
+ "Vulnerable" CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
+ "Mitigation: $M" CPU is affetcted and mitigation $M is in effect
--- a/drivers/base/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/base/Kconfig
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ config GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES
config GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
bool
+config GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
+ bool
+
config SOC_BUS
bool
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -499,10 +499,58 @@ static void __init cpu_dev_register_gene
#endif
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
+ &dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
+ &dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group = {
+ .name = "vulnerabilities",
+ .attrs = cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs,
+};
+
+static void __init cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void)
+{
+ if (sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
+ &cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group))
+ pr_err("Unable to register CPU vulnerabilities\n");
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void) { }
+#endif
+
void __init cpu_dev_init(void)
{
if (subsys_system_register(&cpu_subsys, cpu_root_attr_groups))
panic("Failed to register CPU subsystem");
cpu_dev_register_generic();
+ cpu_register_vulnerabilities();
}
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -44,6 +44,13 @@ extern void cpu_remove_dev_attr(struct d
extern int cpu_add_dev_attr_group(struct attribute_group *attrs);
extern void cpu_remove_dev_attr_group(struct attribute_group *attrs);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
const struct attribute_group **groups,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 74/96] x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/96] sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/96] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Peter Zijlstra, Will Deacon, Dave Hansen,
Linus Torvalds, Borislav Petkov, David Woodhouse,
Razvan Ghitulete
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4 upstream.
Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and
spectre_v2.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ config X86
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST
select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
+ select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT
select GENERIC_IOMAP
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -67,3 +68,31 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
#endif
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 75/96] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
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@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/96] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tom Lendacky, Thomas Gleixner,
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov, Peter Zijlstra, Tim Chen,
Dave Hansen, Borislav Petkov, Dan Williams, Linus Torvalds,
David Woodhouse, Paul Turner, Razvan Ghitulete,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
commit e4d0e84e490790798691aaa0f2e598637f1867ec upstream.
To aid in speculation control, make LFENCE a serializing instruction
since it has less overhead than MFENCE. This is done by setting bit 1
of MSR 0xc0011029 (DE_CFG). Some families that support LFENCE do not
have this MSR. For these families, the LFENCE instruction is already
serializing.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220921.12580.71694.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -330,6 +330,8 @@
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_MASK 0xfffffffULL
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_SHIFT 20
#define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID 0xc001100c
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG 0xc0011029
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1
/* K8 MSRs */
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -782,6 +782,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
+ /*
+ * A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so
+ * use it for execution serialization. On families which
+ * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
+ * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
+ * is not present.
+ */
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
+ MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
+
/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 76/96] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/96] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/96] sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tom Lendacky, Thomas Gleixner,
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov, Peter Zijlstra, Tim Chen,
Dave Hansen, Borislav Petkov, Dan Williams, Linus Torvalds,
David Woodhouse, Paul Turner, Razvan Ghitulete,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
commit 9c6a73c75864ad9fa49e5fa6513e4c4071c0e29f upstream.
With LFENCE now a serializing instruction, use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference
to MFENCE_RDTSC. However, since the kernel could be running under a
hypervisor that does not support writing that MSR, read the MSR back and
verify that the bit has been set successfully. If the MSR can be read
and the bit is set, then set the LFENCE_RDTSC feature, otherwise set the
MFENCE_RDTSC feature.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220932.12580.52458.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@
#define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID 0xc001100c
#define MSR_F10H_DECFG 0xc0011029
#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE BIT_ULL(MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
/* K8 MSRs */
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -782,6 +782,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
+ unsigned long long val;
+ int ret;
+
/*
* A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so
* use it for execution serialization. On families which
@@ -792,8 +795,19 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
- /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
- set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
+ /*
+ * Verify that the MSR write was successful (could be running
+ * under a hypervisor) and only then assume that LFENCE is
+ * serializing.
+ */
+ ret = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_F10H_DECFG, &val);
+ if (!ret && (val & MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE)) {
+ /* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+ } else {
+ /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
+ }
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 77/96] sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/96] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 78/96] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 upstream.
Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
-Date: Januar 2018
+Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -365,4 +365,4 @@ Description: Information about CPU vulne
"Not affected" CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
"Vulnerable" CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
- "Mitigation: $M" CPU is affetcted and mitigation $M is in effect
+ "Mitigation: $M" CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 78/96] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/96] sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 79/96] x86/alternatives: Add missing \n at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Tom Lendacky, Andi Kleen, Tim Chen,
Peter Zijlstra, Jiri Kosina, Dave Hansen, Andi Kleen,
Andrew Lutomirski, Linus Torvalds, Paul Turner, David Woodhouse,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
commit 612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca upstream.
The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but
with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it
breaks the "optimized' test.
Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there.
Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110112815.mgciyf5acwacphkq@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -340,9 +340,12 @@ done:
static void __init_or_module optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ int i;
- if (instr[0] != 0x90)
- return;
+ for (i = 0; i < a->padlen; i++) {
+ if (instr[i] != 0x90)
+ return;
+ }
local_irq_save(flags);
add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 79/96] x86/alternatives: Add missing \n at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 78/96] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/96] x86/mm/32: Move setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID) earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
gnomes, Rik van Riel, ak, Tim Chen, Peter Zijlstra, Paul Turner,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook,
Linus Torvalds, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit b9e705ef7cfaf22db0daab91ad3cd33b0fa32eb9 upstream.
Where an ALTERNATIVE is used in the middle of an inline asm block, this
would otherwise lead to the following instruction being appended directly
to the trailing ".popsection", and a failed compile.
Fixes: 9cebed423c84 ("x86, alternative: Use .pushsection/.popsection")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180104143710.8961-8-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_rese
".popsection\n" \
".pushsection .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \
ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr, feature, 1) \
- ".popsection"
+ ".popsection\n"
#define ALTERNATIVE_2(oldinstr, newinstr1, feature1, newinstr2, feature2)\
OLDINSTR_2(oldinstr, 1, 2) \
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_rese
".pushsection .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \
ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr1, feature1, 1) \
ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr2, feature2, 2) \
- ".popsection"
+ ".popsection\n"
/*
* Alternative instructions for different CPU types or capabilities.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 80/96] x86/mm/32: Move setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID) earlier
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 79/96] x86/alternatives: Add missing \n at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/96] objtool, modules: Discard objtool annotation sections for modules Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andy Lutomirski, Borislav Petkov,
Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
David Woodhouse
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
commit b8b7abaed7a49b350f8ba659ddc264b04931d581 upstream.
Otherwise we might have the PCID feature bit set during cpu_init().
This is just for robustness. I haven't seen any actual bugs here.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: cba4671af755 ("x86/mm: Disable PCID on 32-bit kernels")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b16dae9d6b0db5d9801ddbebbfd83384097c61f3.1505663533.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 --------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -22,14 +22,6 @@
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- /*
- * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
- * that it can't be enabled in 32-bit mode.
- */
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
-#endif
-
identify_boot_cpu();
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -890,6 +890,14 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
fpu__init_system(c);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /*
+ * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
+ * that it can't be enabled in 32-bit mode.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
+#endif
}
void __init early_cpu_init(void)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 81/96] objtool, modules: Discard objtool annotation sections for modules
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/96] x86/mm/32: Move setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID) earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/96] objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds, Josh Poimboeuf,
Jessica Yu, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
David Woodhouse
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
commit e390f9a9689a42f477a6073e2e7df530a4c1b740 upstream.
The '__unreachable' and '__func_stack_frame_non_standard' sections are
only used at compile time. They're discarded for vmlinux but they
should also be discarded for modules.
Since this is a recurring pattern, prefix the section names with
".discard.". It's a nice convention and vmlinux.lds.h already discards
such sections.
Also remove the 'a' (allocatable) flag from the __unreachable section
since it doesn't make sense for a discarded section.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: d1091c7fa3d5 ("objtool: Improve detection of BUG() and other dead ends")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170301180444.lhd53c5tibc4ns77@treble
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[dwmw2: Remove the unreachable part in backporting since it's not here yet]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.ku>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/frame.h | 2 +-
scripts/mod/modpost.c | 1 +
scripts/module-common.lds | 5 ++++-
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/frame.h
+++ b/include/linux/frame.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* For more information, see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
*/
#define STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(func) \
- static void __used __section(__func_stack_frame_non_standard) \
+ static void __used __section(.discard.func_stack_frame_non_standard) \
*__func_stack_frame_non_standard_##func = func
#else /* !CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ static const char *const section_white_l
".cmem*", /* EZchip */
".fmt_slot*", /* EZchip */
".gnu.lto*",
+ ".discard.*",
NULL
};
--- a/scripts/module-common.lds
+++ b/scripts/module-common.lds
@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
* combine them automatically.
