From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 169ADECDFBB for ; Wed, 18 Jul 2018 21:10:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA1B32075A for ; Wed, 18 Jul 2018 21:10:31 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org BA1B32075A Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730659AbeGRVuL (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Jul 2018 17:50:11 -0400 Received: from mail-qt0-f193.google.com ([209.85.216.193]:35688 "EHLO mail-qt0-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730451AbeGRVuL (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Jul 2018 17:50:11 -0400 Received: by mail-qt0-f193.google.com with SMTP id a5-v6so5399028qtp.2 for ; Wed, 18 Jul 2018 14:10:28 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=JYOf584Ydg8gijpMp6qHyZQQNvlyScAA4CitiUdr5Zo=; b=Dp+2Cumq9vo96QMge3iGeUCJjBD3LNsDw5ZD1CtNJEMMjKN84V+PemcpdELy/lbAqd 4yh8oMMoWm1H3ioLkqr8BYttK6A0GHoLQZOh18oUS3j6P6TUxl6gibBmUAipzIloDQ9w pnlURN3Y024U6ccxNaFgabLLjwFYQ/SYTDOW8PIwObxm/EQIofb5OrngLQnuLsiKPOX1 EpLErUHMxnM4t/IelZRyYSOc6/oMQMH6rg7XXA/+ov2LUghROvyBOJyWxRYNqx7oQdRB eBFCDVxud2xvZa21vdpEXx8HrpRmwUmocBjmFt7N470015clPuUsXw6XpIY3vG0/2s4F 1Nig== X-Gm-Message-State: AOUpUlHDbCjRNfl+a1j8BZUaMpU7BYABu5dlUKzBw7sf0qIbl/XLw0ca bfJ/kjYbqZ086rhsBVuJqteMuQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpf/xAuzyFz6H0tuX4cNMeoZhOEuFZ0ESMy9azzLtFVumP/bsWIcoyyw+wQgKXpUepXhZPvJuw== X-Received: by 2002:aed:3534:: with SMTP id a49-v6mr6960492qte.244.1531948227972; Wed, 18 Jul 2018 14:10:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from labbott-redhat.redhat.com ([2601:602:9802:a8dc:4eb2:6dae:ab32:e5b0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id k3-v6sm4143463qta.37.2018.07.18.14.10.25 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 18 Jul 2018 14:10:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Laura Abbott To: Alexander Popov , Kees Cook , Mark Rutland , Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Laura Abbott , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 14:10:13 -0700 Message-Id: <20180718211013.14512-3-labbott@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20180718211013.14512-1-labbott@redhat.com> References: <20180718211013.14512-1-labbott@redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott --- Since last time: Minor style cleanups. Re-wrote check_alloca to correctly handle all stack types. While doing that, I also realized current_top_of_stack was incorrect so I fixed that as well. --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 7 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile | 3 ++- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 ++- include/linux/stackleak.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 42c090cf0292..216d36a49ab5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index a73ae1e49200..4f3062ee22c6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -266,5 +266,22 @@ extern void __init minsigstksz_setup(void); #define SVE_SET_VL(arg) sve_set_current_vl(arg) #define SVE_GET_VL() sve_get_current_vl() +/* + * For CONFIG_STACKLEAK + * + * These need to be macros because otherwise we get stuck in a nightmare + * of header definitions for the use of task_stack_page. + */ + +#define current_top_of_stack() \ +({ \ + unsigned long _low = 0; \ + unsigned long _high = 0; \ + \ + current_stack_type(current, current_stack_pointer, &_low, &_high); \ + _high; \ +}) +#define on_thread_stack() (on_task_stack(current, current_stack_pointer, NULL, NULL)) + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_PROCESSOR_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 28ad8799406f..67d12016063d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -431,6 +431,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info .text + .macro stackleak_erase +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + bl stackleak_erase +#endif + .endm /* * Exception vectors. */ @@ -910,6 +915,7 @@ ret_fast_syscall: and x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK cbnz x2, work_pending enable_step_tsk x1, x2 + stackleak_erase kernel_exit 0 ret_fast_syscall_trace: enable_daif @@ -936,6 +942,7 @@ ret_to_user: cbnz x2, work_pending finish_ret_to_user: enable_step_tsk x1, x2 + stackleak_erase kernel_exit 0 ENDPROC(ret_to_user) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index e10bc363f533..904defa36689 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -493,3 +493,35 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) { current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +void __used stackleak_check_alloca(unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long stack_left; + enum stack_type type; + unsigned long current_sp = current_stack_pointer; + unsigned long low, high; + + type = current_stack_type(current, current_sp, &low, &high); + BUG_ON(type == STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN); + + stack_left = current_sp - low; + + if (size >= stack_left) { + /* + * Kernel stack depth overflow is detected, let's report that. + * If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, we can safely use BUG(). + * If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is disabled, BUG() handling can corrupt + * the neighbour memory. CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK calls + * panic() in a similar situation, so let's do the same if that + * option is on. Otherwise just use BUG() and hope for the best. + */ +#if !defined(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK) && defined(CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK) + panic("alloca() over the kernel stack boundary\n"); +#else + BUG(); +#endif + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_check_alloca); +#endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile index 4313f7475333..2fabc2dc1966 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile @@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ # Makefile for Kernel-based Virtual Machine module, HYP part # -ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING +ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) KVM=../../../../virt/kvm diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ -D__NO_FORTIFY \ $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \ - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \ + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) GCOV_PROFILE := n KASAN_SANITIZE := n diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h index b911b973d328..08420ec6b7c3 100644 --- a/include/linux/stackleak.h +++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include +#include /* * Check that the poison value points to the unused hole in the * virtual memory map for your platform. -- 2.17.1 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: labbott@redhat.com (Laura Abbott) Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 14:10:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack In-Reply-To: <20180718211013.14512-1-labbott@redhat.com> References: <20180718211013.14512-1-labbott@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20180718211013.14512-3-labbott@redhat.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott --- Since last time: Minor style cleanups. Re-wrote check_alloca to correctly handle all stack types. While doing that, I also realized current_top_of_stack was incorrect so I fixed that as well. --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 7 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile | 3 ++- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 ++- include/linux/stackleak.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 42c090cf0292..216d36a49ab5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index a73ae1e49200..4f3062ee22c6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -266,5 +266,22 @@ extern void __init minsigstksz_setup(void); #define SVE_SET_VL(arg) sve_set_current_vl(arg) #define SVE_GET_VL() sve_get_current_vl() +/* + * For CONFIG_STACKLEAK + * + * These need to be macros because otherwise we get stuck in a nightmare + * of header definitions for the use of task_stack_page. + */ + +#define current_top_of_stack() \ +({ \ + unsigned long _low = 0; \ + unsigned long _high = 0; \ + \ + current_stack_type(current, current_stack_pointer, &_low, &_high); \ + _high; \ +}) +#define on_thread_stack() (on_task_stack(current, current_stack_pointer, NULL, NULL)) + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_PROCESSOR_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 28ad8799406f..67d12016063d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -431,6 +431,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info .text + .macro stackleak_erase +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + bl stackleak_erase +#endif + .endm /* * Exception vectors. */ @@ -910,6 +915,7 @@ ret_fast_syscall: and x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK cbnz x2, work_pending enable_step_tsk x1, x2 + stackleak_erase kernel_exit 0 ret_fast_syscall_trace: enable_daif @@ -936,6 +942,7 @@ ret_to_user: cbnz x2, work_pending finish_ret_to_user: enable_step_tsk x1, x2 + stackleak_erase kernel_exit 0 ENDPROC(ret_to_user) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index e10bc363f533..904defa36689 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -493,3 +493,35 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) { current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +void __used stackleak_check_alloca(unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long stack_left; + enum stack_type type; + unsigned long current_sp = current_stack_pointer; + unsigned long low, high; + + type = current_stack_type(current, current_sp, &low, &high); + BUG_ON(type == STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN); + + stack_left = current_sp - low; + + if (size >= stack_left) { + /* + * Kernel stack depth overflow is detected, let's report that. + * If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, we can safely use BUG(). + * If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is disabled, BUG() handling can corrupt + * the neighbour memory. CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK calls + * panic() in a similar situation, so let's do the same if that + * option is on. Otherwise just use BUG() and hope for the best. + */ +#if !defined(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK) && defined(CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK) + panic("alloca() over the kernel stack boundary\n"); +#else + BUG(); +#endif + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_check_alloca); +#endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile index 4313f7475333..2fabc2dc1966 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile @@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ # Makefile for Kernel-based Virtual Machine module, HYP part # -ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING +ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) KVM=../../../../virt/kvm diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ -D__NO_FORTIFY \ $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \ - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \ + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) GCOV_PROFILE := n KASAN_SANITIZE := n diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h index b911b973d328..08420ec6b7c3 100644 --- a/include/linux/stackleak.h +++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include +#include /* * Check that the poison value points to the unused hole in the * virtual memory map for your platform. -- 2.17.1