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From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RESEND][PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 14:46:23 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180220134623.GA21134@dhcp22.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1518638796-20819-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

On Wed 14-02-18 12:06:33, Kees Cook wrote:
> Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
> continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around
> the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other
> places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be
> unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be
> manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to
> handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and
> instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that
> need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach.
> 
> Neither I nor 0-day have found issues with this series, so I'd like to
> get it into -mm for further testing.

Sorry, for the late response. All three patches make sense to me.
finalize_exec could see a much better documentation and explain what is
the semantic.

Anyway, feel free to add
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RESEND][PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 14:46:23 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180220134623.GA21134@dhcp22.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1518638796-20819-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

On Wed 14-02-18 12:06:33, Kees Cook wrote:
> Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
> continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around
> the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other
> places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be
> unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be
> manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to
> handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and
> instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that
> need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach.
> 
> Neither I nor 0-day have found issues with this series, so I'd like to
> get it into -mm for further testing.

Sorry, for the late response. All three patches make sense to me.
finalize_exec could see a much better documentation and explain what is
the semantic.

Anyway, feel free to add
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

--
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-20 13:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-14 20:06 Kees Cook
2018-02-14 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 20:06 ` [PATCH 1/3] exec: Pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Kees Cook
2018-02-14 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 20:06 ` [PATCH 2/3] exec: Introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread() Kees Cook
2018-02-14 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 20:06 ` [PATCH 3/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec Kees Cook
2018-02-14 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 13:46 ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2018-02-20 13:46   ` [RESEND][PATCH 0/3] " Michal Hocko

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