*/
SECTIONS {
- /DISCARD/ : { *(.discard) }
+ /DISCARD/ : {
+ *(.discard)
+ *(.discard.*)
+ }
__ksymtab 0 : { *(SORT(___ksymtab+*)) }
__ksymtab_gpl 0 : { *(SORT(___ksymtab_gpl+*)) }
--- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ int cmd_check(int argc, const char **arg
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.insn_list);
hash_init(file.insn_hash);
- file.whitelist = find_section_by_name(file.elf, "__func_stack_frame_non_standard");
+ file.whitelist = find_section_by_name(file.elf, ".discard.func_stack_frame_non_standard");
file.rodata = find_section_by_name(file.elf, ".rodata");
file.ignore_unreachables = false;
file.c_file = find_section_by_name(file.elf, ".comment");
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 82/96] objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/96] objtool, modules: Discard objtool annotation sections for modules Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/96] objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf, David Woodhouse,
Thomas Gleixner, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds, Jiri Kosina,
Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Paul Turner,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
commit 39b735332cb8b33a27c28592d969e4016c86c3ea upstream.
A direct jump to a retpoline thunk is really an indirect jump in
disguise. Change the objtool instruction type accordingly.
Objtool needs to know where indirect branches are so it can detect
switch statement jump tables.
This fixes a bunch of warnings with CONFIG_RETPOLINE like:
arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_nhmex.o: warning: objtool: nhmex_rbox_msr_enable_event()+0x44: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
kernel/signal.o: warning: objtool: copy_siginfo_to_user()+0x91: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
...
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
[dwmw2: Applies to tools/objtool/builtin-check.c not check.c]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
@@ -382,6 +382,13 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
} else if (rela->sym->sec->idx) {
dest_sec = rela->sym->sec;
dest_off = rela->sym->sym.st_value + rela->addend + 4;
+ } else if (strstr(rela->sym->name, "_indirect_thunk_")) {
+ /*
+ * Retpoline jumps are really dynamic jumps in
+ * disguise, so convert them accordingly.
+ */
+ insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC;
+ continue;
} else {
/* sibling call */
insn->jump_dest = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 83/96] objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/96] objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/96] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf, David Woodhouse,
Thomas Gleixner, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds, Jiri Kosina,
Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Paul Turner,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
commit 258c76059cece01bebae098e81bacb1af2edad17 upstream.
Getting objtool to understand retpolines is going to be a bit of a
challenge. For now, take advantage of the fact that retpolines are
patched in with alternatives. Just read the original (sane)
non-alternative instruction, and ignore the patched-in retpoline.
This allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the
retpoline, even if it can't yet follow what's inside. This means the
ORC unwinder will fail to unwind from inside a retpoline, but will work
fine otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
[dwmw2: Applies to tools/objtool/builtin-check.c not check.[ch]]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct instruction {
unsigned int len, state;
unsigned char type;
unsigned long immediate;
- bool alt_group, visited;
+ bool alt_group, visited, ignore_alts;
struct symbol *call_dest;
struct instruction *jump_dest;
struct list_head alts;
@@ -353,6 +353,40 @@ static void add_ignores(struct objtool_f
}
/*
+ * FIXME: For now, just ignore any alternatives which add retpolines. This is
+ * a temporary hack, as it doesn't allow ORC to unwind from inside a retpoline.
+ * But it at least allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the
+ * retpoline.
+ */
+static int add_nospec_ignores(struct objtool_file *file)
+{
+ struct section *sec;
+ struct rela *rela;
+ struct instruction *insn;
+
+ sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".rela.discard.nospec");
+ if (!sec)
+ return 0;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(rela, &sec->rela_list, list) {
+ if (rela->sym->type != STT_SECTION) {
+ WARN("unexpected relocation symbol type in %s", sec->name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ insn = find_insn(file, rela->sym->sec, rela->addend);
+ if (!insn) {
+ WARN("bad .discard.nospec entry");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ insn->ignore_alts = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Find the destination instructions for all jumps.
*/
static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file)
@@ -435,11 +469,18 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct
dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate;
insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec,
dest_off);
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Thanks to retpolines, it's now considered
+ * normal for a function to call within itself. So
+ * disable this warning for now.
+ */
+#if 0
if (!insn->call_dest) {
WARN_FUNC("can't find call dest symbol at offset 0x%lx",
insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_off);
return -1;
}
+#endif
} else if (rela->sym->type == STT_SECTION) {
insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(rela->sym->sec,
rela->addend+4);
@@ -601,12 +642,6 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru
return ret;
list_for_each_entry_safe(special_alt, tmp, &special_alts, list) {
- alt = malloc(sizeof(*alt));
- if (!alt) {
- WARN("malloc failed");
- ret = -1;
- goto out;
- }
orig_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->orig_sec,
special_alt->orig_off);
@@ -617,6 +652,10 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru
goto out;
}
+ /* Ignore retpoline alternatives. */
+ if (orig_insn->ignore_alts)
+ continue;
+
new_insn = NULL;
if (!special_alt->group || special_alt->new_len) {
new_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->new_sec,
@@ -642,6 +681,13 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru
goto out;
}
+ alt = malloc(sizeof(*alt));
+ if (!alt) {
+ WARN("malloc failed");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
alt->insn = new_insn;
list_add_tail(&alt->list, &orig_insn->alts);
@@ -861,6 +907,10 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtoo
add_ignores(file);
+ ret = add_nospec_ignores(file);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
ret = add_jump_destinations(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 84/96] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/96] objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 14:31 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrey Ryabinin, Josh Poimboeuf,
Andy Lutomirski, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
commit 196bd485ee4f03ce4c690bfcf38138abfcd0a4bc upstream.
Currently we use current_stack_pointer() function to get the value
of the stack pointer register. Since commit:
f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
... we have a stack register variable declared. It can be used instead of
current_stack_pointer() function which allows to optimize away some
excessive "mov %rsp, %<dst>" instructions:
-mov %rsp,%rdx
-sub %rdx,%rax
-cmp $0x3fff,%rax
-ja ffffffff810722fd <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2d>
+sub %rsp,%rax
+cmp $0x3fff,%rax
+ja ffffffff810722fa <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2a>
Remove current_stack_pointer(), rename __asm_call_sp to current_stack_pointer
and use it instead of the removed function.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929141537.29167-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[dwmw2: We want ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT for retpoline]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.ku>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 11 -----------
arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
@@ -125,4 +125,15 @@
/* For C file, we already have NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro */
#endif
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+/*
+ * This output constraint should be used for any inline asm which has a "call"
+ * instruction. Otherwise the asm may be inserted before the frame pointer
+ * gets set up by the containing function. If you forget to do this, objtool
+ * may print a "call without frame pointer save/setup" warning.
+ */
+register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP);
+#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (current_stack_pointer)
+#endif
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_ASM_H */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -152,17 +152,6 @@ struct thread_info {
*/
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
-static inline unsigned long current_stack_pointer(void)
-{
- unsigned long sp;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- asm("mov %%rsp,%0" : "=g" (sp));
-#else
- asm("mov %%esp,%0" : "=g" (sp));
-#endif
- return sp;
-}
-
/*
* Walks up the stack frames to make sure that the specified object is
* entirely contained by a single stack frame.
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void call_on_stack(void *func, vo
static inline void *current_stack(void)
{
- return (void *)(current_stack_pointer() & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
+ return (void *)(current_stack_pointer & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
}
static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc)
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(i
/* Save the next esp at the bottom of the stack */
prev_esp = (u32 *)irqstk;
- *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer();
+ *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer;
if (unlikely(overflow))
call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp);
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void do_softirq_own_stack(void)
/* Push the previous esp onto the stack */
prev_esp = (u32 *)irqstk;
- *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer();
+ *prev_esp = current_stack_pointer;
call_on_stack(__do_softirq, isp);
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void ist_begin_non_atomic(struct pt_regs
* from double_fault.
*/
BUG_ON((unsigned long)(current_top_of_stack() -
- current_stack_pointer()) >= THREAD_SIZE);
+ current_stack_pointer) >= THREAD_SIZE);
preempt_enable_no_resched();
}
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct
* mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly
* map it.
*/
- unsigned int stack_pgd_index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer());
+ unsigned int stack_pgd_index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer);
pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + stack_pgd_index;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 84/96] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/96] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 14:31 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2018-01-15 14:37 ` Andrey Ryabinin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Ryabinin @ 2018-01-15 14:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: stable, Josh Poimboeuf, Andy Lutomirski, Linus Torvalds,
Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse
On 01/15/2018 03:35 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
>
> commit 196bd485ee4f03ce4c690bfcf38138abfcd0a4bc upstream.
>
> Currently we use current_stack_pointer() function to get the value
> of the stack pointer register. Since commit:
>
> f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
>
> ... we have a stack register variable declared. It can be used instead of
> current_stack_pointer() function which allows to optimize away some
> excessive "mov %rsp, %<dst>" instructions:
>
> -mov %rsp,%rdx
> -sub %rdx,%rax
> -cmp $0x3fff,%rax
> -ja ffffffff810722fd <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2d>
>
> +sub %rsp,%rax
> +cmp $0x3fff,%rax
> +ja ffffffff810722fa <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2a>
>
> Remove current_stack_pointer(), rename __asm_call_sp to current_stack_pointer
> and use it instead of the removed function.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929141537.29167-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
> [dwmw2: We want ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT for retpoline]
If we want ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT it would be more correct to backport
f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
and some fixes for it:
520a13c530ae ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4")
ca26cffa4e4a ("x86/asm: Allow again using asm.h when building for the 'bpf' clang target")
Because ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT added in f5caf621ee35, not in this patch.
