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From: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 11/19] s390: Replace IS_ENABLED(EXPOLINE_*) with IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXPOLINE_*)
Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 07:36:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180427053657.56944-12-schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180427053657.56944-1-schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

From: Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com>

[ Upstream commit 2cb370d615e9fbed9e95ed222c2c8f337181aa90 ]

I've accidentally stumbled upon the IS_ENABLED(EXPOLINE_*) lines, which
obviously always evaluate to false. Fix this.

Fixes: f19fbd5ed642 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Signed-off-by: Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
---
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
index 86ee26a612cf..57f55c24c21c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 #include <asm/facility.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
-int nospec_call_disable = IS_ENABLED(EXPOLINE_OFF);
-int nospec_return_disable = !IS_ENABLED(EXPOLINE_FULL);
+int nospec_call_disable = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXPOLINE_OFF);
+int nospec_return_disable = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXPOLINE_FULL);
 
 static int __init nospectre_v2_setup_early(char *str)
 {
-- 
2.13.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-27  5:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-27  5:36 [PATCH 00/19] s390 spectre mititgation for 4.9 Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 01/19] s390: introduce CPU alternatives Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 02/19] s390: enable CPU alternatives unconditionally Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 03/19] KVM: s390: wire up bpb feature Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 04/19] s390: scrub registers on kernel entry and KVM exit Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 05/19] s390: add optimized array_index_mask_nospec Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 06/19] s390/alternative: use a copy of the facility bit mask Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 07/19] s390: add options to change branch prediction behaviour for the kernel Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 08/19] s390: run user space and KVM guests with modified branch prediction Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 09/19] s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 10/19] KVM: s390: force bp isolation for VSIE Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` Martin Schwidefsky [this message]
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 12/19] s390: do not bypass BPENTER for interrupt system calls Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 13/19] s390/entry.S: fix spurious zeroing of r0 Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 14/19] s390: move nobp parameter functions to nospec-branch.c Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 15/19] s390: add automatic detection of the spectre defense Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 16/19] s390: report spectre mitigation via syslog Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 17/19] s390: add sysfs attributes for spectre Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 18/19] s390: correct nospec auto detection init order Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 19/19] s390: correct module section names for expoline code revert Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 10:11 ` [PATCH 00/19] s390 spectre mititgation for 4.9 Greg Kroah-Hartman
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-04-27  5:36 [PATCH 00/19] s390 spectre mititgation for 4.14 Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27  5:36 ` [PATCH 11/19] s390: Replace IS_ENABLED(EXPOLINE_*) with IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXPOLINE_*) Martin Schwidefsky

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