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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv2 01/14] x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 19:55:27 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180328165540.648-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180328165540.648-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

AMD SME claims one bit from physical address to indicate whether the
page is encrypted or not. To achieve that we clear out the bit from
__PHYSICAL_MASK.

The capability to adjust __PHYSICAL_MASK is required beyond AMD SME.
For instance for upcoming Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption.

Factor it out into a separate feature with own Kconfig handle.

It also helps with overhead of AMD SME. It saves more than 3k in .text
on defconfig + AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT:

	add/remove: 3/2 grow/shrink: 5/110 up/down: 189/-3753 (-3564)

We would need to return to this once we have infrastructure to patch
constants in code. That's good candidate for it.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                    | 4 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c | 5 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h   | 8 +++++++-
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c  | 3 +++
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c               | 5 +++++
 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 27fede438959..bf68138662c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -332,6 +332,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
 config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
 	def_bool y
 
+config DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+	bool
+
 config PGTABLE_LEVELS
 	int
 	default 5 if X86_5LEVEL
@@ -1503,6 +1506,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
 config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support"
 	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD
+	select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
 	---help---
 	  Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
 	  This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c
index 522d11431433..748456c365f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr_64.c
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ static struct alloc_pgt_data pgt_data;
 /* The top level page table entry pointer. */
 static unsigned long top_level_pgt;
 
+phys_addr_t physical_mask = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
+
 /*
  * Mapping information structure passed to kernel_ident_mapping_init().
  * Due to relocation, pointers must be assigned at run time not build time.
@@ -81,6 +83,9 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void)
 	/* If running as an SEV guest, the encryption mask is required. */
 	set_sev_encryption_mask();
 
+	/* Exclude the encryption mask from __PHYSICAL_MASK */
+	physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
+
 	/* Init mapping_info with run-time function/buffer pointers. */
 	mapping_info.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page;
 	mapping_info.context = &pgt_data;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
index 1e53560a84bb..c85e15010f48 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #define PUD_PAGE_SIZE		(_AC(1, UL) << PUD_SHIFT)
 #define PUD_PAGE_MASK		(~(PUD_PAGE_SIZE-1))
 
-#define __PHYSICAL_MASK		((phys_addr_t)(__sme_clr((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1)))
 #define __VIRTUAL_MASK		((1UL << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1)
 
 /* Cast *PAGE_MASK to a signed type so that it is sign-extended if
@@ -55,6 +54,13 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+extern phys_addr_t physical_mask;
+#define __PHYSICAL_MASK		physical_mask
+#else
+#define __PHYSICAL_MASK		((phys_addr_t)((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1))
+#endif
+
 extern int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr);
 
 extern unsigned long max_low_pfn_mapped;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 1b2197d13832..7ae36868aed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 		/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
 		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
 		sev_enabled = true;
+		physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -561,4 +562,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 		sme_me_mask = 0;
 	else
 		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
+
+	physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 34cda7e0551b..0199b94e6b40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/mtrr.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+phys_addr_t physical_mask __ro_after_init = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(physical_mask);
+#endif
+
 #define PGALLOC_GFP (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHPTE
-- 
2.16.2

  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-28 16:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-28 16:55 [PATCHv2 00/14] Partial MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-04-02 21:12   ` [PATCHv2 01/14] x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME Tom Lendacky
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 02/14] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 03/14] mm/shmem: Zero out unused vma fields in shmem_pseudo_vma_init() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 04/14] mm: Do no merge vma with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 05/14] mm/khugepaged: Do not collapse pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 06/14] mm/page_alloc: Propagate encryption KeyID through page allocator Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 17:15   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-29 12:38     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-29 11:20   ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-29 12:37     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-29 12:52       ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-29 13:13         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-29 13:37           ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-29 14:33             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-30  8:07   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 07/14] mm/page_alloc: Add hook in page allocation path for encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 08/14] mm/page_ext: Drop definition of unused PAGE_EXT_DEBUG_POISON Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-29  5:32   ` Vinayak Menon
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 09/14] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 10/14] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 11/14] x86/mm: Implement vma_is_encrypted() and vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 12/14] x86/mm: Implement page_keyid() using page_ext Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:59   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-29 12:43     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 13/14] x86/mm: Implement prep_encrypted_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-28 16:55 ` [PATCHv2 14/14] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov

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