The end result looks fine though. So it's ok to keep it that way.
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.ku>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 11 +++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 11 -----------
> arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 6 +++---
> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +-
> 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
> @@ -125,4 +125,15 @@
> /* For C file, we already have NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro */
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +/*
> + * This output constraint should be used for any inline asm which has a "call"
> + * instruction. Otherwise the asm may be inserted before the frame pointer
> + * gets set up by the containing function. If you forget to do this, objtool
> + * may print a "call without frame pointer save/setup" warning.
> + */
> +register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP);
> +#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (current_stack_pointer)
> +#endif
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_ASM_H */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 84/96] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value
2018-01-15 14:31 ` Andrey Ryabinin
@ 2018-01-15 14:37 ` Andrey Ryabinin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Ryabinin @ 2018-01-15 14:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: stable, Josh Poimboeuf, Andy Lutomirski, Linus Torvalds,
Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse
Resending with correct David's email s/dwmw@amazon.co.ku/dwmw@amazon.co.uk/
(it's incorrect in signed-off-by line)
On 01/15/2018 05:31 PM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>
>
> On 01/15/2018 03:35 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>>
>> ------------------
>>
>> From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
>>
>> commit 196bd485ee4f03ce4c690bfcf38138abfcd0a4bc upstream.
>>
>> Currently we use current_stack_pointer() function to get the value
>> of the stack pointer register. Since commit:
>>
>> f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
>>
>> ... we have a stack register variable declared. It can be used instead of
>> current_stack_pointer() function which allows to optimize away some
>> excessive "mov %rsp, %<dst>" instructions:
>>
>> -mov %rsp,%rdx
>> -sub %rdx,%rax
>> -cmp $0x3fff,%rax
>> -ja ffffffff810722fd <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2d>
>>
>> +sub %rsp,%rax
>> +cmp $0x3fff,%rax
>> +ja ffffffff810722fa <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2a>
>>
>> Remove current_stack_pointer(), rename __asm_call_sp to current_stack_pointer
>> and use it instead of the removed function.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929141537.29167-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
>> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
>> [dwmw2: We want ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT for retpoline]
>
> If we want ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT it would be more correct to backport
> f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
> and some fixes for it:
> 520a13c530ae ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4")
> ca26cffa4e4a ("x86/asm: Allow again using asm.h when building for the 'bpf' clang target")
>
> Because ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT added in f5caf621ee35, not in this patch.
>
> The end result looks fine though. So it's ok to keep it that way.
>
>
>> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.ku>
>> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 11 +++++++++++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 11 -----------
>> arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 6 +++---
>> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
>> arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +-
>> 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>>
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
>> @@ -125,4 +125,15 @@
>> /* For C file, we already have NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro */
>> #endif
>>
>> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
>> +/*
>> + * This output constraint should be used for any inline asm which has a "call"
>> + * instruction. Otherwise the asm may be inserted before the frame pointer
>> + * gets set up by the containing function. If you forget to do this, objtool
>> + * may print a "call without frame pointer save/setup" warning.
>> + */
>> +register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP);
>> +#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (current_stack_pointer)
>> +#endif
>> +
>> #endif /* _ASM_X86_ASM_H */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/96] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-16 10:22 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 86/96] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 76b043848fd22dbf7f8bf3a1452f8c70d557b860 upstream.
Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide
the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks
in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler.
This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In
some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the
retpoline can be disabled.
On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically
simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has
been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can
enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition
to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE.
Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no
guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during
alternative patching.
[ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks]
[ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to
symbolic labels ]
[ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 13 +++
arch/x86/Makefile | 10 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 25 ++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 +
arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 48 ++++++++++++
8 files changed, 232 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -408,6 +408,19 @@ config GOLDFISH
def_bool y
depends on X86_GOLDFISH
+config RETPOLINE
+ bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
+ default y
+ ---help---
+ Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
+ kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
+ branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
+ support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
+
+ Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler
+ code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path,
+ it is not entirely pointless.
+
if X86_32
config X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM
bool "Support for extended (non-PC) x86 platforms"
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -182,6 +182,16 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwin
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(mflags-y)
KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(mflags-y)
+# Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
+ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
+ ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE
+ else
+ $(warning CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but not supported by the compiler. Toolchain update recommended.)
+ endif
+endif
+
archscripts: scripts_basic
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/tools relocs
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -10,7 +10,32 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/special_insns.h>
#include <asm/preempt.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_CMPXCHG64
extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void);
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_e ## reg(void);
+#else
+#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_r ## reg(void);
+INDIRECT_THUNK(8)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(9)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(10)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(11)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(12)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(13)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(14)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(15)
+#endif
+INDIRECT_THUNK(ax)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(bx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(cx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(dx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(si)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(di)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(bp)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(sp)
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
+ * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
+ * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
+ * alternatives.
+ */
+.macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ .Lannotate_\@:
+ .pushsection .discard.nospec
+ .long .Lannotate_\@ - .
+ .popsection
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
+ * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
+ * invocation below less ugly.
+ */
+.macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
+ call .Ldo_rop_\@
+.Lspec_trap_\@:
+ pause
+ jmp .Lspec_trap_\@
+.Ldo_rop_\@:
+ mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
+ ret
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
+ * returns to the instruction after the macro.
+ */
+.macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
+ jmp .Ldo_call_\@
+.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
+ RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
+.Ldo_call_\@:
+ call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
+ * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
+ * attack.
+ */
+.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg), \
+ __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
+ __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+#else
+ jmp *\reg
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg), \
+ __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
+ __stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+#else
+ call *\reg
+#endif
+.endm
+
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
+ "999:\n\t" \
+ ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \
+ ".long 999b - .\n\t" \
+ ".popsection\n\t"
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
+
+/*
+ * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
+ * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
+ */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC \
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
+ ALTERNATIVE( \
+ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
+ "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
+
+#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+/*
+ * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
+ * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
+ * here, anyway.
+ */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE("call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
+ " jmp 904f;\n" \
+ " .align 16\n" \
+ "901: call 903f;\n" \
+ "902: pause;\n" \
+ " jmp 902b;\n" \
+ " .align 16\n" \
+ "903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \
+ " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
+ " ret;\n" \
+ " .align 16\n" \
+ "904: call 901b;\n", \
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
+#else /* No retpoline */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -889,6 +889,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+#endif
+
fpu__init_system(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ lib-y += memcpy_$(BITS).o
lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o
lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/dwarf2.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
+.macro THUNK reg
+ .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.\reg
+
+ENTRY(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
+ CFI_STARTPROC
+ JMP_NOSPEC %\reg
+ CFI_ENDPROC
+ENDPROC(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Despite being an assembler file we can't just use .irp here
+ * because __KSYM_DEPS__ only uses the C preprocessor and would
+ * only see one instance of "__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg" rather
+ * than one per register with the correct names. So we do it
+ * the simple and nasty way...
+ */
+#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
+#define GENERATE_THUNK(reg) THUNK reg ; EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
+
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_AX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_CX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP)
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+GENERATE_THUNK(r8)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r9)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r10)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r11)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r12)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r13)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r14)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r15)
+#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-16 10:22 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-16 10:38 ` Woodhouse, David
0 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Jiri Slaby @ 2018-01-16 10:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner, Arjan van de Ven,
Ingo Molnar, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen, Josh Poimboeuf,
thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds, Jiri Kosina,
Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Paul Turner,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
On 01/15/2018, 01:35 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
May I ask if somebody has started the 4.4 port yet?
> ------------------
>
> From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
>
> commit 76b043848fd22dbf7f8bf3a1452f8c70d557b860 upstream.
>
> Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide
> the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks
> in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler.
>
> This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In
> some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the
> retpoline can be disabled.
>
> On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically
> simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has
> been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can
> enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition
> to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE.
>
> Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no
> guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during
> alternative patching.
>
> [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks]
> [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to
> symbolic labels ]
> [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ]
>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thanks,
--
js
suse labs
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
2018-01-16 10:22 ` Jiri Slaby
@ 2018-01-16 10:38 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-17 13:51 ` gregkh
0 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Woodhouse, David @ 2018-01-16 10:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Slaby, Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel, Ghitulete, Razvan-alin
Cc: stable, Thomas Gleixner, Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, gnomes,
Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen, Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky,
Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds, Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Paul Turner,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 365 bytes --]
On Tue, 2018-01-16 at 11:22 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> On 01/15/2018, 01:35 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> May I ask if somebody has started the 4.4 port yet?
