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From: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 18:26:45 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180124172645.GF16646@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516813025-10794-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 04:57:04PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> Some old Atoms, anything in family 5 or 4, and newer CPUs when they advertise
> the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR and it has the RDCL_NO bit set, are not vulnerable.
> 
> Roll the AMD exemption into the x86_match_cpu() table too.
> 
> Based on suggestions from Dave Hansen and Alan Cox.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-24 17:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-24 16:56 [PATCH v3 0/6] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:18   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:18   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:20   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 17:57     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 22:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-02-20 15:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:16   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:26   ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-01-26 12:14   ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-01-26 12:27     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:27     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-26 15:30       ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-26 16:47     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:29   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 17:58     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 21:29     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-26 12:16   ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-01-26 12:27     ` David Woodhouse

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