From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 22:23:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180504022349.GH29205@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1525388861-27018-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
On Fri, May 04, 2018 at 09:07:37AM +1000, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is
> enough entropy then '(____ptrval____)' is printed. This makes debugging
> stack traces during early boot difficult.
>
> It was observed that we can relax the requirement for cryptographically
> secure hashing when debugging while still maintaining pointer hashing
> behaviour. This allows kernels to be debugged without developers
> relying on different pointer printing behavior.
>
> Using the hw RNG if available solves this problem for those machines
> that have a hardware RNG, we would like to solve it for _all_ machines.
>
> Patch 1 - Whitespace fixes.
> Patch 2 - Fix get_random_bytes_arch()
> Patch 3 - Use hw RNG for pointer hashing if available (by default).
> Patch 4 - Use insecure hashing with command line option 'debug_early_boot'.
What tree are these patches going in? It seems to be equally split
between random and core kernel code. I'm happy taking it in via the
random tree, or if it goes in some other patch (I've already ack'ed
the random changes). I just want to make sure other folks aren't
assuming I was going take the patches, while I was assuming it would
go to Linus some other way.
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-04 2:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-03 23:07 [PATCH v3 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-03 23:07 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-03 23:07 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-03 23:07 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-03 23:07 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-04 0:09 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-05-04 2:23 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2018-05-04 3:50 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers Tobin C. Harding
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