Razvan pushed that out yesterday:
http://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable.git/shortlog/refs/heads/linux-4.4.y
[-- Attachment #2: smime.p7s --]
[-- Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature, Size: 5210 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
2018-01-16 10:38 ` Woodhouse, David
@ 2018-01-17 13:51 ` gregkh
0 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2018-01-17 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Woodhouse, David
Cc: linux-kernel, jslaby, Ghitulete, Razvan-alin, mingo, peterz,
arjan, tim.c.chen, torvalds, tglx, jpoimboe, stable, ak, riel,
keescook, gnomes, pjt, dave.hansen, jikos, luto, thomas.lendacky
On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 10:38:35AM +0000, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-01-16 at 11:22 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> > On 01/15/2018, 01:35 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > May I ask if somebody has started the 4.4 port yet?
>
> Razvan pushed that out yesterday:
>
> http://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable.git/shortlog/refs/heads/linux-4.4.y
And I've now queued up all of these patches, thanks very much for doing
this work!
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
@ 2018-01-17 13:51 ` gregkh
0 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2018-01-17 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Woodhouse, David
Cc: linux-kernel, jslaby, Ghitulete, Razvan-alin, mingo, peterz,
arjan, tim.c.chen, torvalds, tglx, jpoimboe, stable, ak, riel,
keescook, gnomes, pjt, dave.hansen, jikos, luto, thomas.lendacky
On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 10:38:35AM +0000, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-01-16 at 11:22 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> > On 01/15/2018, 01:35 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > 4.9-stable review patch.� If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > May I ask if somebody has started the 4.4 port yet?
>
> Razvan pushed that out yesterday:
>
> http://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable.git/shortlog/refs/heads/linux-4.4.y
And I've now queued up all of these patches, thanks very much for doing
this work!
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
2018-01-17 13:51 ` gregkh
(?)
@ 2018-01-20 22:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-21 16:03 ` gregkh
-1 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Jiri Kosina @ 2018-01-20 22:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh
Cc: Woodhouse, David, linux-kernel, jslaby, Ghitulete, Razvan-alin,
mingo, peterz, arjan, tim.c.chen, torvalds, tglx, jpoimboe,
stable, ak, riel, keescook, gnomes, pjt, dave.hansen, jikos,
luto, thomas.lendacky
On Wed, 17 Jan 2018, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
> > http://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable.git/shortlog/refs/heads/linux-4.4.y
>
> And I've now queued up all of these patches, thanks very much for doing
> this work!
The patch below is needed on top of it, otherwise if CONFIG_MODVERSIONS is
enabled, all the _thunk symbols end up with 0x0 checksum and fail to load
due to mismatch.
0x00000000 __x86_indirect_thunk_rcx vmlinux EXPORT_SYMBOL
so please consider queuing it on top; I am queuing it in SLE12 codestreams
now.
From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:46:19 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] kbuild: modversions for EXPORT_SYMBOL() for asm
Git-commit: 4efca4ed05cbdfd13ec3e8cb623fb77d6e4ab187
Patch-mainline: 4.9-rc6
[jkosina@suse.cz: folded cc6acc11cad1 fixup in as well ]
Allow architectures to create asm/asm-prototypes.h file that
provides C prototypes for exported asm functions, which enables
proper CRC versions to be generated for them.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
---
scripts/Makefile.build | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/Makefile.build
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.build
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ cmd_cc_i_c = $(CPP) $(c_flags) -
$(obj)/%.i: $(src)/%.c FORCE
$(call if_changed_dep,cc_i_c)
-cmd_gensymtypes = \
+# These mirror gensymtypes_S and co below, keep them in synch.
+cmd_gensymtypes_c = \
$(CPP) -D__GENKSYMS__ $(c_flags) $< | \
$(GENKSYMS) $(if $(1), -T $(2)) \
$(patsubst y,-s _,$(CONFIG_HAVE_UNDERSCORE_SYMBOL_PREFIX)) \
@@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ cmd_gensymtypes =
quiet_cmd_cc_symtypes_c = SYM $(quiet_modtag) $@
cmd_cc_symtypes_c = \
set -e; \
- $(call cmd_gensymtypes,true,$@) >/dev/null; \
+ $(call cmd_gensymtypes_c,true,$@) >/dev/null; \
test -s $@ || rm -f $@
$(obj)/%.symtypes : $(src)/%.c FORCE
@@ -198,9 +199,10 @@ else
# the actual value of the checksum generated by genksyms
cmd_cc_o_c = $(CC) $(c_flags) -c -o $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) $<
-cmd_modversions = \
+
+cmd_modversions_c = \
if $(OBJDUMP) -h $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) | grep -q __ksymtab; then \
- $(call cmd_gensymtypes,$(KBUILD_SYMTYPES),$(@:.o=.symtypes)) \
+ $(call cmd_gensymtypes_c,$(KBUILD_SYMTYPES),$(@:.o=.symtypes)) \
> $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F:.o=.ver); \
\
$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -r -o $@ $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) \
@@ -245,7 +247,7 @@ endif
define rule_cc_o_c
$(call echo-cmd,checksrc) $(cmd_checksrc) \
$(call echo-cmd,cc_o_c) $(cmd_cc_o_c); \
- $(cmd_modversions) \
+ $(cmd_modversions_c) \
$(call echo-cmd,record_mcount) \
$(cmd_record_mcount) \
scripts/basic/fixdep $(depfile) $@ '$(call make-cmd,cc_o_c)' > \
@@ -254,6 +256,15 @@ define rule_cc_o_c
mv -f $(dot-target).tmp $(dot-target).cmd
endef
+define rule_as_o_S
+ $(call echo-cmd,as_o_S) $(cmd_as_o_S); \
+ scripts/basic/fixdep $(depfile) $@ '$(call make-cmd,as_o_S)' > \
+ $(dot-target).tmp; \
+ $(cmd_modversions_S) \
+ rm -f $(depfile); \
+ mv -f $(dot-target).tmp $(dot-target).cmd
+endef
+
# Built-in and composite module parts
$(obj)/%.o: $(src)/%.c $(recordmcount_source) FORCE
$(call cmd,force_checksrc)
@@ -282,6 +293,38 @@ modkern_aflags := $(KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL
$(real-objs-m) : modkern_aflags := $(KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE) $(AFLAGS_MODULE)
$(real-objs-m:.o=.s): modkern_aflags := $(KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE) $(AFLAGS_MODULE)
+# .S file exports must have their C prototypes defined in asm/asm-prototypes.h
+# or a file that it includes, in order to get versioned symbols. We build a
+# dummy C file that includes asm-prototypes and the EXPORT_SYMBOL lines from
+# the .S file (with trailing ';'), and run genksyms on that, to extract vers.
+#
+# This is convoluted. The .S file must first be preprocessed to run guards and
+# expand names, then the resulting exports must be constructed into plain
+# EXPORT_SYMBOL(symbol); to build our dummy C file, and that gets preprocessed
+# to make the genksyms input.
+#
+# These mirror gensymtypes_c and co above, keep them in synch.
+cmd_gensymtypes_S = \
+ (echo "\#include <linux/kernel.h>" ; \
+ echo "\#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>" ; \
+ $(CPP) $(a_flags) $< | \
+ grep "\<___EXPORT_SYMBOL\>" | \
+ sed 's/.*___EXPORT_SYMBOL[[:space:]]*\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)[[:space:]]*,.*/EXPORT_SYMBOL(\1);/' ) | \
+ $(CPP) -D__GENKSYMS__ $(c_flags) -xc - | \
+ $(GENKSYMS) $(if $(1), -T $(2)) \
+ $(patsubst y,-s _,$(CONFIG_HAVE_UNDERSCORE_SYMBOL_PREFIX)) \
+ $(if $(KBUILD_PRESERVE),-p) \
+ -r $(firstword $(wildcard $(2:.symtypes=.symref) /dev/null))
+
+quiet_cmd_cc_symtypes_S = SYM $(quiet_modtag) $@
+cmd_cc_symtypes_S = \
+ set -e; \
+ $(call cmd_gensymtypes_S,true,$@) >/dev/null; \
+ test -s $@ || rm -f $@
+
+$(obj)/%.symtypes : $(src)/%.S FORCE
+ $(call cmd,cc_symtypes_S)
+
quiet_cmd_as_s_S = CPP $(quiet_modtag) $@
cmd_as_s_S = $(CPP) $(a_flags) -o $@ $<
@@ -289,10 +332,40 @@ $(obj)/%.s: $(src)/%.S FORCE
$(call if_changed_dep,as_s_S)
quiet_cmd_as_o_S = AS $(quiet_modtag) $@
-cmd_as_o_S = $(CC) $(a_flags) -c -o $@ $<
+
+ifndef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS
+cmd_as_o_S = $(CC) $(a_flags) -c -o $@ $<
+
+else
+
+ASM_PROTOTYPES := $(wildcard $(srctree)/arch/$(SRCARCH)/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h)
+
+ifeq ($(ASM_PROTOTYPES),)
+cmd_as_o_S = $(CC) $(a_flags) -c -o $@ $<
+
+else
+
+# versioning matches the C process described above, with difference that
+# we parse asm-prototypes.h C header to get function definitions.
