From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF539C28CF6 for ; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 08:01:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B86F20841 for ; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 08:01:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linaro.org header.i=@linaro.org header.b="NwmscwYW" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 5B86F20841 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linaro.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388517AbeHAJp1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Aug 2018 05:45:27 -0400 Received: from mail-pl0-f65.google.com ([209.85.160.65]:33673 "EHLO mail-pl0-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387665AbeHAJp1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Aug 2018 05:45:27 -0400 Received: by mail-pl0-f65.google.com with SMTP id 6-v6so8408247plb.0 for ; Wed, 01 Aug 2018 01:01:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=KyUS6TzJ7Jh2ZgQG+yZL9wQAPjkM+l82AYNmWJn5tsA=; b=NwmscwYWhqZON8CZseKhpgwawplUbNJN7/b2gDIO+S3brOWLLrCVuT0HsDWjOI5tAf i/izdBfGKLCi7iukZUaomqzIUFXKMYv9aNs+WSxYU3bvXXU8fxmyb1YXeafnCHhd8oFw StriFjJ5JMjSHdVXfWvZ79jYjFP4OXFHYXgB8= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=KyUS6TzJ7Jh2ZgQG+yZL9wQAPjkM+l82AYNmWJn5tsA=; b=YWaN4D64E506aweLbUDxlnmfGH51sOof7UBdrUJLZ3hPZ+FPiW9VlcUW7nzBpS/iEZ JX2QOQ3WMNFUttuKBpu1lRLFCCsC1OX5S9PFTjv+mZiZAJV8/3cwl7JrkV1RSZca5+2K g/KSNk1WeLbTJcwRprMrKPPD2TEz14TMP/TXguKeBmAD+W0ilAeDnlJxzlU9XKr7WdDU AUxbDo3pvMmexRJUnrumhqXxAlNOliD4oUVhIsaQKewfbPyfJ4H8yggumiE7y/q141QH q1GiytA2V5O2gL+3EWfmemR/JzesHcd8lUukOl6iAemCE+Sd53YglqRZ4FA26nhzL0Sj g3JA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOUpUlEee5kEC1fZrEKZCiX+vmQjTqbAqZNN8YxWqsF016Khf2KS8YQr vc8jdad9FXrba95c7MZ4INv1BQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpf2ju1RI4PpxT/qDFHLf+d/1AsAffsW46/HN6hBAHfVD6jPpBKGAI9XmbeFoMY+HC8cMCa/bA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:b08d:: with SMTP id p13-v6mr24237716plr.0.1533110460349; Wed, 01 Aug 2018 01:01:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from linaro.org ([121.95.100.191]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id w16-v6sm40801764pfi.101.2018.08.01.01.00.59 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 01 Aug 2018 01:00:59 -0700 (PDT) From: AKASHI Takahiro To: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, dyoung@redhat.com, bhe@redhat.com, arnd@arndb.de, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: prudo@linux.ibm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, james.morse@arm.com, bhsharma@redhat.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, AKASHI Takahiro Subject: [PATCH v13 11/16] arm64: kexec_file: allow for loading Image-format kernel Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:58:15 +0900 Message-Id: <20180801075820.3753-12-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.18.0 In-Reply-To: <20180801075820.3753-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> References: <20180801075820.3753-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch provides kexec_file_ops for "Image"-format kernel. In this implementation, a binary is always loaded with a fixed offset identified in text_offset field of its header. Regarding signature verification for trusted boot, this patch doesn't contains CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG support, which is to be added later in this series, but file-attribute-based verification is still a viable option by enabling IMA security subsystem. You can sign(label) a to-be-kexec'ed kernel image on target file system with: $ evmctl ima_sign --key /path/to/private_key.pem Image On live system, you must have IMA enforced with, at least, the following security policy: "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" See more details about IMA here: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/ Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: James Morse --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h | 28 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h index 157b2897d911..5e673481b3a3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -101,6 +101,34 @@ struct kimage_arch { unsigned long dtb_mem; }; +/** + * struct arm64_image_header - arm64 kernel image header + * See Documentation/arm64/booting.txt for details + * + * @mz_magic: DOS header magic number ('MZ', optional) + * @code1: Instruction (branch to stext) + * @text_offset: Image load offset + * @image_size: Effective image size + * @flags: Bit-field flags + * @reserved: Reserved + * @magic: Magic number + * @pe_header: Offset to PE COFF header (optional) + **/ + +struct arm64_image_header { + __le16 mz_magic; /* also code0 */ + __le16 pad; + __le32 code1; + __le64 text_offset; + __le64 image_size; + __le64 flags; + __le64 reserved[3]; + __le32 magic; + __le32 pe_header; +}; + +extern const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops; + struct kimage; extern int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index 8f1326b2d327..8cd514855eec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION) += hibernate.o hibernate-asm.