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From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH SSBv11 0/3] seccomp 1
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 05:29:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180503122914.GV75137@tassilo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1525308267.git.keescook@chromium.org>

On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 05:44:27PM -0700, speck for Kees Cook wrote:
> From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Subject:  opt-in under seccomp
> 
> As seccomp use overlaps best (though not perfectly) with applications
> most likely to want speculation flaw mitigations enabled, seccomp will
> enable them when seccomp is enabled for a task. Also adds a line to
> /proc/$pid/status for examining the mitigation state of a task.

As I wrote earlier this isn't a good idea. We went through
this earlier. 

It originally seems like a good idea until you start looking at the details.

The big users of seccomp like the web browsers eventually
don't want it once they use site isolation. And it would
unnecessarily slow them down.

And other programs need to be maintained anyways (e.g. for 
spectre variant 1 fixes) so they can as well add it explicitely.

Separate enabling makes more sense. And that is already in the patchkit.

-Andi

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-03 12:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-03  0:44 [MODERATED] [PATCH SSBv11 0/3] seccomp 1 Kees Cook
2018-05-01 22:07 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH SSBv11 3/3] seccomp 0 Kees Cook
2018-05-01 22:19 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH SSBv11 1/3] seccomp 2 Kees Cook
2018-05-01 22:31 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH SSBv11 2/3] seccomp 3 Kees Cook
2018-05-03  8:58 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH SSBv11 3/3] seccomp 0 Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-03  9:21   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-03 16:03     ` [MODERATED] " Kees Cook
2018-05-03 12:29 ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2018-05-03 12:45   ` [PATCH SSBv11 0/3] seccomp 1 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-03 14:09     ` [MODERATED] " Ingo Molnar
2018-05-03 14:57       ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-03 17:04       ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03 18:58         ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-03 23:17           ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03 14:47     ` Andi Kleen

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