+
+cmd_as_o_S = $(CC) $(a_flags) -c -o $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) $<
+
+cmd_modversions_S = \
+ if $(OBJDUMP) -h $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) | grep -q __ksymtab; then \
+ $(call cmd_gensymtypes_S,$(KBUILD_SYMTYPES),$(@:.o=.symtypes)) \
+ > $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F:.o=.ver); \
+ \
+ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -r -o $@ $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) \
+ -T $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F:.o=.ver); \
+ rm -f $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F:.o=.ver); \
+ else \
+ mv -f $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F) $@; \
+ fi;
+endif
+endif
$(obj)/%.o: $(src)/%.S FORCE
- $(call if_changed_dep,as_o_S)
+ $(call if_changed_rule,as_o_S)
targets += $(real-objs-y) $(real-objs-m) $(lib-y)
targets += $(extra-y) $(MAKECMDGOALS) $(always)
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
2018-01-20 22:21 ` Jiri Kosina
@ 2018-01-21 16:03 ` gregkh
0 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2018-01-21 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Kosina
Cc: Woodhouse, David, linux-kernel, jslaby, Ghitulete, Razvan-alin,
mingo, peterz, arjan, tim.c.chen, torvalds, tglx, jpoimboe,
stable, ak, riel, keescook, gnomes, pjt, dave.hansen, luto,
thomas.lendacky
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 11:21:08PM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Wed, 17 Jan 2018, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
>
> > > http://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable.git/shortlog/refs/heads/linux-4.4.y
> >
> > And I've now queued up all of these patches, thanks very much for doing
> > this work!
>
> The patch below is needed on top of it, otherwise if CONFIG_MODVERSIONS is
> enabled, all the _thunk symbols end up with 0x0 checksum and fail to load
> due to mismatch.
>
> 0x00000000 __x86_indirect_thunk_rcx vmlinux EXPORT_SYMBOL
>
> so please consider queuing it on top; I am queuing it in SLE12 codestreams
> now.
Many thanks, now queued up.
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4.9 86/96] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/96] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/96] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen, Josh Poimboeuf,
thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds, Jiri Kosina,
Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Paul Turner,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 upstream.
Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect
branch speculation vulnerability.
Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms.
This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features.
The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation
control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a
serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature.
[ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS
integration becomes simple ]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 28 ++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4
4 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2691,6 +2691,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
nosmt [KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
Equivalent to smt=1.
+ nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+ allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+ to spectre_v2=off.
+
noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3944,6 +3949,29 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
sonypi.*= [HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
See Documentation/laptops/sonypi.txt
+ spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+
+ on - unconditionally enable
+ off - unconditionally disable
+ auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+ vulnerable
+
+ Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+ mitigation method at run time according to the
+ CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+ CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+ compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+ Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+ retpoline - replace indirect branches
+ retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
+ retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spectre_v2=auto.
+
spia_io_base= [HW,MTD]
spia_fio_base=
spia_pedr=
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -124,5 +124,15 @@
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
+/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
+ SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+ SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
+};
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -20,6 +23,8 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -29,6 +34,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
+ /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+ spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -61,6 +69,153 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
#endif
}
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+};
+
+static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL] = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+};
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
+{
+ return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
+}
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+ int len = strlen(opt);
+
+ return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
+ sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) {
+ goto disable;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) {
+ spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) {
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) {
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) {
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) {
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+disable:
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+ /*
+ * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
+ * then nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+ (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+ return;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+ return;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+ /* FALLTRHU */
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ goto retpoline_auto;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+ goto retpoline_amd;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+ goto retpoline_generic;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+ goto retpoline_auto;
+ break;
+ }
+ pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ return;
+
+retpoline_auto:
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ retpoline_amd:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+ pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+ goto retpoline_generic;
+ }
+ mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ } else {
+ retpoline_generic:
+ mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ }
+
+ spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
@@ -85,6 +240,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
}
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -889,10 +889,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
-#endif
-
fpu__init_system(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 87/96] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 86/96] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 88/96] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 9697fa39efd3fc3692f2949d4045f393ec58450b upstream.
Convert all indirect jumps in crypto assembler code to use non-speculative
sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 5 +++--
arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 3 ++-
arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 3 ++-
arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/inst.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
* The following macros are used to move an (un)aligned 16 byte value to/from
@@ -2734,7 +2735,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
pxor INC, STATE4
movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
- call *%r11
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r11
movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
@@ -2779,7 +2780,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
movups IV, (IVP)
- call *%r11
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r11
movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
@@ -1224,7 +1225,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_16way:
vpxor 14 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm14;
vpxor 15 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm15;
- call *%r9;
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
addq $(16 * 16), %rsp;
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
@@ -1337,7 +1338,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_32way:
vpxor 14 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm14;
vpxor 15 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm15;
- call *%r9;
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
addq $(16 * 32), %rsp;
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <asm/inst.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
## ISCSI CRC 32 Implementation with crc32 and pclmulqdq Instruction
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ continue_block:
movzxw (bufp, %rax, 2), len
lea crc_array(%rip), bufp
lea (bufp, len, 1), bufp
- jmp *bufp
+ JMP_NOSPEC bufp
################################################################
## 2a) PROCESS FULL BLOCKS:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 88/96] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/96] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 89/96] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, Arjan van de Ven, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 2641f08bb7fc63a636a2b18173221d7040a3512e upstream.
Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use
non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.
Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return
address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the
.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work,
and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid
games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's
not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the
first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare
jmp *%rax anyway.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 5 +++--
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 10 ++++++++--
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
.section .entry.text, "ax"
@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
/* kernel thread */
1: movl %edi, %eax
- call *%ebx
+ CALL_NOSPEC %ebx
/*
* A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
* calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve()
@@ -1062,7 +1063,7 @@ error_code:
movl %ecx, %es
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
- call *%edi
+ CALL_NOSPEC %edi
jmp ret_from_exception
END(page_fault)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/kaiser.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
/* Avoid __ASSEMBLER__'ifying <linux/audit.h> just for this. */
@@ -208,7 +209,12 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
* It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX
* and all argument registers are clobbered.
*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax
+ call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax
+#else
call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8)
+#endif
.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call:
movq %rax, RAX(%rsp)
@@ -380,7 +386,7 @@ ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64)
jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path
1:
- jmp *%rax /* Called from C */
+ JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */
END(stub_ptregs_64)
.macro ptregs_stub func
@@ -457,7 +463,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
1:
/* kernel thread */
movq %r12, %rdi
- call *%rbx
+ CALL_NOSPEC %rbx
/*
* A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
* calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve()
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 89/96] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 88/96] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 90/96] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 9351803bd803cdbeb9b5a7850b7b6f464806e3db upstream.
Convert all indirect jumps in ftrace assembler code to use non-speculative
sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 5 +++--
arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S | 7 ++++---
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -985,7 +985,8 @@ trace:
movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax
- call *ftrace_trace_function
+ movl ftrace_trace_function, %ecx
+ CALL_NOSPEC %ecx
popl %edx
popl %ecx
@@ -1021,7 +1022,7 @@ return_to_handler:
movl %eax, %ecx
popl %edx
popl %eax
- jmp *%ecx
+ JMP_NOSPEC %ecx
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mcount_64.S
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/ftrace.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
-
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
.code64
.section .entry.text, "ax"
@@ -290,8 +290,9 @@ trace:
* ip and parent ip are used and the list function is called when
* function tracing is enabled.
*/
- call *ftrace_trace_function
+ movq ftrace_trace_function, %r8
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r8
restore_mcount_regs
jmp fgraph_trace
@@ -334,5 +335,5 @@ GLOBAL(return_to_handler)
movq 8(%rsp), %rdx
movq (%rsp), %rax
addq $24, %rsp
- jmp *%rdi
+ JMP_NOSPEC %rdi
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 90/96] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 89/96] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 91/96] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31 upstream.
Convert all indirect jumps in hyperv inline asm code to use non-speculative
sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-9-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
[ backport to 4.9, hopefully correct, not tested... - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hv/hv.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hv/hv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/clockchips.h>
#include <asm/hyperv.h>
#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "hyperv_vmbus.h"
/* The one and only */
@@ -103,9 +104,10 @@ u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *i
return (u64)ULLONG_MAX;
__asm__ __volatile__("mov %0, %%r8" : : "r" (output_address) : "r8");
- __asm__ __volatile__("call *%3" : "=a" (hv_status) :
+ __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC :
+ "=a" (hv_status) :
"c" (control), "d" (input_address),
- "m" (hypercall_page));
+ THUNK_TARGET(hypercall_page));
return hv_status;
@@ -123,11 +125,12 @@ u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *i
if (!hypercall_page)
return (u64)ULLONG_MAX;
- __asm__ __volatile__ ("call *%8" : "=d"(hv_status_hi),
+ __asm__ __volatile__ (CALL_NOSPEC : "=d"(hv_status_hi),
"=a"(hv_status_lo) : "d" (control_hi),
"a" (control_lo), "b" (input_address_hi),
"c" (input_address_lo), "D"(output_address_hi),
- "S"(output_address_lo), "m" (hypercall_page));
+ "S"(output_address_lo),
+ THUNK_TARGET(hypercall_page));
return hv_status_lo | ((u64)hv_status_hi << 32);
#endif /* !x86_64 */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 91/96] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 90/96] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 92/96] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, Juergen Gross, gnomes,
Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen, Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky,
Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds, Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Paul Turner,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350 upstream.