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE) += machine_kexec.o relocate_kernel.o \ cpu-reset.o -arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test.o arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d64f5e9f9d22 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Kexec image loader + + * Copyright (C) 2018 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec_file(Image): " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int image_probe(const char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len) +{ + const struct arm64_image_header *h; + + h = (const struct arm64_image_header *)(kernel_buf); + + if (!h || (kernel_len < sizeof(*h)) || + memcmp(&h->magic, ARM64_MAGIC, sizeof(h->magic))) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static void *image_load(struct kimage *image, + char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len, + char *initrd, unsigned long initrd_len, + char *cmdline, unsigned long cmdline_len) +{ + struct arm64_image_header *h; + u64 flags, value; + struct kexec_buf kbuf; + unsigned long text_offset; + struct kexec_segment *kernel_segment; + int ret; + + /* Don't support old kernel */ + h = (struct arm64_image_header *)kernel; + if (!h->text_offset) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Check cpu features */ + flags = le64_to_cpu(h->flags); + value = head_flag_field(flags, HEAD_FLAG_BE); + if (((value == HEAD_FLAG_BE) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)) || + ((value != HEAD_FLAG_BE) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN))) + if (!system_supports_mixed_endian()) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + value = head_flag_field(flags, HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE); + if (((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_4K) && + !system_supports_4kb_granule()) || + ((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_64K) && + !system_supports_64kb_granule()) || + ((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_16K) && + !system_supports_16kb_granule())) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Load the kernel */ + kbuf.image = image; + kbuf.buf_min = 0; + kbuf.buf_max = ULONG_MAX; + kbuf.top_down = false; + + kbuf.buffer = kernel; + kbuf.bufsz = kernel_len; + kbuf.mem = 0; + kbuf.memsz = le64_to_cpu(h->image_size); + text_offset = le64_to_cpu(h->text_offset); + kbuf.buf_align = MIN_KIMG_ALIGN; + + /* Adjust kernel segment with TEXT_OFFSET */ + kbuf.memsz += text_offset; + + ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + kernel_segment = &image->segment[image->nr_segments - 1]; + kernel_segment->mem += text_offset; + kernel_segment->memsz -= text_offset; + image->start = kernel_segment->mem; + + pr_debug("Loaded kernel at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n", + kernel_segment->mem, kbuf.bufsz, + kernel_segment->memsz); + + /* Load additional data */ + ret = load_other_segments(image, + kernel_segment->mem, kernel_segment->memsz, + initrd, initrd_len, cmdline, cmdline_len); + + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = { + .probe = image_probe, + .load = image_load, +}; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index f53f14bd1700..05fb2d4e6fef 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #define FDT_PSTR_BOOTARGS "bootargs" const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { + &kexec_image_ops, NULL }; -- 2.18.0 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org (AKASHI Takahiro) Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:58:15 +0900 Subject: [PATCH v13 11/16] arm64: kexec_file: allow for loading Image-format kernel In-Reply-To: <20180801075820.3753-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> References: <20180801075820.3753-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Message-ID: <20180801075820.3753-12-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org This patch provides kexec_file_ops for "Image"-format kernel. In this implementation, a binary is always loaded with a fixed offset identified in text_offset field of its header. Regarding signature verification for trusted boot, this patch doesn't contains CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG support, which is to be added later in this series, but file-attribute-based verification is still a viable option by enabling IMA security subsystem. You can sign(label) a to-be-kexec'ed kernel image on target file system with: $ evmctl ima_sign --key /path/to/private_key.pem Image On live system, you must have IMA enforced with, at least, the following security policy: "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" See more details about IMA here: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/ Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: James Morse --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h | 28 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h index 157b2897d911..5e673481b3a3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -101,6 +101,34 @@ struct kimage_arch { unsigned long dtb_mem; }; +/** + * struct arm64_image_header - arm64 kernel image header + * See Documentation/arm64/booting.txt for details + * + * @mz_magic: DOS header magic number ('MZ', optional) + * @code1: Instruction (branch to stext) + * @text_offset: Image load offset + * @image_size: Effective image size + * @flags: Bit-field flags + * @reserved: Reserved + * @magic: Magic number + * @pe_header: Offset to PE COFF header (optional) + **/ + +struct arm64_image_header { + __le16 mz_magic; /* also code0 */ + __le16 pad; + __le32 code1; + __le64 text_offset; + __le64 image_size; + __le64 flags; + __le64 reserved[3]; + __le32 magic; + __le32 pe_header; +}; + +extern const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops; + struct kimage; extern int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index 8f1326b2d327..8cd514855eec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION) += hibernate.o hibernate-asm.