From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753146AbeBEO5T (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Feb 2018 09:57:19 -0500 Received: from aserp2120.oracle.com ([141.146.126.78]:54252 "EHLO aserp2120.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752972AbeBEO5L (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Feb 2018 09:57:11 -0500 Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 11:02:20 +0000 From: Darren Kenny To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , x86@kernel.org, David Woodhouse , Arjan van de Ven , Borislav Petkov , Andi Kleen , Tom Lendacky , Masami Hiramatsu , Darren Kenny Subject: [PATCH v2] Correct use of IBRS_ATT name, should be IBRS_ALL Message-ID: <20180205110220.ky2ih34egygmg4xs@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: NeoMutt/20171215 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=5900 definitions=8795 signatures=668662 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=1 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1711220000 definitions=main-1802050190 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes a comment in commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") While the original name was "IBRS All The Time" (IBRS_ATT), the publicly documented name is IBRS_ALL, we should be using that. Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Acked-by: David Woodhouse --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 4ad4108..5b778d2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { -- 2.9.5