From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AB8JxZrjv/79DocEirOy0sQRGCvaKvX3qQvcAum7YSEiFPP6DcEzqEzHSFovseuwctf+axELdjZv ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1525843622; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=0UkysmGLRtP2f/sMNAbRRbBuyEixHQZHj5dUwVJ6Pd9+AmJeGGianPtTNHCvj3lHAI xxrbw8s88eymfJo797rTyUpYmAHrkatyrg4pKsFzqlVImm6ffKHIgsdkGiFQv4WNaizP 9P+7u6fUtBp52MqPC/d9oS1GB8+P135zNFo/+qh9BBNw+P5o/Ks9jc81D04vLqIcjU1+ FhmAsirKLlrgC8W8reCqMlJkMU30WnFpzEyafV+56X8MrwP6QnYF7cO7Iyz16WB8MKTp pz6+kQmqK9G+vN5ytLf2nzj9ToRBr/u+RybNkZVkVw+vkfOr9WdizCz2D11/6t2YsxlJ 0SKQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=message-id:user-agent:in-reply-to:content-disposition:mime-version :references:subject:cc:to:from:date:arc-authentication-results; bh=GxTPwVB3C7OqHjBj96aMNe5TnVlAZ6RU+qX60MTkzYI=; b=X7q4UmAXB3pMyXy1PLnXjiHpx9N5GT3xsSw1KOd7ya/bdmHLH0v+CpwcJvHNqesn01 eNQsiuWtadzCO5+05YyynImzTdgKdrJwV93zHY2eCOY1zUjY1rkk/iRqqixuumT2NDyU 1Ly8XiJ1pD/7nfSvu0ChTbqAcWxFCsWl6tIfaCtu7NwwRblmcN6af1Z5KATQWaUhUsMa mXERmEHDL8Jy1AES9HuycpAuWyh/X7KVFUFhTfQ6mtv3W5CTw1qcPaZ/O/mgSTTffzA6 ldkQDcDqgcIm25AeoTdvl9qvNVDVcKvhy93zooHGCo5orD2VfaDHIJ2CKdggcQYqvDK8 aRMQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=neutral (google.com: 148.163.158.5 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com) smtp.mailfrom=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=neutral (google.com: 148.163.158.5 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com) smtp.mailfrom=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 08:26:32 +0300 From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Dmitry Vyukov , Jonathan Corbet , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Christopher Li , Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , Masahiro Yamada , Michal Marek , Mark Rutland , Nick Desaulniers , Yury Norov , Marc Zyngier , Kristina Martsenko , Suzuki K Poulose , Punit Agrawal , Dave Martin , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morse , Michael Weiser , Julien Thierry , Tyler Baicar , "Eric W . Biederman" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Kees Cook , Sandipan Das , David Woodhouse , Paul Lawrence , Herbert Xu , Josh Poimboeuf , Geert Uytterhoeven , Tom Lendacky , Arnd Bergmann , Dan Williams , Michal Hocko , Jan Kara , Ross Zwisler , =?iso-8859-1?B?Suly9G1l?= Glisse , Matthew Wilcox , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Souptick Joarder , Hugh Dickins , Davidlohr Bueso , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Philippe Ombredanne , Kate Stewart , Laura Abbott , Boris Brezillon , Vlastimil Babka , Pintu Agarwal , Doug Berger , Anshuman Khandual , Mel Gorman , Pavel Tatashin , Tetsuo Handa , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, Kostya Serebryany , Evgeniy Stepanov , Lee Smith , Ramana Radhakrishnan , Jacob Bramley , Ruben Ayrapetyan , Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Mark Brand , Chintan Pandya Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 16/16] khwasan: update kasan documentation References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18050905-0040-0000-0000-00000437A2B6 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18050905-0041-0000-0000-0000263BE0ED Message-Id: <20180509052632.GB15939@rapoport-lnx> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-05-09_01:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=2 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1805090054 X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1599917372360161351?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1599963002565945998?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, May 08, 2018 at 07:21:02PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > This patch updates KASAN documentation to reflect the addition of KHWASAN. > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov > --- > Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 213 +++++++++++++++++------------- > 1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > index f7a18f274357..2e5f1cf766f3 100644 > --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > @@ -8,11 +8,19 @@ KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides > a fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds > bugs. > > -KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, > -therefore you will need a GCC version 4.9.2 or later. GCC 5.0 or later is > -required for detection of out-of-bounds accesses to stack or global variables. > +KASAN has two modes: classic KASAN (a classic version, similar to user space > +ASan) and KHWASAN (a version based on memory tagging, similar to user space > +HWASan). > > -Currently KASAN is supported only for the x86_64 and arm64 architectures. > +KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert validity checks before every > +memory access, and therefore requires a compiler version that supports that. > +For classic KASAN you need GCC version 4.9.2 or later. GCC 5.0 or later is > +required for detection of out-of-bounds accesses on stack and global variables. > +KHWASAN in turns is only suppoeted in clang and requires revision 330044 or Typos: in turn is only supported > +later. > + > +Currently classic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm64 and xtensa > +architectures, and KHWASAN is supported only for arm64. > > Usage > ----- > @@ -21,12 +29,14 @@ To enable KASAN configure kernel with:: > > CONFIG_KASAN = y > > -and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and > -inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary > -the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. Inline instrumentation requires a GCC > +and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC (to enable classic KASAN) and > +CONFIG_KASAN_HW (to enabled KHWASAN). You also need to choose choose between > +CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and inline are compiler > +instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary the latter is > +1.1 - 2 times faster. For classic KASAN inline instrumentation requires GCC > version 5.0 or later. > > -KASAN works with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators. > +Both KASAN modes work with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators. > For better bug detection and nicer reporting, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE. > > To disable instrumentation for specific files or directories, add a line > @@ -43,85 +53,80 @@ similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile: > Error reports > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > -A typical out of bounds access report looks like this:: > +A typical out-of-bounds access classic KASAN report looks like this:: > > ================================================================== > - BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan] at addr ffff8800693bc5d3 > - Write of size 1 by task modprobe/1689 > - ============================================================================= > - BUG kmalloc-128 (Not tainted): kasan error > - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > - > - Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint > - INFO: Allocated in kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan] age=0 cpu=0 pid=1689 > - __slab_alloc+0x4b4/0x4f0 > - kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10b/0x190 > - kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan] > - init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan] > - do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200 > - load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20 > - SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80 > - system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 > - INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001a4ef00 objects=17 used=7 fp=0xffff8800693bd728 flags=0x100000000004080 > - INFO: Object 0xffff8800693bc558 @offset=1368 fp=0xffff8800693bc720 > - > - Bytes b4 ffff8800693bc548: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ > - Object ffff8800693bc558: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk > - Object ffff8800693bc568: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk > - Object ffff8800693bc578: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk > - Object ffff8800693bc588: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk > - Object ffff8800693bc598: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk > - Object ffff8800693bc5a8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk > - Object ffff8800693bc5b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk > - Object ffff8800693bc5c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. > - Redzone ffff8800693bc5d8: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ > - Padding ffff8800693bc718: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ > - CPU: 0 PID: 1689 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B 3.18.0-rc1-mm1+ #98 > - Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 > - ffff8800693bc000 0000000000000000 ffff8800693bc558 ffff88006923bb78 > - ffffffff81cc68ae 00000000000000f3 ffff88006d407600 ffff88006923bba8 > - ffffffff811fd848 ffff88006d407600 ffffea0001a4ef00 ffff8800693bc558 > + BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan] > + Write of size 1 at addr ffff8800696f3d3b by task insmod/2734 > + > + CPU: 0 PID: 2734 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.15.0+ #98 > + Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 > Call Trace: > - [] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 > - [] print_trailer+0xf8/0x160 > - [] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan] > - [] object_err+0x35/0x40 > - [] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan] > - [] kasan_report_error+0x38a/0x3f0 > - [] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40 > - [] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x14/0x40 > - [] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40 > - [] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan] > - [] __asan_store1+0x75/0xb0 > - [] ? kmem_cache_oob+0x1d/0xc3 [test_kasan] > - [] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan] > - [] kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan] > - [] init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan] > - [] do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200 > - [] ? __vunmap+0xec/0x160 > - [] load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20 > - [] ? m_show+0x240/0x240 > - [] SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80 > - [] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 > + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 > + dump_stack+0x83/0xbc lib/dump_stack.c:53 > + print_address_description+0x73/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:254 > + kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 > + kasan_report+0x10e/0x220 mm/kasan/report.c:410 > + __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:505 > + kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan] lib/test_kasan.c:42 > + kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x769 [test_kasan] > + do_one_initcall+0x9e/0x240 init/main.c:832 > + do_init_module+0x1b6/0x542 kernel/module.c:3462 > + load_module+0x6042/0x9030 kernel/module.c:3786 > + SYSC_init_module+0x18f/0x1c0 kernel/module.c:3858 > + SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10 kernel/module.c:3841 > + do_syscall_64+0x198/0x480 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 > + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:251 > + RIP: 0033:0x7fdd79df99da > + RSP: 002b:00007fff2229bdf8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af > + RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c408121190 RCX: 00007fdd79df99da > + RDX: 00007fdd7a0b8f88 RSI: 0000000000055670 RDI: 00007fdd7a47e000 > + RBP: 000055c4081200b0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 > + R10: 00007fdd79df5d0a R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fdd7a0b8f88 > + R13: 000055c408120090 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 > + > + Allocated by task 2734: > + save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:176 > + set_track+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:188 > + kasan_kmalloc+0x9a/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:372 > + kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xcd/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:2761 > + kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:512 > + kmalloc_oob_right+0x56/0xbc [test_kasan] lib/test_kasan.c:36 > + kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x769 [test_kasan] > + do_one_initcall+0x9e/0x240 init/main.c:832 > + do_init_module+0x1b6/0x542 kernel/module.c:3462 > + load_module+0x6042/0x9030 kernel/module.c:3786 > + SYSC_init_module+0x18f/0x1c0 kernel/module.c:3858 > + SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10 kernel/module.c:3841 > + do_syscall_64+0x198/0x480 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 > + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:251 > + > + The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800696f3cc0 > + which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 > + The buggy address is located 123 bytes inside of > + 128-byte region [ffff8800696f3cc0, ffff8800696f3d40) > + The buggy address belongs to the page: > + page:ffffea0001a5bcc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 > + flags: 0x100000000000100(slab) > + raw: 0100000000000100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180150015 > + raw: ffffea0001a8ce40 0000000300000003 ffff88006d001640 0000000000000000 > + page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > + > Memory state around the buggy address: > - ffff8800693bc300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > - ffff8800693bc380: fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc > - ffff8800693bc400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > - ffff8800693bc480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > - ffff8800693bc500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 > - >ffff8800693bc580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 fc fc fc fc fc > - ^ > - ffff8800693bc600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > - ffff8800693bc680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > - ffff8800693bc700: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > - ffff8800693bc780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > - ffff8800693bc800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > + ffff8800696f3c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc > + ffff8800696f3c80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 > + >ffff8800696f3d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > + ^ > + ffff8800696f3d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc > + ffff8800696f3e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ================================================================== > > -The header of the report discribe what kind of bug happened and what kind of > -access caused it. It's followed by the description of the accessed slub object > -(see 'SLUB Debug output' section in Documentation/vm/slub.txt for details) and > -the description of the accessed memory page. > +The header of the report provides a short summary of what kind of bug happened > +and what kind of access caused it. It's followed by a stack trace of the bad > +access, a stack trace of where the accessed memory was allocated (in case bad > +access happens on a slab object), and a stack trace of where the object was > +freed (in case of a use-after-free bug report). Next comes a description of > +the accessed slab object and information about the accessed memory page. > > In the last section the report shows memory state around the accessed address. > Reading this part requires some understanding of how KASAN works. > @@ -138,18 +143,24 @@ inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). > In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that > the accessed address is partially accessible. > > +For KHWASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed > +address (see Implementation details section). > + > > Implementation details > ---------------------- > > +Classic KASAN > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > + > From a high level, our approach to memory error detection is similar to that > of kmemcheck: use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe > -to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to check shadow memory on each > -memory access. > +to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to insert checks of shadow > +memory on each memory access. > > -AddressSanitizer dedicates 1/8 of kernel memory to its shadow memory > -(e.g. 16TB to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and > -offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. > +Classic KASAN dedicates 1/8th of kernel memory to its shadow memory (e.g. 16TB > +to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to > +translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. > > Here is the function which translates an address to its corresponding shadow > address:: > @@ -162,12 +173,34 @@ address:: > > where ``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3``. > > -Compile-time instrumentation used for checking memory accesses. Compiler inserts > -function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory > -access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory access is > -valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. > +Compile-time instrumentation is used to insert memory accesses checks. Compiler > +inserts function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each > +memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory > +access is valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. > > GCC 5.0 has possibility to perform inline instrumentation. Instead of making > function calls GCC directly inserts the code to check the shadow memory. > This option significantly enlarges kernel but it gives x1.1-x2 performance > boost over outline instrumented kernel. > + > +KHWASAN > +~~~~~~~ > + > +KHWASAN uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature of modern arm64 CPUs to store > +a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. KHWASAN also uses shadow > +memory to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory cell (therefore > +it dedicates 1/16th of the kernel memory for shadow memory). > + > +On each memory allocation KHWASAN generates a random tag, tags allocated memory > +with this tag, and embeds this tag into the returned pointer. KHWASAN uses > +compile-time instrumentation to insert checks before each memory access. These > +checks make sure that tag of the memory that is being accessed is equal to tag > +ofthe pointer that is used to access this memory. In case of a tag mismatch of the > +KHWASAN prints a bug report. > + > +KHWASAN also has two instrumentation modes (outline, that emits callbacks to > +check memory accesses; and inline, that performs the shadow memory checks > +inline). With outline instrumentation mode, a bug report is simply printed > +from the function that performs the access check. With inline instrumentation > +a brk instruction is emitted by the compiler, and a dedicated brk handler is > +used to print KHWASAN reports. > -- > 2.17.0.441.gb46fe60e1d-goog > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.