From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97075FC6182 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5910B20861 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:20 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 5910B20861 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728245AbeINNQe (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:34 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:50920 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727881AbeINNQe (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:34 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098416.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8E7xCNR059279 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:16 -0400 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mg5u7y3pf-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:16 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:03:10 +0100 Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.60]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8E8399U62324896 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:09 GMT Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id ECD0B42052; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:59 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81F854204C; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:58 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.124.31.41]) by d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:58 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v2 5/6] ima: add support for external setting of ima_appraise Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:04 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091408-0020-0000-0000-000002C630D7 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091408-0021-0000-0000-000021139125 Message-Id: <20180914080005.6138-6-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-14_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809140085 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The "ima_appraise" mode defaults to enforcing, unless configured to allow the boot command line "ima_appraise" option. This patch explicitly sets the "ima_appraise" mode for the arch specific policy setting. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 588e4813370c..6e5fa7c42809 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +void set_ima_appraise(char *str); #else static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, @@ -290,6 +291,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +static inline void set_ima_appraise(char *str) +{ +} + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8bd7a0733e51..e061613bcb87 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -18,15 +18,22 @@ #include "ima.h" -static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) +void set_ima_appraise(char *str) { -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = 0; else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG; else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX; + else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0) + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; +} + +static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM + set_ima_appraise(str); #endif return 1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 23f3aa214016..c574841bcc9a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -585,9 +585,12 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(); if (!arch_entries) pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); - else + else { add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); + if (temp_ima_appraise) + set_ima_appraise("enforce"); + } /* * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file -- 2.13.6 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Nayna Jain) Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:04 +0530 Subject: [PATCH v2 5/6] ima: add support for external setting of ima_appraise In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-ID: <20180914080005.6138-6-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org The "ima_appraise" mode defaults to enforcing, unless configured to allow the boot command line "ima_appraise" option. This patch explicitly sets the "ima_appraise" mode for the arch specific policy setting. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 588e4813370c..6e5fa7c42809 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +void set_ima_appraise(char *str); #else static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, @@ -290,6 +291,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +static inline void set_ima_appraise(char *str) +{ +} + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8bd7a0733e51..e061613bcb87 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -18,15 +18,22 @@ #include "ima.h" -static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) +void set_ima_appraise(char *str) { -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = 0; else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG; else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX; + else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0) + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; +} + +static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM + set_ima_appraise(str); #endif return 1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 23f3aa214016..c574841bcc9a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -585,9 +585,12 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(); if (!arch_entries) pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); - else + else { add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); + if (temp_ima_appraise) + set_ima_appraise("enforce"); + } /* * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file -- 2.13.6