Convert indirect call in Xen hypercall to use non-speculative sequence,
when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-10-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
#include <xen/interface/sched.h>
@@ -216,9 +217,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call,
__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
stac();
- asm volatile("call *%[call]"
+ asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
: __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
- : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
+ : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
: __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5);
clac();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 92/96] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 91/96] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 93/96] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen,
Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 5096732f6f695001fa2d6f1335a2680b37912c69 upstream.
Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit checksum assembler code to use
non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-11-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
-
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
/*
* computes a partial checksum, e.g. for TCP/UDP fragments
*/
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial)
negl %ebx
lea 45f(%ebx,%ebx,2), %ebx
testl %esi, %esi
- jmp *%ebx
+ JMP_NOSPEC %ebx
# Handle 2-byte-aligned regions
20: addw (%esi), %ax
@@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
andl $-32,%edx
lea 3f(%ebx,%ebx), %ebx
testl %esi, %esi
- jmp *%ebx
+ JMP_NOSPEC %ebx
1: addl $64,%esi
addl $64,%edi
SRC(movb -32(%edx),%bl) ; SRC(movb (%edx),%bl)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 93/96] x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 92/96] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 94/96] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andi Kleen, Thomas Gleixner,
Arjan van de Ven, Ingo Molnar, gnomes, Rik van Riel,
Josh Poimboeuf, thomas.lendacky, Peter Zijlstra, Linus Torvalds,
Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen,
Paul Turner, David Woodhouse, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
commit 7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4 upstream.
Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit irq inline asm code to use non
speculative sequences.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-12-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
@@ -54,11 +55,11 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, softi
static void call_on_stack(void *func, void *stack)
{
asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
- "call *%%edi \n"
+ CALL_NOSPEC
"movl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
: "=b" (stack)
: "0" (stack),
- "D"(func)
+ [thunk_target] "D"(func)
: "memory", "cc", "edx", "ecx", "eax");
}
@@ -94,11 +95,11 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(i
call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp);
asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
- "call *%%edi \n"
+ CALL_NOSPEC
"movl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
: "=a" (arg1), "=b" (isp)
: "0" (desc), "1" (isp),
- "D" (desc->handle_irq)
+ [thunk_target] "D" (desc->handle_irq)
: "memory", "cc", "ecx");
return 1;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 94/96] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 93/96] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 95/96] selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Woodhouse, Thomas Gleixner,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen, Josh Poimboeuf,
thomas.lendacky, Linus Torvalds, Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski,
Dave Hansen, Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Paul Turner,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b upstream.
In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite
all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch
target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both
for retpoline and for IBRS.
[ak: numbers again for the RSB stuffing labels]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515755487-8524-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +
3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -7,6 +7,48 @@
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
+ * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
+ * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
+ */
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
+
+/*
+ * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
+ * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
+ * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
+ mov $(nr/2), reg; \
+771: \
+ call 772f; \
+773: /* speculation trap */ \
+ pause; \
+ jmp 773b; \
+772: \
+ call 774f; \
+775: /* speculation trap */ \
+ pause; \
+ jmp 775b; \
+774: \
+ dec reg; \
+ jnz 771b; \
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
+
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
/*
@@ -76,6 +118,20 @@
#endif
.endm
+ /*
+ * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
+ * monstrosity above, manually.
+ */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \
+ \ftr
+.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+#endif
+.endm
+
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
@@ -119,7 +175,7 @@
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
-#else /* No retpoline */
+#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
@@ -134,5 +190,25 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
+/*
+ * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
+ * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
+ * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ */
+static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
+
+ asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+ "910:"
+ : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+ : "r" (loops) : "memory" );
+#endif
+}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include "trace.h"
@@ -4917,6 +4918,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
#endif
);
+ /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+ vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
#else
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
#include <asm/kexec.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "trace.h"
#include "pmu.h"
@@ -9026,6 +9027,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
#endif
);
+ /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+ vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
if (debugctlmsr)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 95/96] selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 94/96] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 96/96] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andy Lutomirski, Borislav Petkov,
Dave Hansen, H. Peter Anvin, Hugh Dickins, Josh Poimboeuf,
Juergen Gross, Kees Cook, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
commit 352909b49ba0d74929b96af6dfbefc854ab6ebb5 upstream.
This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do.
It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as
expected.
If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling,
running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate,
and vsyscall=native are helpful.
(Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their
vDSO equivalents.)
Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three
vsyscall modes. Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure
that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config
option as to which mode you're in. It's quite easy to mess up
the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates
or vice versa.
Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched
kernels. It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress
vsyscalls.
CSigned-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.1515719552.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c | 500 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 500 insertions(+)
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/ucontext.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+# define VSYS(x) (x)
+#else
+# define VSYS(x) 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_getcpu
+# ifdef __x86_64__
+# define SYS_getcpu 309
+# else
+# define SYS_getcpu 318
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static void sethandler(int sig, void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *),
+ int flags)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sa.sa_sigaction = handler;
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | flags;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ if (sigaction(sig, &sa, 0))
+ err(1, "sigaction");
+}
+
+/* vsyscalls and vDSO */
+bool should_read_vsyscall = false;
+
+typedef long (*gtod_t)(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz);
+gtod_t vgtod = (gtod_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600000);
+gtod_t vdso_gtod;
+
+typedef int (*vgettime_t)(clockid_t, struct timespec *);
+vgettime_t vdso_gettime;
+
+typedef long (*time_func_t)(time_t *t);
+time_func_t vtime = (time_func_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600400);
+time_func_t vdso_time;
+
+typedef long (*getcpu_t)(unsigned *, unsigned *, void *);
+getcpu_t vgetcpu = (getcpu_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600800);
+getcpu_t vdso_getcpu;
+
+static void init_vdso(void)
+{
+ void *vdso = dlopen("linux-vdso.so.1", RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_LOCAL | RTLD_NOLOAD);
+ if (!vdso)
+ vdso = dlopen("linux-gate.so.1", RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_LOCAL | RTLD_NOLOAD);
+ if (!vdso) {
+ printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find vDSO\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vdso_gtod = (gtod_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_gettimeofday");
+ if (!vdso_gtod)
+ printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find gettimeofday in vDSO\n");
+
+ vdso_gettime = (vgettime_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_clock_gettime");
+ if (!vdso_gettime)
+ printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find clock_gettime in vDSO\n");
+
+ vdso_time = (time_func_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_time");
+ if (!vdso_time)
+ printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find time in vDSO\n");
+
+ vdso_getcpu = (getcpu_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_getcpu");
+ if (!vdso_getcpu) {
+ /* getcpu() was never wired up in the 32-bit vDSO. */
+ printf("[%s]\tfailed to find getcpu in vDSO\n",
+ sizeof(long) == 8 ? "WARN" : "NOTE");
+ }
+}
+
+static int init_vsys(void)
+{
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ int nerrs = 0;
+ FILE *maps;
+ char line[128];
+ bool found = false;
+
+ maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+ if (!maps) {
+ printf("[WARN]\tCould not open /proc/self/maps -- assuming vsyscall is r-x\n");
+ should_read_vsyscall = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps)) {
+ char r, x;
+ void *start, *end;
+ char name[128];
+ if (sscanf(line, "%p-%p %c-%cp %*x %*x:%*x %*u %s",
+ &start, &end, &r, &x, name) != 5)
+ continue;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "[vsyscall]"))
+ continue;
+
+ printf("\tvsyscall map: %s", line);
+
+ if (start != (void *)0xffffffffff600000 ||
+ end != (void *)0xffffffffff601000) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\taddress range is nonsense\n");
+ nerrs++;
+ }
+
+ printf("\tvsyscall permissions are %c-%c\n", r, x);
+ should_read_vsyscall = (r == 'r');
+ if (x != 'x') {
+ vgtod = NULL;
+ vtime = NULL;
+ vgetcpu = NULL;
+ }
+
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ fclose(maps);
+
+ if (!found) {
+ printf("\tno vsyscall map in /proc/self/maps\n");
+ should_read_vsyscall = false;
+ vgtod = NULL;
+ vtime = NULL;
+ vgetcpu = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return nerrs;
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* syscalls */
+static inline long sys_gtod(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz)
+{
+ return syscall(SYS_gettimeofday, tv, tz);
+}
+
+static inline int sys_clock_gettime(clockid_t id, struct timespec *ts)
+{
+ return syscall(SYS_clock_gettime, id, ts);
+}
+
+static inline long sys_time(time_t *t)
+{
+ return syscall(SYS_time, t);
+}
+
+static inline long sys_getcpu(unsigned * cpu, unsigned * node,
+ void* cache)
+{
+ return syscall(SYS_getcpu, cpu, node, cache);
+}
+
+static jmp_buf jmpbuf;
+
+static void sigsegv(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void)
+{
+ siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
+}
+
+static double tv_diff(const struct timeval *a, const struct timeval *b)
+{
+ return (double)(a->tv_sec - b->tv_sec) +
+ (double)((int)a->tv_usec - (int)b->tv_usec) * 1e-6;
+}
+
+static int check_gtod(const struct timeval *tv_sys1,
+ const struct timeval *tv_sys2,
+ const struct timezone *tz_sys,
+ const char *which,
+ const struct timeval *tv_other,
+ const struct timezone *tz_other)
+{
+ int nerrs = 0;
+ double d1, d2;
+
+ if (tz_other && (tz_sys->tz_minuteswest != tz_other->tz_minuteswest || tz_sys->tz_dsttime != tz_other->tz_dsttime)) {
+ printf("[FAIL] %s tz mismatch\n", which);
+ nerrs++;
+ }
+
+ d1 = tv_diff(tv_other, tv_sys1);
+ d2 = tv_diff(tv_sys2, tv_other);
+ printf("\t%s time offsets: %lf %lf\n", which, d1, d2);
+
+ if (d1 < 0 || d2 < 0) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\t%s time was inconsistent with the syscall\n", which);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\t%s gettimeofday()'s timeval was okay\n", which);
+ }
+
+ return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_gtod(void)
+{
+ struct timeval tv_sys1, tv_sys2, tv_vdso, tv_vsys;
+ struct timezone tz_sys, tz_vdso, tz_vsys;
+ long ret_vdso = -1;
+ long ret_vsys = -1;
+ int nerrs = 0;
+
+ printf("[RUN]\ttest gettimeofday()\n");
+
+ if (sys_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tz_sys) != 0)
+ err(1, "syscall gettimeofday");
+ if (vdso_gtod)
+ ret_vdso = vdso_gtod(&tv_vdso, &tz_vdso);
+ if (vgtod)
+ ret_vsys = vgtod(&tv_vsys, &tz_vsys);
+ if (sys_gtod(&tv_sys2, &tz_sys) != 0)
+ err(1, "syscall gettimeofday");
+
+ if (vdso_gtod) {
+ if (ret_vdso == 0) {
+ nerrs += check_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tv_sys2, &tz_sys, "vDSO", &tv_vdso, &tz_vdso);
+ } else {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO gettimeofday() failed: %ld\n", ret_vdso);
+ nerrs++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (vgtod) {
+ if (ret_vsys == 0) {
+ nerrs += check_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tv_sys2, &tz_sys, "vsyscall", &tv_vsys, &tz_vsys);
+ } else {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvsys gettimeofday() failed: %ld\n", ret_vsys);
+ nerrs++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_time(void) {
+ int nerrs = 0;
+
+ printf("[RUN]\ttest time()\n");
+ long t_sys1, t_sys2, t_vdso = 0, t_vsys = 0;
+ long t2_sys1 = -1, t2_sys2 = -1, t2_vdso = -1, t2_vsys = -1;
+ t_sys1 = sys_time(&t2_sys1);
+ if (vdso_time)
+ t_vdso = vdso_time(&t2_vdso);
+ if (vtime)
+ t_vsys = vtime(&t2_vsys);
+ t_sys2 = sys_time(&t2_sys2);
+ if (t_sys1 < 0 || t_sys1 != t2_sys1 || t_sys2 < 0 || t_sys2 != t2_sys2) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tsyscall failed (ret1:%ld output1:%ld ret2:%ld output2:%ld)\n", t_sys1, t2_sys1, t_sys2, t2_sys2);
+ nerrs++;
+ return nerrs;
+ }
+
+ if (vdso_time) {
+ if (t_vdso < 0 || t_vdso != t2_vdso) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO failed (ret:%ld output:%ld)\n", t_vdso, t2_vdso);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else if (t_vdso < t_sys1 || t_vdso > t_sys2) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO returned the wrong time (%ld %ld %ld)\n", t_sys1, t_vdso, t_sys2);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\tvDSO time() is okay\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (vtime) {
+ if (t_vsys < 0 || t_vsys != t2_vsys) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall failed (ret:%ld output:%ld)\n", t_vsys, t2_vsys);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else if (t_vsys < t_sys1 || t_vsys > t_sys2) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall returned the wrong time (%ld %ld %ld)\n", t_sys1, t_vsys, t_sys2);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\tvsyscall time() is okay\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_getcpu(int cpu)
+{
+ int nerrs = 0;
+ long ret_sys, ret_vdso = -1, ret_vsys = -1;
+
+ printf("[RUN]\tgetcpu() on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+
+ cpu_set_t cpuset;
+ CPU_ZERO(&cpuset);
+ CPU_SET(cpu, &cpuset);
+ if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpuset), &cpuset) != 0) {
+ printf("[SKIP]\tfailed to force CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ return nerrs;
+ }
+
+ unsigned cpu_sys, cpu_vdso, cpu_vsys, node_sys, node_vdso, node_vsys;
+ unsigned node = 0;
+ bool have_node = false;
+ ret_sys = sys_getcpu(&cpu_sys, &node_sys, 0);
+ if (vdso_getcpu)
+ ret_vdso = vdso_getcpu(&cpu_vdso, &node_vdso, 0);
+ if (vgetcpu)
+ ret_vsys = vgetcpu(&cpu_vsys, &node_vsys, 0);
+
+ if (ret_sys == 0) {
+ if (cpu_sys != cpu) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tsyscall reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_sys, cpu);
+ nerrs++;
+ }
+
+ have_node = true;
+ node = node_sys;
+ }
+
+ if (vdso_getcpu) {
+ if (ret_vdso) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO getcpu() failed\n");
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ if (!have_node) {
+ have_node = true;
+ node = node_vdso;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_vdso != cpu) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_vdso, cpu);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\tvDSO reported correct CPU\n");
+ }
+
+ if (node_vdso != node) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO reported node %hu but should be %hu\n", node_vdso, node);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\tvDSO reported correct node\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (vgetcpu) {
+ if (ret_vsys) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall getcpu() failed\n");
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ if (!have_node) {
+ have_node = true;
+ node = node_vsys;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_vsys != cpu) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_vsys, cpu);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\tvsyscall reported correct CPU\n");
+ }
+
+ if (node_vsys != node) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall reported node %hu but should be %hu\n", node_vsys, node);
+ nerrs++;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\tvsyscall reported correct node\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_vsys_r(void)
+{
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ printf("[RUN]\tChecking read access to the vsyscall page\n");
+ bool can_read;
+ if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+ *(volatile int *)0xffffffffff600000;
+ can_read = true;
+ } else {
+ can_read = false;
+ }
+
+ if (can_read && !should_read_vsyscall) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tWe have read access, but we shouldn't\n");
+ return 1;
+ } else if (!can_read && should_read_vsyscall) {
+ printf("[FAIL]\tWe don't have read access, but we should\n");
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ printf("[OK]\tgot expected result\n");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+#define X86_EFLAGS_TF (1UL << 8)
+static volatile sig_atomic_t num_vsyscall_traps;
+
+static unsigned long get_eflags(void)
+{
+ unsigned long eflags;
+ asm volatile ("pushfq\n\tpopq %0" : "=rm" (eflags));
+ return eflags;
+}
+
+static void set_eflags(unsigned long eflags)
+{
+ asm volatile ("pushq %0\n\tpopfq" : : "rm" (eflags) : "flags");
+}
+
+static void sigtrap(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void)
+{
+ ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)ctx_void;
+ unsigned long ip = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP];
+
+ if (((ip ^ 0xffffffffff600000UL) & ~0xfffUL) == 0)
+ num_vsyscall_traps++;
+}
+
+static int test_native_vsyscall(void)
+{
+ time_t tmp;
+ bool is_native;
+
+ if (!vtime)
+ return 0;
+
+ printf("[RUN]\tchecking for native vsyscall\n");
+ sethandler(SIGTRAP, sigtrap, 0);
+ set_eflags(get_eflags() | X86_EFLAGS_TF);
+ vtime(&tmp);
+ set_eflags(get_eflags() & ~X86_EFLAGS_TF);
+
+ /*
+ * If vsyscalls are emulated, we expect a single trap in the
+ * vsyscall page -- the call instruction will trap with RIP
+ * pointing to the entry point before emulation takes over.
+ * In native mode, we expect two traps, since whatever code
+ * the vsyscall page contains will be more than just a ret
+ * instruction.
+ */
+ is_native = (num_vsyscall_traps > 1);
+
+ printf("\tvsyscalls are %s (%d instructions in vsyscall page)\n",
+ (is_native ? "native" : "emulated"),
+ (int)num_vsyscall_traps);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int nerrs = 0;
+
+ init_vdso();
+ nerrs += init_vsys();
+
+ nerrs += test_gtod();
+ nerrs += test_time();
+ nerrs += test_getcpu(0);
+ nerrs += test_getcpu(1);
+
+ sethandler(SIGSEGV, sigsegv, 0);
+ nerrs += test_vsys_r();
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ nerrs += test_native_vsyscall();
+#endif
+
+ return nerrs ? 1 : 0;
+}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 96/96] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 95/96] selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 12:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-15 16:28 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review kernelci.org bot
` (3 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-15 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner,
David Woodhouse, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
gnomes, Rik van Riel, Andi Kleen, Josh Poimboeuf,
thomas.lendacky, Jiri Kosina, Andy Lutomirski, Dave Hansen,
Kees Cook, Tim Chen, Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6 upstream.
Remove the compile time warning when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and the compiler
does not have retpoline support. Linus rationale for this is:
It's wrong because it will just make people turn off RETPOLINE, and the
asm updates - and return stack clearing - that are independent of the
compiler are likely the most important parts because they are likely the
ones easiest to target.
And it's annoying because most people won't be able to do anything about
it. The number of people building their own compiler? Very small. So if
their distro hasn't got a compiler yet (and pretty much nobody does), the
warning is just annoying crap.
It is already properly reported as part of the sysfs interface. The
compile-time warning only encourages bad things.
Fixes: 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support")
Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzWgquv4i6Mab6bASqYXg3ErV3XDFEYf=GEcCDQg5uAtw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/Makefile | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -187,8 +187,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE
- else
- $(warning CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but not supported by the compiler. Toolchain update recommended.)
endif
endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 12:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 96/96] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-15 16:28 ` kernelci.org bot
2018-01-15 22:03 ` Dan Rue
` (2 subsequent siblings)
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: kernelci.org bot @ 2018-01-15 16:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuahkh, patches,
ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable
stable-rc/linux-4.9.y boot: 130 boots: 0 failed, 128 passed with 2 offline (v4.9.76-97-gdc5060a582f8)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.76-97-gdc5060a582f8/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.76-97-gdc5060a582f8/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.9.y
Git Describe: v4.9.76-97-gdc5060a582f8
Git Commit: dc5060a582f8d5bc77883da561c8c63cec0b5999
Git URL: http://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 70 unique boards, 19 SoC families, 17 builds out of 183
Offline Platforms:
arm:
multi_v7_defconfig:
exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab
exynos_defconfig:
exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab
---
For more info write to <info@kernelci.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 16:28 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review kernelci.org bot
@ 2018-01-15 22:03 ` Dan Rue
2018-01-16 5:53 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-16 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-16 20:36 ` Shuah Khan
99 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Dan Rue @ 2018-01-15 22:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, ben.hutchings, shuahkh, lkft-triage, patches,
stable, akpm, torvalds, linux
On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:33:59PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.77 release.
> There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:26 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.77-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.77-rc2
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: aa8f4c62cd1ceee8dd60ba20231fc44d13b01db1
git describe: v4.9.76-99-gaa8f4c62cd1c
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.76-99-gaa8f4c62cd1c
No regressions (compared to build v4.9.76-97-g8cc984c38b60)
Boards, architectures and test suites:
-------------------------------------
hi6220-hikey - arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 23, pass: 40,
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 60,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 1, pass: 21,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 121, pass: 983,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,
juno-r2 - arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 23, pass: 40,
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 60,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 121, pass: 987,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,
x15 - arm
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 25, pass: 37,
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 87,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 60,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 2, pass: 20,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 13,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 66, pass: 1037,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,
x86_64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 24, pass: 53,
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 1, pass: 61,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 9,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 116, pass: 1016,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review
2018-01-15 22:03 ` Dan Rue
@ 2018-01-16 5:53 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-16 11:19 ` Naresh Kamboju
0 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-16 5:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, ben.hutchings, shuahkh, lkft-triage, patches,
stable, akpm, torvalds, linux
On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 04:03:06PM -0600, Dan Rue wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:33:59PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.77 release.
> > There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:26 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.77-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
Really? Did you test ebpf? If not, can you go and manually do that (I
don't know if it's part of your skips), as it is important here...
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review
2018-01-16 5:53 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-01-16 11:19 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-01-16 12:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 112+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2018-01-16 11:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, Ben Hutchings, Shuah Khan, lkft-triage, patches,
linux- stable, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds, Guenter Roeck
On 16 January 2018 at 11:23, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 04:03:06PM -0600, Dan Rue wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:33:59PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.77 release.
>> > There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
>> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
>> > let me know.
>> >
>> > Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:26 UTC 2018.
>> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
>> >
>> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>> > kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.77-rc1.gz
>> > or in the git tree and branch at:
>> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
>> > and the diffstat can be found below.
>>
>> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
>> No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
>
> Really? Did you test ebpf? If not, can you go and manually do that (I
> don't know if it's part of your skips), as it is important here...
We do not have selftests/bpf tests for 4.9
So running 4.14 version of bpf test cases on 4.9 kernel causing these failures.
bpf# ./test_tag
test_tag: test_ta[ 2947.456687] audit: type=1701
audit(1516100826.662:8): auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295
pid=2672 comm="test_6
g.c:111: tag_from_fdinfo: Assertion `!ret' failed.
Aborted (core dumped)
bpf# gdb ./test_tag
<>
test_tag: test_tag.c:111: tag_from_fdinfo: Assertion `!ret' failed.
Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
0x0000ffffb7e96a00 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
bpf# gdb ./test_lpm_map
Starting program: /opt/kselftests/mainline/bpf/test_lpm_map
test_lpm_map: test_lpm_map.c:191: test_lpm_map: Assertion `map >= 0' failed.
Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
0x0000ffffb7e96a00 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
The error log is same before and after the previous stable reviews.
We have old bugs on these issues,
LKFT: 4.4 and 4.9: kselftest: bpf: test_lpm_map: Assertion `map >= 0' failed
https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3119
LKFT: 4.4 and 4.9: kselftest: bpf: test_lpm_map: Assertion `map >= 0' failed
https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3116
- Naresh
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
> _______________________________________________
> Lkft-triage mailing list
> Lkft-triage@lists.linaro.org
> https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/lkft-triage
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review
2018-01-16 11:19 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2018-01-16 12:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-01-16 12:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Naresh Kamboju
Cc: linux-kernel, Ben Hutchings, Shuah Khan, lkft-triage, patches,
linux- stable, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds, Guenter Roeck
On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 04:49:11PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On 16 January 2018 at 11:23, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 04:03:06PM -0600, Dan Rue wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:33:59PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.77 release.
> >> > There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> >> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> >> > let me know.
> >> >
> >> > Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:26 UTC 2018.
> >> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >> >
> >> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> >> > kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.77-rc1.gz
> >> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> >> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> >> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >>
> >> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> >> No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
> >
> > Really? Did you test ebpf? If not, can you go and manually do that (I
> > don't know if it's part of your skips), as it is important here...
>
> We do not have selftests/bpf tests for 4.9
> So running 4.14 version of bpf test cases on 4.9 kernel causing these failures.
>
> bpf# ./test_tag
> test_tag: test_ta[ 2947.456687] audit: type=1701
> audit(1516100826.662:8): auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295
> pid=2672 comm="test_6
> g.c:111: tag_from_fdinfo: Assertion `!ret' failed.
> Aborted (core dumped)
>
> bpf# gdb ./test_tag
> <>
> test_tag: test_tag.c:111: tag_from_fdinfo: Assertion `!ret' failed.
> Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
> 0x0000ffffb7e96a00 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
>
> bpf# gdb ./test_lpm_map
> Starting program: /opt/kselftests/mainline/bpf/test_lpm_map
> test_lpm_map: test_lpm_map.c:191: test_lpm_map: Assertion `map >= 0' failed.
> Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
> 0x0000ffffb7e96a00 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
>
> The error log is same before and after the previous stable reviews.
> We have old bugs on these issues,
> LKFT: 4.4 and 4.9: kselftest: bpf: test_lpm_map: Assertion `map >= 0' failed
> https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3119
> LKFT: 4.4 and 4.9: kselftest: bpf: test_lpm_map: Assertion `map >= 0' failed
> https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3116
Ok, I guess we are just as broken as before, I'll take it! :)
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-15 22:03 ` Dan Rue
@ 2018-01-16 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-16 20:36 ` Shuah Khan
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2018-01-16 14:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, shuahkh, patches, ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable
On 01/15/2018 04:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.77 release.
> There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:26 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 126 pass: 126 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review
2018-01-15 12:33 [PATCH 4.9 00/96] 4.9.77-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-16 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
@ 2018-01-16 20:36 ` Shuah Khan
99 siblings, 0 replies; 112+ messages in thread
From: Shuah Khan @ 2018-01-16 20:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, patches, ben.hutchings, lkft-triage,
stable, Shuah Khan
On 01/15/2018 05:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.77 release.
> There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:26 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.77-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 112+ messages in thread