From: Peter Malone <peter.malone@gmail.com>
To: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 14:57:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180131145755.26109-1-peter.malone@gmail.com> (raw)
Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in
sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
'index' is defined as an int in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
We retrieve this from the user:
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
and then we use 'index' in the following way:
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
This is a classic information leak vulnerability. 'index' should be
an unsigned int, given its usage above.
This patch is straight-forward; it changes 'index' to unsigned int
in two switch-cases: FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC && FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC.
Signed-off-by: Peter Malone <peter.malone@gmail.com>
---
v2: fixed formatting
drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c
index af6fc97f4ba4..a436d44f1b7f 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cmd, unsigned long arg,
unsigned char __user *ured;
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
- int index, count, i;
+ unsigned int index, count, i;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cmd, unsigned long arg,
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
struct fb_cmap *cmap = &info->cmap;
- int index, count, i;
+ unsigned int index, count, i;
u8 red, green, blue;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
--
2.14.3
next prev reply other threads:[~2018-01-31 14:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-30 20:30 [PATCH] Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper() Peter Malone
2018-01-31 8:33 ` Mathieu Malaterre
2018-01-31 8:33 ` Mathieu Malaterre
2018-01-31 14:57 ` Peter Malone [this message]
2018-01-31 15:49 ` [PATCH v2] " Mathieu Malaterre
2018-01-31 15:49 ` Mathieu Malaterre
2018-02-04 14:12 ` Peter Malone
2018-02-04 14:18 ` Peter Malone
2018-02-04 14:18 ` Peter Malone
2018-03-07 13:03 ` Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz
2018-03-07 13:03 ` Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz
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