From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
francis.deslauriers@efficios.com,
Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] uprobes: x86: Reject probing MOV SS
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 07:25:59 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180510072559.21cf860390f62bfc195ae959@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVNFAB-zJxhs3t+CxOdftssmWjMaS_bYuQDR+NcBGPRfg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, 09 May 2018 14:36:27 +0000
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 5:58 AM Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> > Hi,
>
> > I found the CVE-2018-1087 and CVE-2018-8897 should
> > be related to kprobes and uprobes too, since both
> > are using #DB for single stepping.
>
>
> Seems okay to me. I doubt we have a security problem, but I can easily
> imagine that the probes wouldn't work right.
Sorry for confusion, yes, that will not be a security issue, since kprobes
and uprobes can be used only by root user.
Thank you,
--
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-09 22:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-09 12:57 [PATCH 0/2] uprobes: x86: Reject probing MOV SS Masami Hiramatsu
2018-05-09 12:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] kprobes: x86: Prohibit probing on exception masking instructions Masami Hiramatsu
2018-05-13 17:57 ` [tip:x86/urgent] kprobes/x86: " tip-bot for Masami Hiramatsu
2018-05-09 12:58 ` [PATCH 2/2] uprobes: x86: Prohibit probing on MOV SS instruction Masami Hiramatsu
2018-05-09 16:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-05-13 17:58 ` [tip:x86/urgent] uprobes/x86: " tip-bot for Masami Hiramatsu
2018-05-09 13:01 ` [PATCH 0/2] uprobes: kprobes: x86: Reject probing MOV SS/POP SS Masami Hiramatsu
2018-05-09 14:36 ` [PATCH 0/2] uprobes: x86: Reject probing MOV SS Andy Lutomirski
2018-05-09 22:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
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