From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthew Wilcox Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] kvmalloc: always use vmalloc if CONFIG_DEBUG_SG Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 10:16:51 -0700 Message-ID: <20180424171651.GC30577__6890.55958432636$1524590110$gmane$org@bombadil.infradead.org> References: <20180420130852.GC16083@dhcp22.suse.cz> <20180420210200.GH10788@bombadil.infradead.org> <20180421144757.GC14610@bombadil.infradead.org> <20180423151545.GU17484@dhcp22.suse.cz> <20180424034643.GA26636@bombadil.infradead.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: virtualization-bounces@lists.linux-foundation.org Errors-To: virtualization-bounces@lists.linux-foundation.org To: Mikulas Patocka Cc: Christoph Lameter , dm-devel@redhat.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, mst@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michal Hocko , Pekka Enberg , linux-mm@kvack.org, edumazet@google.com, David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, David Miller , Vlastimil Babka List-Id: virtualization@lists.linuxfoundation.org On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 08:29:14AM -0400, Mikulas Patocka wrote: > > > On Mon, 23 Apr 2018, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > > > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 08:06:16PM -0400, Mikulas Patocka wrote: > > > Some bugs (such as buffer overflows) are better detected > > > with kmalloc code, so we must test the kmalloc path too. > > > > Well now, this brings up another item for the collective TODO list -- > > implement redzone checks for vmalloc. Unless this is something already > > taken care of by kasan or similar. > > The kmalloc overflow testing is also not ideal - it rounds the size up to > the next slab size and detects buffer overflows only at this boundary. > > Some times ago, I made a "kmalloc guard" patch that places a magic number > immediatelly after the requested size - so that it can detect overflows at > byte boundary > ( https://www.redhat.com/archives/dm-devel/2014-September/msg00018.html ) > > That patch found a bug in crypto code: > ( http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1409.1/02325.html ) Is it still worth doing this, now we have kasan?