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE) += machine_kexec.o relocate_kernel.o \ cpu-reset.o -arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test.o arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d64f5e9f9d22 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Kexec image loader + + * Copyright (C) 2018 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec_file(Image): " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int image_probe(const char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len) +{ + const struct arm64_image_header *h; + + h = (const struct arm64_image_header *)(kernel_buf); + + if (!h || (kernel_len < sizeof(*h)) || + memcmp(&h->magic, ARM64_MAGIC, sizeof(h->magic))) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static void *image_load(struct kimage *image, + char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len, + char *initrd, unsigned long initrd_len, + char *cmdline, unsigned long cmdline_len) +{ + struct arm64_image_header *h; + u64 flags, value; + struct kexec_buf kbuf; + unsigned long text_offset; + struct kexec_segment *kernel_segment; + int ret; + + /* Don't support old kernel */ + h = (struct arm64_image_header *)kernel; + if (!h->text_offset) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Check cpu features */ + flags = le64_to_cpu(h->flags); + value = head_flag_field(flags, HEAD_FLAG_BE); + if (((value == HEAD_FLAG_BE) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)) || + ((value != HEAD_FLAG_BE) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN))) + if (!system_supports_mixed_endian()) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + value = head_flag_field(flags, HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE); + if (((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_4K) && + !system_supports_4kb_granule()) || + ((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_64K) && + !system_supports_64kb_granule()) || + ((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_16K) && + !system_supports_16kb_granule())) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Load the kernel */ + kbuf.image = image; + kbuf.buf_min = 0; + kbuf.buf_max = ULONG_MAX; + kbuf.top_down = false; + + kbuf.buffer = kernel; + kbuf.bufsz = kernel_len; + kbuf.mem = 0; + kbuf.memsz = le64_to_cpu(h->image_size); + text_offset = le64_to_cpu(h->text_offset); + kbuf.buf_align = MIN_KIMG_ALIGN; + + /* Adjust kernel segment with TEXT_OFFSET */ + kbuf.memsz += text_offset; + + ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + kernel_segment = &image->segment[image->nr_segments - 1]; + kernel_segment->mem += text_offset; + kernel_segment->memsz -= text_offset; + image->start = kernel_segment->mem; + + pr_debug("Loaded kernel at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n", + kernel_segment->mem, kbuf.bufsz, + kernel_segment->memsz); + + /* Load additional data */ + ret = load_other_segments(image, + kernel_segment->mem, kernel_segment->memsz, + initrd, initrd_len, cmdline, cmdline_len); + + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = { + .probe = image_probe, + .load = image_load, +}; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index f53f14bd1700..05fb2d4e6fef 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #define FDT_PSTR_BOOTARGS "bootargs" const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { + &kexec_image_ops, NULL }; -- 2.18.0 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mail-pl0-x244.google.com ([2607:f8b0:400e:c01::244]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.90_1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1fkm4F-00056V-9V for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Wed, 01 Aug 2018 08:01:16 +0000 Received: by mail-pl0-x244.google.com with SMTP id e11-v6so8411251plb.3 for ; Wed, 01 Aug 2018 01:01:01 -0700 (PDT) From: AKASHI Takahiro Subject: [PATCH v13 11/16] arm64: kexec_file: allow for loading Image-format kernel Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:58:15 +0900 Message-Id: <20180801075820.3753-12-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> In-Reply-To: <20180801075820.3753-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> References: <20180801075820.3753-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, dyoung@redhat.com, bhe@redhat.com, arnd@arndb.de, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, bhsharma@redhat.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, prudo@linux.ibm.com, AKASHI Takahiro , james.morse@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org This patch provides kexec_file_ops for "Image"-format kernel. In this implementation, a binary is always loaded with a fixed offset identified in text_offset field of its header. Regarding signature verification for trusted boot, this patch doesn't contains CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG support, which is to be added later in this series, but file-attribute-based verification is still a viable option by enabling IMA security subsystem. You can sign(label) a to-be-kexec'ed kernel image on target file system with: $ evmctl ima_sign --key /path/to/private_key.pem Image On live system, you must have IMA enforced with, at least, the following security policy: "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" See more details about IMA here: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/ Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: James Morse --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h | 28 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h index 157b2897d911..5e673481b3a3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -101,6 +101,34 @@ struct kimage_arch { unsigned long dtb_mem; }; +/** + * struct arm64_image_header - arm64 kernel image header + * See Documentation/arm64/booting.txt for details + * + * @mz_magic: DOS header magic number ('MZ', optional) + * @code1: Instruction (branch to stext) + * @text_offset: Image load offset + * @image_size: Effective image size + * @flags: Bit-field flags + * @reserved: Reserved + * @magic: Magic number + * @pe_header: Offset to PE COFF header (optional) + **/ + +struct arm64_image_header { + __le16 mz_magic; /* also code0 */ + __le16 pad; + __le32 code1; + __le64 text_offset; + __le64 image_size; + __le64 flags; + __le64 reserved[3]; + __le32 magic; + __le32 pe_header; +}; + +extern const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops; + struct kimage; extern int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index 8f1326b2d327..8cd514855eec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION) += hibernate.o hibernate-asm.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE) += machine_kexec.o relocate_kernel.o \ cpu-reset.o -arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test.o arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d64f5e9f9d22 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Kexec image loader + + * Copyright (C) 2018 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec_file(Image): " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int image_probe(const char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len) +{ + const struct arm64_image_header *h; + + h = (const struct arm64_image_header *)(kernel_buf); + + if (!h || (kernel_len < sizeof(*h)) || + memcmp(&h->magic, ARM64_MAGIC, sizeof(h->magic))) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static void *image_load(struct kimage *image, + char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len, + char *initrd, unsigned long initrd_len, + char *cmdline, unsigned long cmdline_len) +{ + struct arm64_image_header *h; + u64 flags, value; + struct kexec_buf kbuf; + unsigned long text_offset; + struct kexec_segment *kernel_segment; + int ret; + + /* Don't support old kernel */ + h = (struct arm64_image_header *)kernel; + if (!h->text_offset) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Check cpu features */ + flags = le64_to_cpu(h->flags); + value = head_flag_field(flags, HEAD_FLAG_BE); + if (((value == HEAD_FLAG_BE) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)) || + ((value != HEAD_FLAG_BE) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN))) + if (!system_supports_mixed_endian()) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + value = head_flag_field(flags, HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE); + if (((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_4K) && + !system_supports_4kb_granule()) || + ((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_64K) && + !system_supports_64kb_granule()) || + ((value == HEAD_FLAG_PAGE_SIZE_16K) && + !system_supports_16kb_granule())) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Load the kernel */ + kbuf.image = image; + kbuf.buf_min = 0; + kbuf.buf_max = ULONG_MAX; + kbuf.top_down = false; + + kbuf.buffer = kernel; + kbuf.bufsz = kernel_len; + kbuf.mem = 0; + kbuf.memsz = le64_to_cpu(h->image_size); + text_offset = le64_to_cpu(h->text_offset); + kbuf.buf_align = MIN_KIMG_ALIGN; + + /* Adjust kernel segment with TEXT_OFFSET */ + kbuf.memsz += text_offset; + + ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + kernel_segment = &image->segment[image->nr_segments - 1]; + kernel_segment->mem += text_offset; + kernel_segment->memsz -= text_offset; + image->start = kernel_segment->mem; + + pr_debug("Loaded kernel at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n", + kernel_segment->mem, kbuf.bufsz, + kernel_segment->memsz); + + /* Load additional data */ + ret = load_other_segments(image, + kernel_segment->mem, kernel_segment->memsz, + initrd, initrd_len, cmdline, cmdline_len); + + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = { + .probe = image_probe, + .load = image_load, +}; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index f53f14bd1700..05fb2d4e6fef 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #define FDT_PSTR_BOOTARGS "bootargs" const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { + &kexec_image_ops, NULL }; -- 2.18.0 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec